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ABSTRACT
Polycentric Information Commons: A Theory Development and Empirical Investigation
BY
VITALI MINDEL
11/26/2018

Committee Chair:

Lars Mathiassen & Arun Rai

Major Academic Unit:

Center for Process Innovation & Computer Information Systems

Decentralized systems online—such as open source software (OSS) development, online
communities, wikis, and social media—often experience decline in participation which threatens
their long-terms sustainability. Building on a rich body of research on the sustainability of physical
resource systems, this dissertation presents a novel theoretical framing that addresses the
sustainability issues arising in decentralized systems online and which are amplified because of
their open nature. The first essay develops the theory of polycentric information commons (PIC)
which conceptualizes decentralized systems online as “information commons”. The theory defines
information commons, the stakeholders that participate in them, the sustainability indicators of
information commons and the collective-action threats putting pressure on their long-term
sustainability. Drawing on Ostrom’s factors associated with stable common pool resource systems,
PIC theory specifies four polycentric governance practices that can help information commons
reduce the magnitude and impact of collective-action threats while improving the information
commons’ sustainability. The second essay further develops PIC theory by applying it in an
empirical context of “digital activism”. Specifically, it examines the role of polycentric governance
in reducing the threats to the legitimacy of digital activism—a type of information commons with
an overarching objective of instigating societal change. As such, it illustrates the applicability of
PIC theory in the study of digital activism. The third essay focuses on the threat of “information
pollution” and its impact on open collaboration, a type of information commons dedicated to the
creation of value through open participation online. It uncovers the way polycentric governance
mechanism help reduce the duration of pollution events. This essay contributes to PIC theory by
expanding it to the realm of operational governance in open collaboration.
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CHAPTER 1: DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
Decentralized systems online—such as open source software (OSS) development, online
communities, wikis, and social media—are highly accessible, dispersed and propelled by
voluntary participation that varies in its intensity and stability (von Krogh and Spaeth 2007). The
openness and decentralization of these systems has been shown to spur incredible outcomes
(Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006; Tapscott and Williams 2008). Software created by volunteers and
openly distributed online propels private and government organizations around the world and is
used by private individuals daily. Online communities and social media platforms connect people
and improve their well-being in countless ways, ranging from providing entertainment and
professional functionality to offering emotional support and information. Wikis provide content
on all sorts of topics, and are increasingly widely used as a source of information for lay people as
well as a wide range of professionals, including academics, healthcare professionals, journalists,
lawyers, and judges (Brokowski and Sheehan 2009; Brown 2011; Lim and Simon 2011; Miller
and Murray 2010; Peoples 2009). The impact that decentralized systems online have on our
everyday lives cannot be overstated; they impact how we spend our leisure time, connect, learn,
absorb news and cultural trends, shop and find other transaction opportunities, and much more.
In addition to affecting the everyday lives of anyone with an internet connection, the openness and
connectivity-potential of decentralized systems online has become a major catalyst for new
business models. Some of the most valued companies today started not so long ago as simple
platforms on which individuals from all walks of life were invited to freely participate. At first, in
the mid-90s, websites such as eBay and Craigslist invited individuals and small businesses to
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advertise all sorts of goods and services with little restrictions. At the same time, online dating was
born and Match.com invited individuals to advertise themselves to others to promote a different
type of transaction. In the early 2000s, the internet’s openness and connectivity gave rise to social
media websites such as Myspace and Facebook, where people can freely share personal
information, photos, and videos with anyone they choose to include in their virtual social circle.
Social media’s value proposition is similar to that of transaction-oriented websites such as eBay
and Craigslist and even Match; all are based on the notion of virtuous network effects (although
the revenue model has shifted from charging brokerage and platform usage fees to selling eyeballs
to advertisers). Half a decade later, the multisided platform business model progressed with the
advent of smartphone technologies that incorporate global positioning systems (GPS) to allow
people to coordinate transactions in real time. Multisided platform services driving the emerging
sharing economy is exemplified by Uber and Lyft, which—with few restrictions—allow people
with cars to offer rides for a fee to people needing a ride in real time. Similarly, Airbnb, also with
little restrictions, allows individuals with extra living space to offer it for a fee to those looking for
a place to stay. The idea of using decentralized online technologies to invite people to freely
transact with each other or simply exchange information proved to be business gold; as of Summer
2018, the companies mentioned above are estimated to be worth collectively more than half a
trillion dollars.1
The increase in the importance of decentralized systems online is well reflected in IS research,
which shifted its focus in the past decade from “traditional” business systems such as enterprise
resource planning (ERP) to the various “new” emerging systems online. In 2005, only three
research papers on decentralized systems online were published in the top two IS journals—

1

Yahoo Finance
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Management Information Systems Quarterly (MISQ) and Information Systems Research (ISR); 10
years later, in 2014, the same two journals published 26 research papers on the subject, reflecting
a steady trend (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1. Published Papers on Decentralized Systems Online
Year

MISQ

ISR

MISQ+ISR

2014

13

13

26

2013

5

17

22

2012

6

6

12

2011

4

4

8

2010

3

2

5

2009

3

0

3

2008

0

8

8

2007

3

2

5

2006

3

4

7

2005

2

1

3

Total

42

57

99

Although existing research has made some important theoretical contributions to the study of
decentralized systems online (Bateman et al. 2011; Butler et al. 2014; Howison et al. 2014; Kane
et al. 2012; Levina et al. 2014), most studies in this area are light on theory. To the extent that
researchers use theories, those theories are typically longstanding frameworks developed in other
social science fields. Borrowing established “outside” theories for framing research is a common
practice in the IS field. Still, the lack of new theories is problematic for two main reasons: (i) it
limits the cross-fertilization of insights, which contributes to (ii) theoretical stagnation in an
increasingly mature field. The shortage of new theories on decentralized systems online is
noticeable, and several prominent researchers have called for their development (Johnson et al.
2014; Majchrzak 2009; Singh et al. 2011; Von Krogh et al. 2012). New theories are needed to
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consolidate the many empirical insights generated shortly after the emergence of decentralized
systems online and to serve as a stepping stone for future research in the field.
In response to the identified need, this dissertation advances the theoretical understanding of
governance of decentralized systems online to help address the challenges that arise due to their
high degree of openness to participation (Table 1.2 summarizes the dissertation essays). The
dissertation presents a novel theoretical framework for examining the systems’ sustainability in
the face of degenerative threats. In addition, it exemplifies the theory’s versatility and applicability
by providing evidence from two distinct research contexts and research methods. The dissertation
then leverages the distinctive aspects of these contexts, coupled with different modes of inquiry,
to further advance theory regarding decentralized information systems online. The first empirical
research study—an explanatory case study—aims to contribute to the understanding of how
decentralized systems online may be harnessed for promoting institutional change. The second
empirical research—a quantitative study—aims to contribute to our understanding of how open
collaboration (OC) systems online resolve arising information pollution problems. The developed
theory, coupled with the two empirical investigations that build upon it, contribute to a better
understanding of governance of decentralized systems online.

15
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Table 1.2. Summary of Context, Theory, and Methods
Essay 1

Essay 3

Technological
Context

Online communities,
social media,
multisided platforms,
online reviews, wikis,
crowdsourcing

Smartphone-based
crowdsourcing and
social media

Open collaboration
(OC) systems online

Area of
research

Theory development
on the governance of
decentralized systems
online

Digital activism for
promoting institutional
change

OC systems
governance against
information pollution

Target
audience

Researchers of
decentralized systems
online; firms using
decentralized systems
online as part of their
business model

Researchers of
technology and social
activism; organizers
of social activism

Researchers of OC
systems; participants
in OC systems

Informing
theoretical
perspectives

Tragedy of the
commons; common
pool resources (CPR)
governance

Polycentric
information
commons; legitimacy
and institutional
change

Polycentric
information commons

Data source

Coding papers
published in MISQ and
ISR between 2005 and
2014

Interviews with key
informants; electronic
communications, and
official and media
reports

Wikipedia data
release processed
with a Python script
developed by
coauthor Aleksi
Aaltonen

Sample

72 articles

18 interviews, 95
emails, 43 Facebook
communication
streams, 439
Facebook posts, 621
media stories, 7
official reports

4,325 pollution
events and the
editing activities in
Wikipedia between
the posting of a
“cleanup” tag and its
removal

Analysis
approach

Manual coding

Episodes and
encounters analysis
of qualitative data

Hierarchical linear
regression modeling

Context

Theory

Essay 2

Method
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1.2 Essay 1
To add to the body of theories on decentralized information systems online, Essay 1 focuses on
the theoretical question of how these systems may be governed to achieve sustainability in the face
of threats arising from within because of their openness to participation.2 At present, the literature
examining the question of sustainability of decentralized systems online is limited and focused
mostly on online communities. This stream of research finds that an increase in the community’s
size reduces the efficiency of communication, and that participants are generally sensitive to
barriers that raise the opportunity cost of engagement; it also identifies an inherent tension between
the need to attract new members while also avoiding alienating old-timers that might be
dissatisfied with the changes that new participants bring (Butler 2001; Butler and Wang 2012;
Butler et al. 2014). The theory development essay seeks to further advance our understanding
about the sustainability of decentralized information systems online by identifying the threats
impacting them and the conditions under which these threats may be addressed.
Drawing on the well-established paradigms of tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) and
polycentric governance of common pool resource (CPR) systems (Ostrom 1990), in Essay 1, we3
analyze a sample of 72 research articles published in MISQ and ISR on decentralized systems
online. We appropriate the Hardin and Ostrom terminologies to code the literature and create a
“common language” repository of insights that we subsequently use, in conjunction with Ostrom’s
findings on CPR governance in the physical world, to develop a novel theoretical framework.
Conceptualizing decentralized systems online as “information commons” because of their high

Mindel, V., Mathiassen, L. and Rai, A., 2018. “The Sustainability of Polycentric Information Commons,” MIS
Quarterly (42:2), pp 607-631.
3
The paper was coauthored with Lars Mathiassen and Arun Rai
2
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degree of openness to participation, the theory of polycentric information commons (PIC),
theorizes on the categories of actors deriving value from participating in information commons;
the factors associated with their sustainability; the collective-action threats that arise from within
and threaten their sustainability; and the polycentric governance practices that may help them
reduce the prevalence of threats and strengthen them in the long run.
Understanding the sustainability conditions for the various web-based decentralized information
systems is important for theory for two reasons: (i) these systems represent a novel mode of
information production and governance that is distinctly different from past hierarchical models
(Benkler 2006; Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006), and (ii) they impact societal outcomes, ranging
from affecting markets (Dellarocas 2005; Xu and Zhang 2013) and economic displacement (Chan
and Ghose 2014) to outcomes in politics (Gibson and McAllister 2011; Wattal et al. 2010), health
(Barak et al. 2008; Chan and Ghose 2014) and education (Agazio and Buckley 2009; Burke et al.
2009). Hence, it is important to understand theoretically what differentiates successful systems
from the numerous systems that become unsustainable. Moreover, understanding practically how
decentralized information systems may be governed to improve their sustainability odds becomes
increasingly important for companies relying on these systems as part of their business model;
those companies include YouTube, Airbnb, Uber, eBay, Waze, Facebook, Yelp, TripAdvisor,
Twitter, and Craigslist, all of which rely on self-selecting volunteers to provide the bulk of their
content.

1.3 Essay 2
Decentralized systems online share the characteristic of open access to participants, but otherwise
differ in their overarching goals. Increasingly, researchers from various disciplines examine how
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decentralized systems online are being used to promote social change (Agarwal et al. 2014;
Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Bennett and Segerberg 2011; Edwards et al. 2013). The literature
demonstrates that the use of online communities, social media, crowdsourcing, and crowdfunding
online can be useful for fundraising and promoting awareness for various causes, but they are not
very impactful beyond these narrow objectives (Bimber et al. 2005; DeLuca et al. 2012). Digital
activism online also suffers from the negative perception that it is simply an easy way for people
to feel as if they are doing something without actually engaging with the issues beyond cyberspace
(Butler 2011). Even when decentralized systems online enable mobilization offline in the real
world, the resulting impact is typically disappointing (Friedersdorf 2015; White 2016). This is
typically because the congregation of people sharing similar views feeds the echo-chamber effect
of continuous reinforcement of agitation among activists (Garrett 2009), which alienates nonactivists, while the lack of strong leadership makes it hard for social movements born online to
articulate a clear and unified agenda (White 2016, 2017). Thus, despite their rising profile in
promoting social change, we still do not fully understand how decentralized systems online can be
effectively harnessed to achieve lasting institutional change.
Drawing on PIC theory (Essay 1) and legitimacy in institutional change theory (Suchman 1995),
Essay 2 examines how harnessing digital activism online and offline can effectively promote
institutional change. Unlike most information commons, digital activism is less concerned about
its long-run sustainability and more about achieving a result, whether it be raising money, signing
people on a petition, passing a new legislation or reversing an existing one, pressuring an
organization to change its practices, or even changing practices across institutions. In our research,
we examine the case of Cabotagestudien (CS), a research initiative in Sweden in which researchers
used smartphone crowdsourcing and social media to collect data. The generated data, to the
19
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surprise of many, impacted large-scale institutional change, including noticeably shifting public
opinion, shifting political alliances, passing new legislations, and changing industry practices. In
Essay 2, we analyze CS through the prism of PIC and legitimacy theories. We find that for digital
activism to achieve noticeable institutional change, it must establish its pragmatic, moral, and
cognitive legitimacy, which is difficult when facing collective-action threats arising from within
as well as attacks from opposing actors. By adopting more of a polycentric approach to managing
the decentralized systems facilitating it, digital activism is more likely to overcome such treats and
achieve the needed legitimacy to impact change.

Essay 2 contributes to the literature on digital activism by showing how it can be harnessed for
institutional change. Drawing on the prisms of PIC and legitimacy theories, Essay 2 uses the
empirical findings to formulate broad theoretical propositions on the relationship between digital
activism and institutional change. In addition, Essay 2 contributes to PIC theory by illustrating its
applicability for examining decentralized systems online and for qualitative research in general.
Finally, Essay 2 contributes to practice by outlining the problems social movement organizers are
likely to encounter in digital activism and how those problems can be lessened by incorporating
polycentric practices in the governance and design of their initiatives.

1.4 Essay 3
OC systems online are a type of information commons in which providers of information build on
each other’s work to create value for appropriators in the form of a knowledge repository or
software that is made freely available as an open-access alternative to professionally created retail
products (Tapscott and Williams 2008). Much has been written about the OC model’s novelty—
specifically, how products created by mostly uncoordinated and unpaid volunteers often prove to
have quality that is equivalent to products produced by paid specialists (Benkler 2006; Benkler
20
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and Nissenbaum 2006; von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). This fact stands in stark contrast to
traditional economic theories. No theory of production could have predicted that unorganized and
uncompensated self-selecting volunteers can sustain complex enterprises requiring constant
updating and maintenance to keep generating value over time (Tapscott and Williams 2008). OC
systems emerged in the past two decades, and our limited time perspective prevents us from
knowing who is right: those who hype OC systems as a superior way of organizing production, or
those who doubt the capacity of OC systems to continuously provide value over the long run. The
conflicting findings from empirical research on the quality of OC system outputs—some finding
it to be on par with professionally created products (Brown 2011; Chesney 2006; Giles 2005),
while others finding it to be subpar (Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; Lavsa et
al. 2011)—continue to remind us that the questions of how OC systems resolve quality issues is
important for their long-term viability.
At present, research on the quality of OC systems is exploratory and almost entirely atheoretical,
providing insights on certain factors associated with quality, but for the most part unable to explain
how OC systems successfully manage to balance their high-level inclusiveness and openness to
participation with inevitably arising quality problems. Using PIC theory (Essay 1) as our lens,
Essay 3 examines how OC systems address quality issues through the prism of polycentric
governance and information pollution resolution. PIC theory asserts that all information commons
are more susceptible than professionally organized production to incidental and even deliberate
pollution. When unlimited numbers of mostly anonymous people are free to upload content with
little supervision, PIC theory asserts that some of it is bound to conflict with the overarching goal
of the information commons. Examples of information pollution include fake news,
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unsubstantiated rumors and conspiracy theories, manipulated and biased content, and all sorts of
incomplete and erroneous information.
In Essay 3, we zero-in on how polycentric practices of shared accountability, boundary regulation,
incremental adaptation, and provider recognition are associated with pollution event resolution in
Wikipedia—one of the most successful and arguably the most polycentric OC system to date.
Conceptualizing that the posting of tags calling for the cleanup of articles is the start of “pollution
events,” we examine the relationship between the four polycentric practices mentioned above and
the time until the tag is removed, which signifies the temporary pollution resolution. We find that
shared accountability and incremental adaption is directly associated with the reduction in the time
it takes to resolve pollution. Boundary regulation, on the other hand, at first increases pollution
resolution time to a point; thereafter, it is associated with a decrease in pollution resolution time.
This suggests that boundary regulation initially creates confusion about the article’s boundary, but
after the confusion is resolved, it helps it to improve information quality. Finally, although
Wikipedia does not have a provider recognition mechanism at the article editing level, we find
evidence that persistent provider rejection—that is, reverts of revisions—is associated with a
decrease in the pollution resolution time. Essay 3 contributes to both the literature on OC system
quality management and to PIC theory by confirming the relationship between polycentric
practices and pollution alleviation.
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CHAPTER 2: THE SUSTAINABILITY OF POLYCENTRIC INFORMATION
COMMONS
ABSTRACT
Research on various distributed online information systems—including blogging, crowdsourcing,
media sharing, online communities, online reviews, open source software development, social
media, wikis, peer-to-peer file sharing, and two-sided electronic markets—shows that the level of
user engagement and overall activity in most systems eventually decline substantially. Here, we
draw on Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons and Ostrom’s theory of polycentric
governance to introduce a unifying theory of polycentric information commons (PIC) that explains
these phenomena. Further, our theory illuminates how polycentric governance principles, as
manifested in system rules and infrastructure features, counterbalance various sustainability
threats arising from unrestricted participation. By integrating previous research findings and
offering new insights into information and governance practices, the theory, practically applied,
can enhance the likelihood of sustained participation across diverse, decentralized online
information systems. We conclude by discussing how researchers can use the theory in empirical
investigations and how they can engage in theoretical elaborations.

Key Words: Theory development, tragedy of the commons, polycentricity, governance,
decentralized online information systems, collective-action threats
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2.1 Sustainability of Decentralized Systems Online
We increasingly depend on information systems (IS) with a high degree of volunteer user
participation and consequential sustainability threats, including blogging, crowdsourcing, media
sharing, online communities, online reviews, open source software (OSS) development, social
media, wikis, peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing, and two-sided electronic markets. Although many
researchers have studied these decentralized online information systems and produced important
insights over the past several years, the literature remains fragmented and light on theory
(Majchrzak 2009; Singh et al. 2011). With the exception of the theory of social dynamics in online
settings (Levina et al. 2014), which explains power relations across various user-generated content
platforms, the few theories recently published are primarily phenomenon-specific (Bateman et al.
2011; Butler et al. 2014; Howison et al. 2014; Kane et al. 2012) and have limited applicability
beyond their explicit context of origin. It is not surprising, then, that researchers are increasingly
calling for “more highly socialized and multitheoretic explanations of community development”
(Johnson et al. 2014) that “cover the interplay with institutions, goods, and the social practice”
(Von Krogh et al. 2012). In response, our work integrates contemporary empirical evidence in IS
research and theoretical insights from the literature on the sustainability of online communities
(Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014; Butler et al. 2012) with the literature on the governance of
common pool resource (CPR) institutions (Ostrom 1990) to develop a theoretical framework
aimed at explaining and predicting outcomes in decentralized online information systems.
While undoubtedly different in many regards, the online phenomena cited above share three
important characteristics. First, relative to traditional information systems, decentralized online
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information systems are (1) highly accessible4 to content consumers (typically at no cost) and (2)
highly accessible to content producers who, in most cases, engage without payment. These features
give rise to a third: (3) high-accessibility characteristics, which let individuals join for free and
leave anytime, can lead to high volatility in consumer and producer participation. Although
commercial (and sometimes nonprofit) organizations create and maintain the technical
infrastructure of these systems, most of their content is not provided by system owners; rather, it
is generated in an unordered, decentralized fashion by volunteer participants. This freedom of
participation creates the conditions for sudden growth, but it also makes the systems vulnerable to
sudden massive exits of content producers. This open access and high dependency on self-selecting
individuals is the foundation on which we build our theory, guided by the following overarching
research question: How can decentralized online information systems mitigate the threats to
sustainability that follow from their high degree of openness to participation?
For centuries, ecologists, demographers, economists, sociologists, and political scientists have
studied and debated questions related to the sustainability of various types of openly accessible
resource systems. The discourse on the topic can be coarsely categorized into two prominent—yet
rival—schools of thought. One school is best represented by ecologist Garret Hardin, and the other
by political scientist Elinor Ostrom.
In 1968, Hardin published his influential thought experiment in which he describes the dissipation
of medieval-type grazing commons resulting from unchecked individual-level overgrazing and
pollution. “The tragedy of the commons,” as it came to be known, grew to be the leading paradigm
in political science and economics, taught in college classes and public administration circles as a

Throughout the paper, we use the term “accessibility” in the sense of “hard to exclude people” as opposed to
technical accessibility (i.e., internet access, ease of access, and so forth).
4
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cautionary tale of what might happen to collective resources if strong, top-down institutions do not
sufficiently curtail individual freedoms (Hardin 1968). According to the logic of the tragedy of the
commons, decentralized online information systems will eventually decline and become
unsustainable because of their high level of openness. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that
many online communities, after initial growth, have experienced a substantial decline in
participation (as in Napster and MySpace) or ceased activity all together (Butler 2001; Butler et
al. 2014; Butler et al. 2012; Hann et al. 2013; Ma et al. 2007; Moon et al. 2008; Ransbotham et al.
2011; Stewart et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2013). Even high-profile systems such as Wikipedia,
according to observers studying them, show signs of declining participation (Halfaker et al. 2011).
The rise of cyber-archeology, which “digs” into failed digital communities and their digital
artifacts, further illustrates the tendency of decentralized online information systems to decline or
collapse (Harrison 2009; Jones 1997). Can the decline of these systems be viewed, at least partially,
as a form of tragedy of the commons—that is, an inevitable outcome resulting from “too much”
freedom in how people engage and interact with these technologies? If so, how can we then
reconcile the supposed inevitability of decline with the fact that so many successful decentralized
online information systems such as YouTube and Facebook manage to remain robust?
According to Ostrom, the tragedy of the commons oversimplifies reality, and its conclusion—that
a central authority must significantly curtain individual freedoms—is highly problematic5 (Ostrom
1990). Ostrom and her colleagues analyzed thousands of cases of local resource governance
arrangements (such as grazing grounds, fisheries, forests, and watersheds) and, while they did find
instances of tragedies, they also found numerous examples of sustainable and well-functioning

5

Ostrom challenged Hardin’s notion of open access commons and instead maintained that Hardin in effect was
describing a common property regime which, although permeable, is not ungovernable.
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resource systems that operate without strong centralized authorities (Nagendra et al. 2012; Ostrom
1990; Schlager et al. 1999). More often than not, local communities, for hundreds of years in some
cases, were found to be successful in governing CPRs with minimal oversight from central
authorities (Ostrom 1990). That is, contrary to the tragedy of the commons, in most cases people
communicate and work together to find sensible ways to share resources without endangering their
long-term sustainability. Ostrom observed that the most resilient governance arrangements were
those that dynamically managed boundary setting and mutual accountability through a high degree
of inclusivity in decision-making. Increasing the number of independent decision-making centers
generates system stability by reinforcing individual commitment to the CPR rather than delegating
this responsibility to a narrow, elite group of decision makers. These boundary-setting and mutualaccountability mechanisms constitute local arrangements that keep wrongdoers at bay without
compromising the freedoms of others. The mechanisms emerge from mutual adjustments among
the involved autonomous actors, rather than relying primarily on central governance structures or
private market forces; they thus represent a third mode of governance: polycentricity. Following
this school of thought, could one major differentiating factor between successful and unsuccessful
decentralized online information systems be rooted in the extent to which they embed polycentric
governance principles in their design?
Drawing on these important distinctions and insights, we conceptualize decentralized online
information systems as “information commons.” Although these various online systems differ in
structure and objectives, they are similar in at least two important ways: (i) they are information
systems, and (ii) they resemble Hardin’s commons in their openness. Adopting this as a frame, we
suggest that the extent to which polycentric governance principles are embedded into those
information commons explains why some systems decline and others flourish, even in the face of
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many collective-action threats resulting from their inherent openness. Although polycentricity
cannot explain everything we need to know about the sustainability of decentralized online
information systems, we use it as a starting point for developing a foundational theory. While we
build on Ostrom’s insights, we acknowledge that decentralized online information systems are
sociotechnical phenomena that do not entirely fit the definition of CPR systems. The difference in
contexts necessitates a careful borrowing and adaptation of specific concepts to enhance the theory
development beyond a simple overt reproduction that would fail to increase our understanding of
the phenomena at hand (Whetten et al. 2009). Hence, in our theorizing, we rely on both our
reasoning and our creative imagination (Bacharach 1989; Rivard 2014) supported by two literature
streams: (i) the general literature on polycentric governance of shared resources, and (ii) the
literature on decentralized online information systems (see the Appendix for details of our IS
literature review).
We structure the paper in accordance with Zmud’s (1998) recommendations to develop “pure” IS
theory papers by defining the principle phenomena, explicating core concepts, and relating them
to each other while articulating their raisons d’être. Accordingly, we next specify the proposed
theory’s content and boundaries by defining information commons and specifying the many
different IS phenomena that fit the definition. We subsequently conceptualize and define the core
concepts underlying our theoretical development: derived stakeholder value, sustainability,
collective-action threats, and polycentric governance practices. We then develop a conceptual
model and associated propositions that relate the core concepts to each other and to their
constituent constructs. We conclude by discussing the contributions of our theorizing and how the
proposed theoretical framing can serve as a generative mechanism for further theoretical
elaboration and empirical evaluation of information commons.
31

Polycentric Information Commons  V. Mindel  2018

2.2 Information Commons
To facilitate analysis of their sustainability, we conceptualize decentralized online information
systems as information commons—that is, a highly accessible, self-rising information system in
which stakeholders share an overarching goal. To conceptually unify several streams of research,
we address information commons in their generic form, acknowledging that future research should
explore differences across their specific forms, such as whether an information commons is standalone, nested within traditional systems, or entangled with other information commons. To set the
boundary conditions for our theorizing, we draw on Ostrom’s work to conceptualize information
commons (Table 2.1) and describe contemporary phenomena that represent information commons
(Table 2.2).
Both Hardin and Ostrom identify accessibility as a major defining characteristic of the commons
and CPR systems, respectively (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990). Accordingly, relative to other
information systems and platforms, information commons are highly accessible. Although the
access is not necessarily unlimited, information commons are generally nonexclusive, allowing
anyone who wishes—regardless of experience or credentials—a high degree of freedom of
entrance and autonomy to supply and acquire digitalized information in the form of words, videos,
images, sound, and code (Hann et al. 2013; Shah 2006; Stewart et al. 2006). The flip side of
freedom of access is freedom of exit. Individual participants can easily leave the information
commons at any time.
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Table 2.1 Conceptualization of Information Commons
CPR Concept

Physical Resources

Natural and manmade

Actors

Common Pool
Resource System

“…natural or manmade resource
system that is
sufficiently as to
make it costly to
exclude potential
beneficiaries from
obtaining benefits
from its use” (E.
Ostrom 1990, pp. 30)

Producers

“Anyone who actually
constructs, repairs, or
takes actions that
ensure the long-term
sustenance of a
resource systems
itself” (E. Ostrom
1990, pp. 31)

Providers

“…those who arrange
for the provisioning of
a CPR” (E. Ostrom
1990, pp. 31)

Appropriators

“…those who
withdraw [resource
units]” (E. Ostrom
1990, pp. 30)

Adapted Concept

Examples

Information
Commons

Highly
accessible,
self-rising
information
system in
which
stakeholders
share an
overarching
goal

Blogging,
crowdsourcing,
media sharing,
online
communities,
online reviews,
OSS development,
P2P file sharing,
two-sided
electronic markets,
social media, wikis

Information

Intangible;
digitalized
and manmade

Words, icons,
videos, images,
sound, code

Producers

Architects
and
sponsors of
the
infrastructure
that enable
the system

The Mozilla
foundation,
Wikimedia
foundation, Turner
Broadcasting

Providers

People who
supply
information
to the system

Developers,
uploaders, posters,
content producers

Appropriators

People who
acquire
information
from the
system

Readers,
downloaders,
content consumers

Hardin warned about the dire consequences of accessibility; however, Ostrom, basing her assertion
on a substantial body of empirical observations, argued that, in the majority of cases, a high degree
of accessibility prompts the emergence of a self-rising order. Taking Ostrom’s position, we
identify self-rising order from within—as opposed to top-down design—as the second
characteristic of information commons. Prior IS research addresses this self-rising property in
different forms of information commons. For instance, OSS development research has referred to
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the property as “self-emerging” (Hann et al. 2013), while online community research calls it
“inherently evolving” (Butler et al. 2014). Moreover, blogs have different centers of influence that
emerge spontaneously (Chau et al. 2012; Howison et al. 2014), and online communities involve
autonomous centers that emerge and disappear without any predefined pattern (Johnson et al.
2014). Although the self-rising property of information commons is widely recognized in extant
literature, it is rather unconventional. Throughout history, traditional information systems—from
the hieroglyphs in the Great Pyramid to printed newspapers—were produced by specialists
working within hierarchical structures of authority. Hence, based on the self-rising property alone,
information commons are distinctly unique types of information systems.
In these systems, people play various roles; IS research describes these roles using many different
terms, including users, consumers, participants, contributors, developers, uploaders, bloggers, and
posters. To further clarify our definition of information commons, we adapt Ostrom’s (1990)
concepts to classify these principal stakeholders into three distinct categories: (i) producers—the
architects and sponsors of the infrastructure that enable the system; (ii) providers—the people who
supply information to the system; and (iii) appropriators—the people who extract information
from the system. Of course, an individual may play more than one role; most people are both
providers and appropriators of content on social media platforms, for example. Distinguishing
among the principal actors involved in information commons also facilitates cross-case analyses
(Darke et al. 1998). We expand further on these stakeholders in the next section.
Every CPR system has an overarching purpose, whether it is distributing water, managing grazing
rights, determining tree-cutting schedules, restricting fishing activities, or allocating specific
common resources. Similarly, every information commons has an overarching goal, which might
be broad or specific, continuous or ephemeral, legal or illegal. While stakeholders may be
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motivated by different considerations and goals, they inevitably share some overarching goal that
ties them to the information commons. For instance, sellers and buyers in two-sided electronic
markets such as eBay, Craigslist, Airbnb, and Uber are typically interested in maximizing their
individual utility but share the overarching goal of transacting. Similarly, providers of code,
articles, and posts may have different motivations and goals than appropriators, yet they both share
the overarching goal of exchanging the information; otherwise, they would not be participating in
the information commons.
Despite common characteristics, an important difference exists between information commons on
the one hand, and Hardin’s commons and Ostrom’s CPRs on the other. Hardin and Ostrom both
addressed physical resource systems with tangible natural or man-made resource units. This
materiality makes the resource units subtractable—implying that their consumption depletes the
CPR (Ostrom 1990). In contrast, information commons pertain to resources in digitalized form,
implying that the resources in information commons cannot be depleted through overconsumption.
If anything, information commons become more sustainable through increased consumption
because of network effects that bring about the comedy of the commons (Rose 1986) rather than
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). This difference in resources is a given and, in any case,
Hardin’s notion of the commons focuses on the collective decline resulting from unchecked
individual actions, rather than on overconsumption per se. As a result, we assert that our use of the
term “commons” is appropriate because the types of information systems that we theorize emerge
from the actions of free individuals and make the systems susceptible to various collective-action
threats afflicting CPRs. We expand more on these threats to information commons in subsequent
sections.
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Information commons are information systems. Hence, to bound the phenomena of information
commons, we emphasize the representation and token views of information (McKinney Jr et al.
2010). Information can be viewed as representative of something that exists independently in the
world as an object, is reflected through symbols and signs,6 and becomes meaningful only after a
brain (whether organic or computerized) processes it. An image or a video is simply mediums
transferring static and dynamic visuals with or without auditory sounds—all of which are
meaningless without a brain to process them. Similarly, words on the screen, numbers, and
symbols (be they emojis or lines of code) are also just meaningless shapes outside a human context
(language) that can attach significance to them. Subscribing to the representation view, we can see
that, even though information commons differ vastly in the ways in which information is
transferred within them, they are nonetheless information systems. We can also see that the process
of encoding information into symbols and signs and the subsequent interpretation of them is
inherently vulnerable. The “pure” form of information typically gets compromised to a certain
degree because of the limitations of symbol systems and of the processing capabilities of humans
and computers.
The token view is also worth considering here. This view asserts that information, while abstract
in general, acquires a certain tangible property when encoded into symbols and signs via an
information system in which it can be further molded, moved, stored, repackaged, retrieved, and
distributed (McKinney jr et al. 2010). The token view suggests that information, despite not being
a physical resource, nonetheless is “governable.” When providers upload, delete, edit, transfer, and
publish content, they engage in acts of information governance (as opposed to system governance,

6

Examples include language symbols, such as words, numbers, icons, and codes, as well as sensory signs, such as
visual images, audible sounds, odorous smells, feelable textures, and tasteable flavors (as of now, the latter three are
irrelevant for information commons).
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which is the producers’ domain). Thus, when we posit that information commons are “self-rising,”
we do not mean that they pop into existence out of nowhere, but rather that the content and
information in them emerge in an unorganized fashion from the actions of individual providers.
In Table 2.2, we list exemplary contemporary phenomena that we conceptualize as information
commons. Because these phenomena and the related literature are still emerging, each
phenomenon has multiple definitions and names that at times overlap. For instance, we list
Wikipedia as a wiki, but it may also be viewed as an online community or crowdsourcing platform.
In this case, we categorize Wikipedia as a wiki because of its unique characteristic of live-time
editing, which does not exist in most online communities or crowdsourcing platforms. The
phenomena in Table 2.2 differ in many respects, but they all share the defining characteristics of
information commons—that is, they are highly accessible, self-rising information systems in
which stakeholders share an overarching goal, even if some of their individual goals differ and
possibly conflict within the overarching goal’s framework.

Table 2.2 Contemporary Forms of Information Commons
Phenomenon

Definition

Examples

Shared Goal

Blogging

A website that lets anyone write and
publish a blog

Blogger, Tumblr,
Twitter

Self-expression and
information sharing

Crowdsourcing

A platform in which the contributions of
numerous self-selected volunteers or
part-time workers combine with those of
others to achieve a greater result

Innocentive,
Quirky,
Threadless

A specific, contextdependent goal

Media sharing

A website that lets people upload and
share their video clips and/or images with
the public at large or invited guests

YouTube,
Vimeo,
DailyMotion,
Instagram,
Flickr, Imgur

Creation of a
repository of videos
and images

Online
community

A website where people congregate
online to discuss a subject or to introduce
themselves for possible in-person
meetings

TES, Mumsnet,
HackerNews

Creation of a
dedicated
information
resource
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Online reviews

A platform on which reviews can be
posted about people, businesses,
products, or services

Yelp,
TripAdvisor,
Amazon, IMDB

Self-expression and
peer signaling on
quality of products
and services

Open source
software
development

A website that software developers can
use to control and manage free and opensource software development

SourceForge,
GitHub, BerliOS

Making software
publically available
to study, change,
and distribute

Peer-to-peer
file sharing

A platform that lets users access media
files such as books, music, movies, and
games

Pirate Bay,
Torrentz,
isoHunt

Sharing of digital
content

Two-sided
electronic
markets

A platform that lets individuals post and
access information for making online or
offline transactions

eBay, Craigslist,
Airbnb, Uber

Transacting

Social media

Online forms of communication that
individuals and companies use to share
information with interested parties
(friends, colleagues, customers, etc.)

Facebook,
MySpace,
Friendster

Maintaining social
ties

Wikis

A website that lets users collaboratively
edit its content and structure

LyricWiki,
WikiAnswers,
wikiHow,
Wikipedia

Amassing a large
body of information

2.3 Derived Stakeholder Value
Realizing the shared goal of an information commons requires that the involved stakeholders
receive value 7 from it. Accordingly, we define derived stakeholder value as the benefits
stakeholders gain from being involved with an information commons. Although a significant body
of IS research has examined IT’s value by focusing on tangible aspects of organizational
performance, the value of information commons cannot be adequately gauged through such
traditional measures. In information commons, derived value is context dependent, can be tangible
or intangible, is realized at both the individual and collective levels, and is likely to be multifaceted.
Prior research reveals that IT users can derive different types of value including satisfaction, selfexpression, enjoyment, and economic value in different contexts (Agarwal et al. 2000; Kohli et al.
The word value can mean either “a person’s principles” or “worth.” Here, we refer to value as worth, which is how
it is commonly used in research on IT gains (typically referred to as the “value of IT”).
7
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2008; Melone 1990); all of these facets of value can be relevant when examining derived
stakeholder value in information commons. Drawing on these insights, we distinguish between
three types of actors involved in information commons and propose the following constructs
related to derived stakeholder value: (i) producer value, (ii) provider value, and (iii) appropriator
value.
2.3.1 Derived Producer Value
We define producer value as the benefits a producer gains from architecting and maintaining the
infrastructure of an information commons. Information commons support may require an ongoing
investment, such as to pay the salaries of graphic designers, programmers, and other personnel.
Information commons’ producers may also carry other costs, such as for domain names, servers,
cloud storage, search engine optimization, and securing private information. While some
producers (such as Wikipedia producers) are motivated by intangible factors such as prestige,
satisfaction, and genuine interest in the overarching goal of the information commons, others are
profit-seekers and thus measure much of the value they derive in terms of financial gain. Producers
of two-sided electronic markets may derive economic value by charging providers and
appropriators brokerage fees, but most information commons are free to use and supported through
advertising revenue. For that reason, producers’ value is directly dependent on appropriators (the
segment advertisers are trying to reach) and indirectly on providers, who attract appropriators by
supplying them with content. Of course, other economic systems also depend on the efficient
alignment of supply and demand. The difference, though, is that in information commons,
producers have little control over provision.
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Table 2.3 Conceptualizing Stakeholder Value
Concept

Detention

Examples

Derived
Stakeholder
Value

The benefits stakeholders gain from
being involved with the information
commons

Benefits vary based on stakeholder type (see
below)

Producer
Value

The benefits a producer gains from
architecting and maintaining the
infrastructure of the information
commons

Personal satisfaction, pride, profit

Provider
Value

The benefits a provider gains from
contributing content to the
information commons

Recognition, personal satisfaction and
enjoyment, rewards

Appropriator
Value

The benefits an appropriator gains
from accessing the content of the
information commons

Satisfaction of a defined need for information
(such as content, entertainment, software, or
knowledge) or an undefined need for
information (discovery and exploration)

Constructs

2.3.2 Derived Provider Value
We define provider value as the benefits a provider gains from contributing content to an
information commons. In some information commons, providers can expect to receive tangible
value (as in crowdsourcing competitions and two-sided electronic markets), while in others, the
value that providers derive is intangible. Past work finds that the value here is often a combination
of personal and social fulfillment (Faraj et al. 2011; Hann et al. 2013; Levina et al. 2014; Ma et al.
2007; Moon et al. 2008; Tsai et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2013). Past work also finds that providers
are sensitive to barriers that increase the opportunity cost of participation (Butler et al. 2014), as
well as that the intensity of provision varies across time and from individual to individual (Gu et
al. 2007).
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2.3.3 Derived Appropriator Value
We define appropriator value as the benefits an appropriator gains from accessing the content of
an information commons. Appropriators turn to information commons to satisfy a specific need
for information or an indeterminate need to explore (Aggarwal et al. 2013; Browne et al. 2007;
Heer et al. 2005). The need for information is personal for each appropriator and varies greatly
across different information commons—ranging from a need to learn about transaction
opportunities or the availability of free software to a need to know what members of one’s social
circle are doing. Often, appropriators seek to satisfy the need to explore or simply to be entertained.
Regardless of the context, the derived value from satisfying the need for information and discovery
determines the likelihood of the appropriator returning to the information commons. Like
providers, appropriators are also sensitive to barriers that raise their opportunity cost of
information retrieval and exploration (Gu et al. 2007; Jones et al. 2004). Examples of opportunity
cost-raising barriers include cumbersome registration mechanisms, interfaces that are difficult to
navigate, cybersecurity issues, and other factors that reduce the seamlessness of appropriation.

2.4 Sustainability
For stakeholders to continuously derive value from an information commons, that commons must
be sustainable. Sustainability, or “the capacity to endure” (Davidson 2014), has long been
examined in environmental, social, and economic contexts (Malhotra et al. 2013) and has been
increasingly examined in the context of online communities, virtual teams, online forums, and
smartphone applications (Adar et al. 2000; Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014; Cheung et al. 2002;
Ridings et al. 2010; Teo et al. 2003). Drawing on themes from CPR literature and research on the
sustainability of emerging phenomena related to decentralized online information systems, we
consider sustainability as the universal purpose of all information commons. Thus, understanding
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sustainability can help explain why an information commons fails or succeeds in realizing its
overarching goal, as well as help predict a commons’ trajectory. Accordingly, we define
sustainability as the capacity of an information commons to continuously provide value to its
stakeholders. Ultimately, any information commons seeks to realize this overarching goal, whether
it is achieved through continuous activity, such as the ongoing cataloging of all human knowledge
or ongoing maintenance of social relationships, or in a more temporary fashion that completes the
overarching goal and countermands the need for sustainability, such as solving a technical problem
in an online forum. Drawing on insights from CPR and IS research, we put forward four constructs
of sustainability: (i) provision, (ii) appropriation, (iii) revitalization, and (iv) equitability.

Table 2.4 Conceptualizing Derived Stakeholder Value
Concept

Definition

Examples

The capacity of the information
commons to continuously provide
value to its stakeholders

The micro-blogging platform Pownce is an
information commons that is no longer
sustainable due to low provision, appropriation,
and revitalization

Provision

The extent to which providers
continuously input information into
the information commons

Posting and uploading of digital content on
YouTube, Facebook, eBay, Craigslist, and Digg

Appropriation

The extent to which appropriators
continuously consume information
from the information commons

Viewing, reading, listening to, and downloading
digital content on YouTube, Facebook, eBay,
Craigslist, and Digg

Revitalization

The rate of information provision
between new and disengaged
providers

The rate of digital content contributions between
new and inactive providers on YouTube,
Facebook, eBay, Craigslist, and Digg

Equitability

The extent to which provision
activities are distributed across a
base of providers

The extent to which a broad rather than narrow
base of individuals provide information on
YouTube, Facebook, eBay, Craigslist, and Digg

Sustainability

Constructs

2.4.1 Provision
Without continuous provision of resource units, CPR systems (Ostrom 1990) and information
commons such as online communities (Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014) eventually dwindle.
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Provision activities in information commons rely on self-selecting individuals who come from
vastly different backgrounds (Hann et al. 2013; Shah 2006; Stewart et al. 2006) and who inevitably
incur the opportunity cost of forfeiting their time and energy for no tangible return (Butler et al.
2014). As a result, provision of information is diverse and volatile (Daniel et al. 2013; Gu et al.
2007; Ransbotham et al. 2011). Understanding provision activities is thus important for predicting
whether an information commons is growing, stabilizing, or declining.
2.4.2 Appropriation
Appropriation is a fundamental activity in information commons. In contrast to subtractable
physical resource systems, which are strained as appropriation grows (for instance, ever-increasing
hunting can cause extinction), information commons depend on continuous appropriation to
reinforce network effects (Susarla et al. 2012). In addition, studies find that providers in
information commons are often motivated by continuous appropriation (Goes et al. 2014;
Huberman et al. 2009; Jabr et al. 2013; McKinney Jr et al. 2010; Moon et al. 2008; Singh et al.
2014; Zhang et al. 2013) and that information commons production is often supported by
appropriation—through subscriptions, advertising, or brokerage fees. As such, understanding
appropriation predicts the likelihood of an information commons to continue offering value.
2.4.3 Revitalization
Sustainability of natural resource systems is often gauged by the rate of resource unit replacement
(Ostrom 1990). Although information does not decay8 and is not subject to physical depletion, the
representation view implies that information is interdependent with the agency transferring it
(McKinney Jr et al. 2010). Thus, attraction-selection-attrition theory (Butler et al. 2014) suggests

8

Information can become outdated, which can be considered a form of decay.
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that the balance between newly engaged and withdrawing information providers (that is, the
balance between those who enter and those who are no longer active) is an important predictor of
an information commons’ capacity to continue generating value for its stakeholders. Accordingly,
we focus on information revitalization—that is, the difference between contributions of content
from new providers and those who have become disengaged. A positive balance between provider
entrance and exit (that is, a net gain in the number of providers) accompanied by an overall
decrease in provision indicates that the new providers are not as productive as the providers that
left the system. In contrast, a negative balance between the entrance and exit of providers (a net
loss in the number of providers) accompanied by an overall increase in provision indicates that the
burden of supplying the information commons with content is shared among fewer providers.
2.4.4 Equitability
Equitability among providers is another important information practice. Although complete
equitability is unrealistic and impractical, as some providers are naturally better suited for certain
information provision tasks than others (Kuk 2006), it is important to remember that provision in
information commons is inherently unpredictable as providers can exit at any time without notice.
Thus, the greater the dependency on a few information providers, the more vulnerable the
information commons is to attrition. Political scientists and economists use concentration
indices—such as the GINI coefficient—as a proxy measure of inequality that endangers the
sustainability of economies and municipalities (Pulselli et al. 2006; Rodrik 1999). Such
concentration indices also can be used to understand the distribution of information-provision
activities; understanding equitability can serve to predict the information commons’ future
capacity to provide value to its stakeholders.
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Sustainability is as important for information commons as it is for organisms, ecosystems, and
other artificial resource systems. On that account, the information commons are not unique. On
the other hand, as highly accessible, self-rising information systems, information commons operate
under conditions of uncertainty that make them more vulnerable to collective-action threats than
traditional information systems.

2.5 Collective-Action Threats
Many factors can adversely or positively impact the sustainability of information commons.
Ostrom identifies six institutional factors that include no less than 43 subfactors for analyzing
socio-ecological system sustainability (Ostrom 2009). Factors known to reduce information
commons’ capacity to provide value to their stakeholders include government censorship,
insufficient internet infrastructure, competition from other information commons, poor design,
information overload, and lack of capital (Christine Roy et al. 2001; Rochet et al. 2003; Rosen and
Purinton 2004; Sullivan 2012). Factors that increase information commons’ capacity to provide
value include uniqueness, virtuous network effects, and provision volume (Butler et al. 2014;
Ellison et al. 2007; Prahalad et al. 2013). To advance research into these factors and maintain the
thematic consistency of our theory development effort, we focus on collective-action threats to
sustainability. Building on the notion of the tragedy of the commons, we conceptualize a
collective-action threat as an adverse aggregate effect that is caused by individual-level actions.
Every resource system is subject to collective-action threats caused by the inherent tension
between community interests and the pursuit of individual gain (Ostrom 1990). Similarly,
information commons’ inherent properties make them highly vulnerable. In these commons, the
unchecked freedom of entry, exit, and action, and the lack of centralized authority to ensure that
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rules are followed and processes carefully executed amplifies the potential for opportunistic
behavior that can lead to negative consequences, including loss of trust, widespread desertion, and
even crackdown by external authorities. Synthesizing observations from the literature on CPR
management (Ostrom 1990) and the commons (Hardin 1968), with insights from the diverse body
of research on decentralized online information systems, we identify five collective-action threats:
(i) free-riding, (ii) congestion, (iii) pollution, (iv) violation, and (v) rebellion (see Table 2.5). Our
theorizing of the five phenomena as collective-action threats is inspired by Hess and Ostrom’s
(2003) conceptualization of information as a CPR; works on “open commons,” such as roads
(Benkler et al. 2013); Hardin’s tragedy of the commons logic, which focuses on individual-level
actions’ adverse effects on collective outcomes in an environment with few restrictions on such
actions; and examples from the literature on decentralized online information system.

Table 2.5 Conceptualizing Collective-action Threats
Concept
Collectiveaction
Threats

Definition

Examples

Adverse aggregate effects that are
caused by individual-level actions

Individual-level consumption as a cause of
global warming; individual-level tax evasion as a
cause of budget shortages

Free-riding

The extent to which appropriators
evade information provision

Consuming but not contributing to online
reviews platforms, discussion boards, online
support communities, P2P file sharing

Congestion

The extent to which appropriation or
provision clogs the information
commons

Slowdowns in video streaming, online gaming
networks, edit wars on Wikipedia

Pollution

The extent to which information fails
to be aligned with the information
commons’ overarching goal

Electronic word-of-mouth manipulation, article
vandalism, false rumors spread on social media

Violation

The extent to which providers break
internal and external morals, rules,
and laws

Copyright violation, cyber bullying, spread of
hate speech, Illegal pornography

Rebellion

The extent to which providers exit
because of dissatisfaction with
producer actions

User revolts in Wikipedia, Reddit, eBay, Uber,
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube

Constructs
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2.5.1 Free-riding
We define free-riding as the extent to which appropriators evade information provision. Extracting
resource units from a resource system without contributing to it on a large, continuous scale might
endanger that system’s sustainability (Ostrom 1990). The vast majority of appropriators never
become active providers, and while information commons differ in their tolerance for free-riding,
the extent to which appropriators avoid acting as providers will inevitably impact the information
commons’ sustainability prospects. For instance, if two information commons occupy the same
niche, yet free-riding is substantially higher in one than the other, then—all else being constant—
we can reasonably predict that the latter is more likely to be sustainable in the long run. Information
provision carries an opportunity cost that differs vastly across individuals (Butler et al. 2014). If
people do not think that the benefit of information provision outweighs the cost of forfeiting their
time and energy, they are more likely to free-ride. Smaller information commons, in which each
additional provider has a relatively high marginal effect, are especially vulnerable to free-riding.
Free-riding behavior is cited as a problem in OSS development (Baldwin et al. 2006), P2P filesharing networks (Adar et al. 2000; Hosanagar et al. 2010; Johar et al. 2011; Karakaya et al. 2009;
Rodrigues et al. 2010), discussion forums (Gu et al. 2007; Wasko et al. 2005), and reputation
mechanisms (Liu et al. 2004).
Although free-riding may adversely impact an information commons, some important caveats
must be considered. Prior research finds that free-riding might be desirable in situations where
certain providers are better suited to performing a specific task (Kuk 2006). In addition, an
information commons with no free-riding would likely cause information overload and reduce the
information value. Finally, evasion of information provision does not necessarily imply freeriding, as appropriators can help the information commons in other ways. For instance, some
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appropriators might not contribute information, but may act as “ambassadors” and attract others
to join (Susarla et al. 2012) or may engage in mundane but necessary tasks, such as editing and
organizing content in wikis (Beck et al. 2015). When appropriators make contributions other than
direct provisioning of information, they are playing a constructive role toward sustaining the
commons and therefore should not be viewed as free-riders.
2.5.2 Congestion
We define congestion as the extent to which appropriation or provision clogs an information
commons. CPRs are vulnerable to spikes in appropriation that, in extreme cases, can render the
entire system highly ineffective. Unlike CPRs, information commons can experience congestion
both in appropriation and in provision. Although information is a non-subtractable resource, the
digital infrastructure that supports its provision and appropriation is a subtractable resource (Johar
et al. 2011; Listanti et al. 2000). For instance, when Facebook was initially expanding its market
penetration, it did so in a deliberately gradual manner to make sure it had enough server capacity
to support growing demand to avoid congestion in appropriation (“How Facebook Became,”
2016). Other examples of information commons that are most susceptible to congestion include
video-streaming platforms (Plissonneau et al. 2012; Setton et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2001) and P2P
file-sharing networks (Johar et al. 2011). Appropriators might get frustrated with and even lose
trust in information commons that suffer from frequent congestion. Loss of trust inevitably leads
to a certain level of desertion that, if large scale, can undermine a commons. Another type of
congestion problem that may frustrate appropriators is information overload caused by rapid
provision (Rosen and Purinton 2004). A rapidly changing Facebook feed that makes it difficult for
appropriators to keep up is an example of information overload caused by congestion in provision.
Congestion in provision is a rather unique problem; it occurs because of the distinctive freedom of
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access and action that information commons afford (similar to the problem academics experience
as they try to get published). Congestion in provision is especially problematic in the most
accessible information commons, which are open to immediate simultaneous provision from
multiple providers (Aaltonen et al. 2015; Kittur et al. 2008).
At present, most information commons do not suffer from serious appropriation congestion.
However, it is not yet clear what will happen if appropriation increases as projected and broadband
infrastructure fails to keep pace (Bolcskel et al. 2001). Similarly, internet service providers’ (ISPs)
objective to undermine Net Neutrality can potentially increase congestion in appropriation for
some information commons (Hahn et al. 2006).
2.5.3 Pollution
We define pollution as the extent to which information fails to be aligned with an information
commons’ overarching goal. Not unlike natural resources, information is subjected to
contamination (data contamination in research is one example of pollution). According to the
representation view of information, in its “pure” form, high-quality information should be true in
relation to its source object, comprehensible, subjectively sincere, and socially legitimate
(Habermas 1985). However, this high standard is rarely achieved, and all information is potentially
subject to misrepresentation. Unintentional, occasional pollution from low-quality provision raises
the search cost for appropriators (Gu et al. 2007) and decreases the information’s overall value to
appropriators (Rice 2012). Deliberate pollution, in the form of information manipulation and
vandalism, can also undermine the trust in a commons and reduce appropriation. Information
manipulation is cited as a problem in online review platforms (Anderson et al. 2014; Dellarocas
2005; Hu et al. 2012; Mayzlin et al. 2012), wikis (Kittur et al. 2008; Shachaf et al. 2010; Stvilia et
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al. 2007), blogs (Schmierbach et al. 2012; Thorson et al. 2010), and two-sided electronic markets
and online communities (Gibbs et al. 2010; Gu et al. 2007; Toma et al. 2008).
2.5.4 Violation
We define violation as the extent to which providers break internal and external morals, rules,
and laws. Crime and the violation of social rules and norms demonstrate how the actions of
relatively few individuals can cause substantial societal damage. This violation strains public
resources, reduces productivity, and, in extreme situations, disintegrates entire communities
(Covington et al. 1991). In information commons, high accessibility inevitably increases the
potential for violation, as opportunistic actors can blend in and exploit the freedom of movement
with relative ease. The literature is full of examples of violation activities in information commons:
stalking, bullying, fraud, proliferation of hate speech, distribution of illegal pornography,
coordination of hacking activities, coordination of terrorism, identity theft, intellectual property
theft, and more (Beale et al. 2007; Gerstenfeld et al. 2003; Gross et al. 2005; Hinduja et al. 2010;
Juvonen et al. 2008; Mishna et al. 2009; Svensson et al. 2012). In addition to violating social rules
and norms, when widespread, such violations threaten information commons’ sustainability in two
distinct ways: (i) they cause information providers and appropriators to leave, thus reducing
appropriation, provision, and, subsequently, revitalization and equitability; (ii) they prompt a
challenge from powerful actors, such as ISPs or criminal or civil litigation systems. Depending on
the nature of the offense, the impact of outside challenges on information commons might be small
or large, ranging from a virtual slap on the hand to a fine, or, in some instances, a complete
shutdown.
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2.5.5 Rebellion
We define rebellion as the extent to which providers exit because of dissatisfaction with producer
actions. Although most people do not actively participate in them, revolutions drive history. As
such, they are in effect a collective-action phenomenon, where the actions of a relatively small
number of individuals have an impact that extends beyond the local level (Muller et al. 1986). To
date, the academic literature does not pay much attention to online rebellions, but that does not
mean they do not occur. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many prominent information commons
experienced some sort of user revolt at one time or another. Over the years, the mainstream media
and the blogosphere have reported instances of rebellion in different information commons,
including eBay, Digg, Wikipedia, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Uber, and Reddit
(Auerbach 2015; Clifford 2010; Feuer 2016; Graham-Felsen 2006; Gross 2012; Johnson 2009;
Nizza 2007; Shih 2013; Tkacz 2011). While in-depth research on user rebellion is lacking, we can
identify three recurring triggers: (i) unwelcomed changes to infrastructure features, (ii)
unwelcomed changes to policies, and (iii) producers’ heavy-handedness in dealings with core
providers.
As with free-riding, congestion, pollution, and violation, rebellion is a potential issue in any
situation involving people. In the information commons, however, these five basic threats are
amplified by high accessibility. Given this, we now examine how information commons can
remain sustainable in the face of such threats and thus continue to benefit their stakeholders.

2.6 Polycentric Governance Practices
To reduce the provenance and impact of collective-action threats and promote sustainability,
traditional information systems rely on hierarchical structures. Such structures are characterized
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by relative stability, compartmentalization, specialization, formal authority and procedures, and
the use of behavioral and outcome controls. In contrast, systems characterized by open access are
more likely to achieve long-term stability through polycentric governance practices that balance
local-level autonomy and inclusivity with local-level boundary-setting and accountability
mechanisms (Ostrom 1990). Drawing on these distinctions, we propose that the extent to which an
information commons integrates polycentric governance into its design determines how likely it is
to fend off collective-action threats and thereby promote sustainability.
The concept of polycentricity was originally developed by Polanyi (1951) to describe the
continuous state of flux in science. Unconstrained by an intervening central authority, scientists,
according to Polanyi, are free to exercise independent, original thought and engage in
experimentation (Aligica et al. 2012). A decade later, the concept of polycentricity was adapted as
an alternative to the movement toward greater centralization and consolidation of public services
administrations in US metropolitan areas (Ostrom et al. 1961). The notion that multiple
crosscutting and autonomous jurisdictions are better positioned to administer public services than
a single centralized authority stood in stark contrast to the prevailing wisdom of political scientists
and policymakers at the time. Defined as an arrangement in which independent elements mutually
adjust to create orderly relationships within a larger system of rules (Ostrom 1972), polycentricity
is characterized by self-emerging spontaneity, self-governing independence, and flexibility arising
from resilience to experimentation with rules. Researchers have found polycentricity to be an
effective alternative to top-down centralization in municipal governance (Ostrom 1972) and,
subsequently, to characterize sustainable CPR systems (Ostrom 1990). People in resilient CPR
systems are generally more engaged in the system’s governance, actively participating in decisionmaking about adjusting rules and working together to monitor those who fail to abide by rules
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agreed to by the majority of people. Ostrom (1990) identified eight principles underlying most
flourishing CPRs that were absent in failing systems (see Table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Ostrom’s Polycentric Governance Principles
Principle

Explanation

1. Clearly defined boundaries

Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw units from the
CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR
itself.

2. Congruence between
appropriation and provision
rules and local conditions

Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to
provision rules requiring labor, material, and/or money.

3. Collective choice
arrangements

Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in
modifying the operational rules.

4. Monitoring

Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator
behavior, are accountable to the appropriators or are the
appropriators.

5. Graduated sanctions

Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed
graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of
the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these
appropriators, or by both.

6. Conflict-resolution
mechanism

Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local
arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between
appropriators and officials.

7. Minimal recognition of
rights to organize

The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not
challenged by external governmental authorities.

8. For CPRs that are parts of
larger systems: Nested
enterprises

Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution,
and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested
enterprises.

We draw on Ostrom’s eight governance principles of successful CPR systems and on insights from
empirical research on decentralized online information systems to synthesize polycentric
governance practices applicable to the information commons context. To balance faithfulness to
the reference literature and our theorizing, we examined points of overlap between Ostrom’s
principles with the different IS context, while avoiding artificial retrofitting as Whetten et al.
(2009) recommend. To make the theoretical framework useful—and not overbearing—we
consolidated some principles to arrive at four general polycentric governance practice constructs:
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(i) boundary regulation, (ii) incremental adaptation, (iii) shared accountability, and (iv) provider
recognition.

Table 2.7 Conceptualizing Polycentric Governance Practices
Concept
Polycentric
Governance
Practices

Definition

Examples

Practices that promote order, where
independent elements make mutual
adjustments to order relationships
with one another within a general
system of rules

In the physical world: local overlapping
municipalities, the European Union,
communes; Online: Wikipedia, eBay, Pirate
Bay, YouTube

Constructs

Boundary
Regulation

The extent to which rules and
technical infrastructure features afford
information provision and
appropriation consistent with the
information commons’ overarching
goal

Restricting posting of content that does not
meet the information commons’ overarching
goal; requiring providers to register

Incremental
Adaptation

The extent to which changes in
infrastructure and rules are gradually
introduced and providers and
appropriators are actively involved in
shaping them

Gradually updating technical features; smallscale experimentation with new features and
rules; seeking feedback from users on new
rules and features

Shared
Accountability

The extent to which rules and
features afford peer monitoring and
gradual sanctioning to support
appropriate behavior and dispute
resolution in an information commons

Peer monitoring mechanisms, such as
mutual ratings and rankings, helpfulness
cores, and flagging rule violators; gradual
punishment of rule violators, from a warning
to banning

Provider
Recognition

The extent to which providers are
acknowledged by peers,
appropriators, and producers

Subscriptions; followers; digital status
symbols, such as icons and avatars; “likes”;
direct feedback

Polycentric governance is an abstract notion that manifests in an information commons’ rules and
technical infrastructure features. Rules underlie the governance of social activities by playing an
integral part in ordering relationships, responsibilities, and expectations (Ostrom 1972). CPR
research identifies three levels of rules—constitutional, collective choice, and operational (Ostrom
1990)—that are also present in information commons. Terms of use by an information commons’
providers and appropriators exemplify constitutional rules. Policies that change in response to
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petitioning or protest of providers and appropriators exemplify collective choice rules (for
example, Facebook relaxed its “real name” policy in response to user protests). Operational rules
are exemplified by an information commons’ day-to-day implicit and explicit norms of conduct,
such as reciprocity (Mathwick 2002), sharing (Sharratt et al. 2003), trust (Ridings et al. 2002), and
the language used in communications (Wilson et al. 2002). Without a mechanism to help enforce
them, rules are no more than general directives or recommendations. Therefore, constitutional,
collective choice, and operational rules are often reflected in an information commons’
infrastructure features, including the graphical interface and mechanisms for access (such as
login), provision, appropriation, self-identity representation, communication, and peer monitoring
(Bartelt et al. 2014; Jabr et al. 2013; Kane et al. 2012; Levina et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2007). Next,
we detail the four practices of polycentric governance.
2.6.1 Boundary Regulation
Although CPR systems need boundaries primarily to control appropriation and avoid overuse
(Ostrom 1990) (Principle 1, Table 2.6), information commons need boundaries to control
provision, including the type of information allowed, provider conduct, and the degree to which
providers can mask their identities. Typically, producers set these boundaries when they design
the information commons, expressing the boundaries both in the commons’ constitutional rules
and in its infrastructure features. However, drawing on Ostrom’s observations, we assert that
provider engagement here is important: the more involved providers are in establishing boundaries,
the more effective those boundaries are in regulating the information commons. The literature
finds that setting effective boundaries based on overarching goals and other contextual
characteristics of online communities and OSS projects is positively associated with outcomes
(Bonaccorsi et al. 2003; Butler et al. 2012; Di Tullio et al. 2013; Hertel et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa et
55

Polycentric Information Commons  V. Mindel  2018

al. 2011; Ren et al. 2007). Twitter’s 140-character tweet restriction is an example of the alignment
of Twitter’s constitutional rules and technical features with its overarching goal of being a
microblogging platform. In addition to regulating types of content, information commons must
regulate anonymity, which is increasingly found to be associated with various types of illicit
behavior (Christopherson 2007; Coffey et al. 2004; Suler et al. 1998). Extant research suggests
that the tolerable degree of anonymity depends on the commons’ overarching goal (Ren et al.
2007). Drawing on polycentricity theory and empirical findings, we assert that involving providers
in decisions on boundary setting such as these increases the likelihood of sustainability.
2.6.2 Incremental Adaptation
A central notion in polycentricity theory is the idea that incremental, bottom-up experimentation
with rules will likely lead to the discovery of better rules for governance (Ostrom et al. 1962)
(Principles 2 and 3, Table 2.6). Because each information commons is different in its overarching
goal, governance rules and infrastructure features must be specific to its evolving circumstances.
It is particularly important that providers and appropriators—who experience these dynamics close
up—influence decisions about rules and features. As the literature finds, autonomy of provision
spurs creativity (Bishop 2007; Hertel et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2012; Roberts et al. 2006), and such
creativity should not be restricted to content provision alone; it should also be leveraged to
incrementally adapt an information commons’ rules and infrastructure features to support its
overarching goal. Although we still lack substantial empirical evidence on the impact of provider
involvement in adjusting the rules and infrastructure features of an information commons, past IS
literature on the benefits of user involvement in systems design (Ives et al. 1984; Kujala 2003) and
recent literature on the sustainability of startups (Blank 2013; Ries 2011) suggest that open
communication and feedback between producers and participants can increase the speed and
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quality of adaptations to rules and infrastructure features.
2.6.3 Shared Accountability
Effective, low-cost, local-level conflict-resolution mechanisms that gradually enforce sanctions on
rule violators, together with peer monitoring, are associated with CPR sustainability (Ostrom
1990) (Principles 4, 5 and 6, Table 2.6). In many cases, community members can effectively
identify perpetrators long before outside police authorities get involved (Bennett et al. 2009). Thus,
a system of accountability arising bottom-up from within the community can be a robust
alternative to top-down policing. Similarly, research finds peer monitoring in information
commons to be an effective governance mechanism (Chua et al. 2007; Feller et al. 2008; Gu et al.
2007; Wall et al. 2007). As long as the offense is not severe, sanctioning of rule violators should
be carried out in a gradual manner (Ostrom 1990). In information commons, this gradual
sanctioning typically starts with a warning, then escalates step-by-step to temporary—and in rare
cases, permanent—blocking of access. Drawing on polycentricity theory and empirical findings,
we assert that, in an information commons, rules and infrastructure features that enable shared
accountability among community members increase the likelihood of sustainability.
2.6.4 Provider Recognition
In information commons, provision activities typically carry no monetary payoff and are instead
motivated by an array of personal and social factors. Although producers cannot easily impact the
providers’ personal motivation, they can enhance the social experience by incorporating various
peer-recognition features. For some time now, IS researchers have recognized that providers are
“strongly driven by status and status seeking, and that status sentiments are more likely to sustain
virtual communities” (Lampel et al. 2007). As such, research finds that recognition—whether from
peers, appropriators, or producers—is a major driver of continuous provider participation. Hence,
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direct feedback, rating schemes, helpfulness scores, “likes,” number of followers or subscribers,
and digital status symbols such as icons and badges have a lasting positive impact on provision
(Goes et al. 2014; Jabr et al. 2013; Levina et al. 2014; Moon et al. 2008; Ren et al. 2007; Von
Krogh et al. 2012). Despite differences in overarching goals and contexts across information
commons, it is safe to assume that rules and infrastructure features that facilitate recognition
increase provider satisfaction, which in turn increases the likelihood that providers will remain
involved in the information commons.

2.7 Theorizing Relationships
Our discussions thus far have focused on the terms—that is, the concepts and their elaboration into
constituent constructs—of the theory of PIC (see Tables 2.1, 2.3–2.5, and 2.7). We now build on
these terms to theorize the relationships between concepts and their constituent constructs9 as
summarized in the conceptual model in Figure 2.1.
We draw on the logic of profile constructs and ideal profiles (Doty and Glick 1994; Venkatraman
1989) and on the literature on decentralized online information systems to conceptualize the
relationship between sustainability and its underlying constructs—that is, continuity of provision,
continuity of appropriation, revitalization, and equitability. We suggest that these four constituent
constructs contribute in non-substitutive and mutually reinforcing ways to achieving the
sustainability necessary for providing continuous value to stakeholders (whether providers,
appropriators, or producers). Accordingly, we suggest that an ideal sustainability profile for an

We follow the notion of “ladder of abstraction” (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 115) in differentiating between concepts and
constructs. Concepts are semantically defined but cannot be operationalized, while constructs are mid-level
abstractions and may be operationalized.
9
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information commons is one with high values for each of its constituent constructs, as explained
in the following.

Figure 2.1 Conceptual Model

Continuous appropriation and provision are fundamental forces that feed each other (Huberman et
al. 2009; Jabr et al. 2013; Moon et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2013) in the same way that supply and
demand are fundamental to all economic activities involving resource exchange. The need to
revitalize provision to sustain the information commons might not be as immediately evident, as
it depends on the provider attrition rate (Butler et al. 2014). However, this revitalization is as
essential to determining the sustainability prospects of an information commons as the resource
replacement rate is to determining the sustainability of natural and economic systems (Ostrom
1990). Providers in information commons typically enter and exit the commons at a rapid rate,
which, when positive, generally injects new energy and content (Ransbotham et al. 2011). As long
as revitalization in provision remains flat or is positive, the information commons is likely to
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remain sustainable. However, if the rate between exit of old providers and entry of new providers
is negative for a prolonged period of time, the likelihood of the commons remaining sustainable
will decrease. Because provision carries an opportunity cost, the smaller the provider pool, the
greater the relative burden on the remaining providers; this can cause some of them to leave, further
aggravating the problem. Revitalization goes hand in hand with equitability. The need for equitable
distribution of provision might not be immediately evident; after all, a few providers can often
sustain a software development project or a discussion forum for some time. Further, equitability
is rarely perfect—some providers are, by nature, more likely to be more involved than others. Still,
we assert that the efforts of a few providers cannot sustain most information commons for an
extended period of time because it increases the systemic vulnerability to provider dropout. Thus,
low revitalization or low equitability is likely to lead to reduced provision which, in turn, is likely
to reduce appropriation. Hence, we make the following core premise in our theorizing:
Premise: Sustainability of an information commons requires that continuous
provision and appropriation as well as revitalization and equitability in provision
operate as a system of complements.
We draw on the nature of collective action in relation to individual action (Morgeson and Hofmann
1999), the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), and the literature on decentralized online
information systems to theorize how collective-action threats that impact information commons’
sustainability emerge from individual actions. We suggest that information commons’ inherent
openness creates conditions for individuals to engage in free-riding, congestion, pollution,
violation, and rebellion. These actions are motivated by individual reasons that may be at odds
with the common good. While less-inclusive information systems can rely on hierarchical
mechanisms to control such actions by individuals, providers in information commons are largely
unaccountable to the system producers. An information commons’ producer cannot threaten to fire
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underperforming providers or incentivize them with pay increases and promotions. For good and
for bad, an information commons is a virtual space in which people—who often feel anonymous
(regardless of how anonymous they really are)—upload, post, publish, broadcast, and code content
and information freely. Just as multiple small individual actions can create remarkable aggregate
outcomes (Benkler et al. 2006; Tapscott et al. 2008), self-interested actions by individuals can
propagate to create adverse aggregate effects, including large-scale free-riding, congestion,
pollution, violation, and rebellion that threaten the long term sustainability of an information
commons. Even if a small proportion of providers and appropriators mistakenly or deliberately
violate the rules—whether those rules pertain specifically to the commons or violate the law—the
aggregate effect becomes larger than the sum of individual parts in commons that involve
hundreds, thousands, or even millions of actors. Because the amount of content provisioned and
appropriated and the number of providers and appropriators differs considerably across
information commons, the threshold at which self-interested, contrary-to-common-good
individual actions emerge as collective-action threats is not clear-cut. However, given that open
access is characteristic of information commons, the potential exists for collective-action threats
to emerge from such individual actions.
Research shows that collective-action threats may adversely impact provision, appropriation,
revitalization, and equitability in information commons. For instance, pollution from low-quality
provision raises the search cost for appropriators (Gu et al. 2007) and decreases their capacity to
derive value (Rice 2012); this can lead to reduced appropriation. As another example, when freeriding increases, revitalization and equitability are likely to decline (Adar et al. 2000; Butler et al.
2014; Johar et al. 2011; Karakaya et al. 2009). Past research also offers evidence of the adverse
impact of congestion and violation on provision and appropriation activities (Beale et al. 2007;
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Finn 2004; Johar et al. 2011; Setton et al. 2005; Wu et al. 2001). At this stage, we could not identify
research on the negative impact of rebellion, but substantial anecdotal evidence exists on the toll
user revolts take on provision and appropriation (Auerbach 2015; Clifford 2010; Feuer 2016;
Graham-Felsen 2006; Gross 2012; Johnson 2009; Nizza 2007; Shih 2013; Tkacz 2011). Hence,
we propose:
Proposition 1: Collective-action threats, which emerge from the aggregation of
the free-riding, congestion, pollution, violation, and rebellion actions of
individual providers and appropriators, create vulnerabilities for an information
commons’ sustainability.
Next, we draw on Ostrom’s observations on the association between the eight governance
principles (Table 2.6) and CPR resilience (Ostrom 1990) and the literature on decentralized online
information systems to theorize that boundary regulation, incremental adaption, shared
accountability, and provider recognition constitute a set of polycentric governance practices that
reduce collective-action threats in information commons while increasing their sustainability. For
instance, achieving a compromise between providers and producers on content boundaries is likely
to reduce rebellion, which can improve the sustainability of the information commons (Jarvenpaa
et al. 2011). Establishing and enforcing boundaries can reduce pollution and help focus provision
activities for an information commons that has close-ended overarching goals, such as in OSS
(Bonaccorsi et al. 2003; Hertel et al. 2003). Indeed, failure to set boundaries on the type of
information allowed into an online community can lead to rebellion and the subsequent exit of
some providers (Butler et al. 2012; Ren et al. 2007). Further, incremental adaptation of rules and
infrastructure features can reduce instances of pollution, violation, and congestion in provision
(Aaltonen et al. 2015; Dellarocas 2005). For instance, Wikipedia’s adoption of the three-revision
rule helped mitigate pollution and congestion threats in provision (Aaltonen et al. 2015). As part
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of the infrastructure, algorithms that incorporate feedback from other providers (peer monitoring
and shared accountability) can substantially reduce pollution and violation in P2P file-sharing
networks (Kamvar et al. 2003). When producers unilaterally initiate major changes to the
infrastructure’s graphic design and technical features or change the content or anonymity
boundaries, a significant proportion of providers are likely to feel dissatisfied and leave (e.g., Gross
2012; Johnson 2009; Nizza 2007). Incremental adaptation that takes stakeholder feedback into
account is likely to reduce dissatisfaction and rebellion (Halfaker et al. 2011). Shared
accountability—as manifested through ratings, flagging, and “report abuse” and “report problem”
features—can also reduce violation and pollution (Diakopoulos et al. 2011; Jøsang et al. 2007;
Resnick et al. 2000). Identity features that act as recognition features and reduce anonymity have
a positive effect on provision and appropriation (Forman et al. 2008; Ma et al. 2007). Recognition
from peers, appropriators, or producers has a lasting effect on sustainability outcomes as it
motivates continuous provision (Goes et al. 2014; Levina et al. 2014; Ma et al. 2007) and helps
entice appropriators to join the ranks of providers, subsequently reducing free-riding and
increasing revitalization. Hence, we propose that:
Proposition 2: Polycentric governance practices of boundary regulation, shared
accountability, incremental adaptation, and provider recognition (a) reduce
collective-action threats and (b) increase the sustainability of an information
commons.
Finally, we draw on literature from CPR governance (Ostrom 1990) and decentralized online
information systems to suggest that the sustainability of an information commons creates the
conditions for deriving stakeholder value, which in turn impacts the evolution of the commons’
polycentric governance practices. Provision of content and information allows appropriators to
derive value by fulfilling their need for information (Aggarwal et al. 2013; Browne et al. 2007;
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Heer et al. 2005). It also allows producers to derive economic value from having a volunteer
“workforce” provide the bulk of the content (Ramaswamy et al. 2010). Appropriation allows
producers to derive value from selling ads, while also motivating providers who, in part, derive
value from feeling needed (Burke et al. 2009). Revitalization and equitability help an information
commons maintain the flow of provision over time and allow appropriators and producers to
continue to derive value. In contrast, when sustainability decreases, the stakeholders’ capacity to
derive value also decreases, creating a spiral effect that endangers the long-term sustainability of
the information commons.
The need to change the information commons’ polycentric governance practices relates inversely
to the level of derived stakeholder value. On the one hand, when all stakeholders derive value,
producers do not need to make urgent changes to the information commons’ rules and
infrastructure features supporting boundary regulation, incremental adaptation, shared
accountability, and provider recognition. In such cases, producers have the opportunity to
experiment with incremental modifications to enhance the overall experience for providers and
appropriators. On the other hand, the urgency to change polycentric information practices
increases when the value derived diminishes for one or more stakeholder groups. The importance
of receiving and adapting to stakeholder feedback is recognized as crucial for the sustainability of
organizations (Anderson 1999; Ries 2011); we suggest it is similarly important for information
commons. As the creators of the information commons, producers ultimately control changes to
the system rules and infrastructure features. Thus, they should create the conditions for monitoring
the extent to which appropriators and providers derive value from participation to preserve their
capacity to derive value. For instance, Angie’s List, a pioneer of online consumer peer reviews,
made major changes to its boundary regulation on access in an attempt to reverse a long-running
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trend of decline in its provision and appropriation (Tuttle 2016). It took Angie’s List a long time
to realize that when providers and appropriators do not derive value, they go somewhere else (to
yelp.com, for instance) and might never return. Had Angie’s List included an effective feedback
process on the value derived by its providers and appropriators, its producers might have been able
to act more urgently to stop its decline by adjusting its access boundaries. Hence, we propose:
Proposition 3: A sustainable information commons allows stakeholders to
continuously derive value.
Proposition 4: Feedback on value derived by stakeholders impacts the evolution
of an information commons’ polycentric governance practices.

2.8 Discussion
While the openness and decentralization of PIC can spur incredible outcomes (Benkler et al. 2006;
Tapscott et al. 2008), they also inevitability create systemic vulnerabilities that cannot be fully
curtailed by traditional means of hierarchical command and control. Information governance that
relies on voluntarily participation is a major paradigm shift—one that challenges previous
assumptions of organized production and its underlying mechanisms (Baldwin et al. 2011; Benkler
et al. 2006; Füller et al. 2006). As the dust of the first wave of mostly empirical research is settling
and researchers provide evidence of the effectiveness of crowdsourcing, open source, and other
forms of peer production (Benkler et al. 2006; Tapscott et al. 2008), the need for new theories
capable of explaining the observed outcomes becomes more pronounced (Arazy et al. 2011;
Johnson et al. 2014; Majchrzak 2009; Von Krogh et al. 2012). Most online forums, communities,
and OSS projects are, in fact, inactive (Butler et al. 2012; Ren et al. 2007; Stewart et al. 2006;
Wiertz et al. 2007), suggesting that the majority of initiatives become unsustainable following a
phase of initial growth. In our theorization, we therefore focused on the common denominator—
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the existential question of sustainability—to develop the theory of PIC by iterating between
insights from literature on CPR governance and from decentralized online information systems.
Building on the notions of the tragedy of the commons and polycentricity, we focused on
identifying the sustainability threats that impact information commons with few restrictions on
participation. The aim of our theoretical framework is to explain outcomes related to sustainability
and governance in information commons as well as to predict (Gregor 2006) the likelihood of
achieving sustainability and the subsequently derived stakeholder value. As such, our merging of
insights from CPR governance literature and empirical evidence from a diverse body of
decentralized online information systems research under a single theoretical platform contributes
to existing literature by (i) unifying multiple related empirical insights under one overarching
framework; (ii) conceptualizing decentralized online information systems as information
commons, which, in turn, helps us better understand questions related to their sustainability in the
face of collective-action threats; and (iii) explicating the polycentric governance practices that
reduce the threats’ prevalence and mitigate their impact.
We are not the only ones to use the CPR governance literature to study intangible resources.
Previous research has convincingly employed this framing to examine governance of radio
spectrums, budgets, and even academic databases (Brubaker 1997; Evans 2005; Hess et al. 2003;
Kranich et al. 2008; Soroos 1982). From these efforts, we have learned that it is implausible and
inappropriate to directly translate all CPR and commons research to advance IS theory. Instead,
we have endeavored to achieve a balance between remaining faithful to the reference literature
(Whetten et al. 2009), our own “creative imagination” (Bacharach 1989. pp, 498), and the body of
literature on decentralized online information system to which we aim to contribute. Hence,
although digital information is vastly different from physical resources—especially when it comes
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to subtractability and cost of distribution—information commons are nonetheless susceptible to
sustainability threats that are traditionally more associated with physical systems, including freeriding, pollution, congestion, violation, and rebellion.
Besides being used to study intangible resources, the CPR governance and collective-action
literature has also been sporadically employed to frame IS studies, including knowledge exchange
in electronic communities of practice (Wasko et al. 2004), governance of Wikipedia (Forte et al.
2009), congestion in P2P networks (Johar et al. 2011), governance of OSS development (Markus
2007; O’Mahony 2003), and adoption and growth of regional health information infrastructures
(Constantinides et al. 2014). What sets our work apart from these previous studies is our ambition
to create a new theoretical platform for studying a diverse body of decentralized online information
systems.
Thus, we position the theory of PIC beside other emerging theories aimed at explaining and
predicting outcomes in decentralized online information systems, such as the theory of social
dynamics in online fields (Levina et al. 2014). While the latter builds on Bourdieu’s notion of
social fields and provides a theoretical framing for studying power relations across various usergenerated content platforms, our theory builds on Ostrom’s work and focuses on governance and
sustainability. Both theories draw inspiration from well-established reference literature to tailor
new, context-specific frameworks for advancing our understanding of emerging online
technologies from different, yet complementary, vantage points. We also see the theory of PIC as
a theoretical expansion of previous empirical and theoretical work of IS scholars who examined
the sustainability of online communities; their work provides important insights on the role of
community size, communication patterns, member attrition, and the opportunity cost of
participation (Butler 2001; Butler et al. 2014; Butler et al. 2012).
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The theoretical framework we present here opens new avenues of research and further theoretical
expansion. Future research can look more deeply at the role of rules and infrastructure features in
information commons governance. The web design literature provides a good starting point for
identifying and classifying the different features (Andrews 2002; Zhang et al. 2000). We need to
better understand how infrastructure features reflect governance rules and how they facilitate a
balance between autonomy and restrictiveness. Theoretical and empirical work that takes the next
step, opening the black box of infrastructure components to see how they reflect governance
practices that reduce sustainability threats’ prevalence and impact, can help us better understand
the technical aspects of information commons.
Future research might also more deeply examine the nuanced differences between types of actors
in an information commons. Although stakeholders share a certain overarching interest in the
context of an information commons, producers, providers, and appropriators are by no means
homogenous. Some researchers already distinguish between actors according to their engagement
levels, splitting providers and appropriators into “core” and “peripheral” actors (Gu et al. 2007;
Scacchi 2004; Setia et al. 2012). Those distinctions are important for understanding dynamics in
PIC; for instance, engaging all providers in decision-making about changes is much harder than
engaging only the core providers, who are also more likely to provide valuable feedback.
Differentiating types of appropriators can also enhance our understanding of sustainability. For
example, a distinction can be made between casual and intensive appropriation, as well as between
patterns of passive content appropriation and active ambassadorship that promotes social
contagion effects (Susarla et al. 2012) that increase an information commons’ sustainability
through enhanced revitalization. Similarly, differentiating between types of producers can help us
better understand their role in governance. Many information commons are produced by profit68
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seeking owners who, besides ensuring the system’s sustainability in the face of collective-action
threats, work to establish a profitable business model to achieve financial sustainability. The
tension between these two goals should be further examined. For instance, appropriators and
providers in an information commons might perceive advertisements as pollution and personal
data mining as a violation. In addition to expanding our understanding of the nuances in
stakeholder groups, we also suggest that future research examines the important differences within
each stakeholder category based on their network characteristics. Examining the co-evolution of
the network structure of stakeholders with the governance of an information commons can provide
insights into how network characteristics constrain or enable the emergence of polycentric
governance and the continuous derivation of value by producers, providers, and appropriators.
Finally, our conceptualization of information commons may also be applied to study different
types of organizational systems, including open-access enterprise-sponsored systems,
crowdsourcing initiatives created for soliciting ideas or specific tasks from information providers
(such as MyStarbucksIdea), support forums created by organizations to allow users to help each
other, and enterprise-based social networks that are generally highly open for participation and
likely to encounter collective-action threats (which might reduce their sustainability and potential
for providing value) and thus can benefit from integrating polycentric governance practices.
The main objective of the PIC theory is to help frame future inquiry in a broad research field with
too few theoretical alternatives. The contextual differences between various information
commons, and the inevitable differences between study objectives, necessitate the
operationalization of measures specific to each research; pollution in P2P file-sharing, for
example, manifests differently than pollution in user-generated online review systems. Given this,
the different concepts and constructs we developed and linked should be adapted in future
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qualitative and quantitative studies aimed at explaining and predicting (Gregor 2006) sustainability
and subsequently derived stakeholder value in information commons. Our generative lexicon of
concepts can be used for framing both process and variance studies (Van de Ven 2007). Process
studies might examine how policies and infrastructure features that reflect polycentric governance
practices are adjusted over time. Process studies can also enhance our understanding of different
information commons’ life cycles—from their inception to maturity—through either a positivist
prism, focusing on measuring variables, or through an interpretive prism, aiming at explaining the
phenomena of interest (Van de Ven 2007). Case studies and netnography (Kozinets 2002) can be
used to enhance our understanding of how stakeholders derive value, how sustainable information
practices unfold, and how polycentric governance practices emerge in response to or anticipation
of unfolding collective-action threats.
The proposed theoretical framing can also be used to investigate changes in sustainable
information practices, collective-action threats, and stakeholder value following a change in an
information commons’ policies and infrastructure features. Such discoveries can be made through
lab and field experiments, as well as through selective examination of naturally occurring quasi
experiments—such as examining outcomes before and after a major change that reflects
polycentric governance practices. In addition, many of the proposed constructs can be
operationalized to be observed directly and used in inferential analysis of relationships between
variables. For instance, it is possible to examine the relationship between free-riding and
revitalization by measuring traffic and provision activities. Latent constructs can also be further
developed to measure stakeholder perceptions psychometrically. At this early stage, we wish to
avoid boxing the nascent theoretical framework into any particular research methodology; we urge
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future researchers to freely adapt and dissect the proposed concepts and constructs to fit their
specific lines of inquiry.
The role of science is to zoom in and break down phenomena into small components. Periodically,
however, it must zoom out to examine how the puzzle pieces fit together on a grander scale. Our
main goal was to take many pieces from a growing body of mostly empirical literature and try to
order them in a way that facilitates a certain degree of cross-fertilization between different streams
of research related to the overarching phenomenon of information commons. As such, we hope
that the resulting theoretical framework will prove general enough to invite further theoretical
expansion and specific enough to be immediately useful for framing empirical studies examining
research questions related to the governance and sustainability of diverse types of decentralized
online information systems.
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APPENDIX: Reviewed IS Research

In the 1980s, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at Indiana University’s Workshop in Political
Theory and Policy Analysis set out to inform CPR theorization by collecting, sorting, and
analyzing more than 5,000 empirical field studies of local resource management arrangements
around the world. The scrutinized field studies did not use CPR or polycentricity language, and
they came from many different research domains. To unify this diverse body of empirical work
from various research domains, the workshop scholars chiefly focused on identifying the structural
characteristics of the observed resource system, the attributes and behaviors of its members, the
rules it used, and the reported outcomes (Ostrom 1990). This grounded theory approach was
complemented by the use of existing taxonomy and terminology from polycentricity research on
public-goods governance (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom 1972). The resulting framework became the
theoretical foundation that was used over the next 30 years in CPR governance research (also
known as collective-action research). The framework was constantly refined by new insights from
the field, but its core remained intact.
On a much smaller scale, we emulated this process. Using core taxonomy and terminology from
CPR governance research to guide our effort, we systematically reviewed 73 studies of
crowdsourcing, social media, online communities, electronic word of mouth, peer-to-peer
networks, and open source software (OSS) development published in Information Systems
Research and MISQ between 2005 and 2014. We specifically focused on extracting and translating
insights on rules and their use, stakeholders and their derived value, evidence on collective-action
threats, evidence of Ostrom’s eight governance principles, infrastructure and design features
(environmental conditions in CPR research), and outcomes (direct effects and indirect
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externalities). We knew that we would not be able to reach the scope of Ostrom and her colleagues;
we therefore explicitly focused our effort on the leading IS research journals to provide a solid
foundation. To frame our discussion, we also branched to other sources for additional evidence
and perspectives. Although our primary goal is theory development and not a literature review, we
did use literature review methodologies to find relevant research on decentralized online
information systems. We followed Jane Webster and Richard Watson’s (2002) guidelines for
performing effective literature reviews and examined reference sections to identify many other
important papers published in ISR or MISQ prior to 2005, as well as in other IS (and related fields’)
journals. To avoid saturation, we cast our net wide (but not too wide), using standard search
engines such as Ebscohost and Google Scholar to find additional relevant material. This inclusive
strategy gave us additional evidence and insights to substantiate the many theoretical claims and
propositions presented in this manuscript.

Table A: Overview of the Reviewed IS Research
Paper

Aggarwal
& Singh
2013

August et
al. 2013

Focus

Findings

Adaptation

Coding

Examines the
impact of
technology blog
content on
venture capitalist
investor
decision-making

Blogs impact decisionmaking in the initial
screening stage, but less
so in subsequent stages.
Blog exposure gave
better negotiation
leverage to the entities
featured.

Information commons
reduce appropriators’
search costs and impact
their decision-making. In
some contexts,
information commons
increase competition
between appropriators for
information, leading to
increased transaction
costs.

appropriation;
appropriator
value;
exploration

Examines
different
strategies
available to firms
that sponsor
OSS
development

When contributors are
efficient, sponsors should
pursue an open software
license and focus on
capitalizing through
support services sales.
When contributors are
inefficient, sponsors
should pursue a
proprietary license and
sell each software unit

Producers of information
commons are often profit
motivated and must
determine the best
strategy when seeking a
balance between
attracting effective
providers and preventing
free-ridership from
competitors who benefit

production;
producer
value;
provision;
free-riding
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separately to prevent
contributors from
spreading the software
code to competitors.

Bapna et
al. 2008

Bartelt &
Dennis
2014

Bateman
et al.
2011

Browne et
al. 2007

from sitting on the
sidelines.

Consumers extract a
median surplus of at
least $4 per eBay
auction. In 2003, eBay’s
auctions generated at
least $7.05 billion in total
consumer surplus.

Transaction information
commons directly benefit
appropriators.

Examines how
instant
messaging and
discussion
boards are
utilized and
subsequently
impact quality of
outcomes

Genre rules can have
powerful effects that
significantly impact team
behavior and
performance.

Operational rules are as
important as
infrastructure for the
sustainability of
information commons.
Language used and built
into a commons’ features
influence its operational
rules, and those rules
become increasingly
entrenched in the fabric
of the commons over
time.

Presents a
model to unify
conflicting
explanations as
to why people
engage in
discussion
forums

Members may have
psychological bonds to a
particular online
community based on
need, affect, and
obligation. Each form of
community commitment
has a unique impact on
each behavior, with
need-based commitment
predicting thread
reading; affect-based
commitment predicting
reply posting and
moderating behaviors;
and obligation-based
commitment predicting
only moderating
behavior.

The need for information
drives appropriation. The
need to make an impact
drives provision. A sense
of obligation to the
commons drives certain
providers to monitor their
peers.

provision;
provider
value;
appropriation;
appropriator
value;
operational
rules; shared
accountability

Mental list and single
criterion rules are used
more often when people
search for relatively
straightforward
information (such as
product information);
people use magnitude
threshold and
representational stability

Appropriation of
information depends on
the appropriator’s task.
More complex and
abstract tasks, such as
diagnosis, adhere to the
representational stability
rule. Other rules for
stopping information
searches are: mental list,
difference threshold,

appropriation;
appropriation
value

Examines how
much surplus
consumers
receive from
eBay auctions

Examines why
people stop
searching for
information
online
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appropriation;
appropriator
value

operational
rules;
infrastructure;
incremental
adaptation
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rules when searching for
complex information.

single criterion, and
magnitude threshold.

An inherent tension
exists between content
boundary management
and reshaping the
community. Reshaping
behaviors within a
discussion forum affect
member dynamics and
community
responsiveness in both
positive and negative
ways.

Information commons
content boundaries
impact information
governance. Flexible
boundaries afford more
engaged provisioning,
while greater
engagement leads to
changes in the commons
that potentially drive
other providers away.

boundary
regulation;
provision;
operational
rules;
constitutional
rules;
provision;
pollution;
rebellion

Butler &
Wang
2012

Examines the
extent to which
boundary
reshaping in an
online
discussion
community
impacts member
dynamics and
responsiveness

Butler et
al. 2014

Presents a
model of key
latent constructs
influenced by
technology
choices and the
possible causal
paths by which
they dynamically
effect
communities

Community size and
resilience directly affect
the community’s
sustainability over time.
The lower the
participation costs and
the more focused the
issue, the better chances
for sustainability.

Critical mass of provision
and appropriation directly
impact the sustainability
of the information
commons. The lower the
opportunity cost of
provision and
appropriation and the
more focused the
subject, the more likely
the commons is to be
sustainable.

Chan &
Ghose
2014

Examines the
connection
between
Craigslist and
spread of HIV

Entry of Craigslist is
related to a 15.9%
increase in HIV cases.
The analysis suggests
that the site entry
produces an average of
6,130–6,455 cases of
HIV infection in the
United States each year.
Analyses reveal that
nonmarket-related casual
sex is the primary driver
of the increase in HIV
cases.

Example of a direct effect
of a polycentric
information commons
that is also a social
externality.

appropriation;
appropriation
value

Chau &
Xu 2012

Proposes a
framework for
gathering
business
intelligence from
blogs by
automatically
collecting and
analyzing blog
contents and
bloggers’
interaction
networks

Networks of bloggers
have different centers of
influence. The networks
are decentralized and do
not exhibit pattern
structures, such as star
and hierarchical
structures. These implicit
communities have been
formed spontaneously.

Polycentric information
commons are
decentralized and
spontaneously arising.

provision;
polycentricity
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Communities monitor for
fraudulent behavior.
Engaged community
members can often
detect suspicious activity
better then outside
official authorities.
Tactics are: direct
intervention against
those who commit fraud,
notification of other
community members,
and involvement of
outside authorities.

Opportunistic providers
can pollute information to
gain at the expense of
other members in the
information commons.
Members of the
information commons
often combat pollution
directly and by involving
outside authorities.

production;
provision;
infrastructure;
constitutional
rules;
incremental
adaptation;
boundary
setting

provision;
polycentricity

Chua et
al. 2007

Examines how
community
members
monitor fraud on
auction sites

Claussen
et al.
2013

Examines how
rule modification
by Facebook
that rewarded
quality app
developers with
access to
Facebook’s
users impacted
application
development

The rule change led to
the development of new
applications with
significantly higher user
satisfaction.

Producers have control
over rules and
infrastructure design that
impact information
provision and subsequent
appropriation. Loosening
control and increasing
polycentricity, for
example, can lead to
improved provision and
more satisfied
appropriators.

Examines the
impact of
diversity among
developers on
engagement and
market success

Variation in participants’
contribution-based
reputation is positively
associated with success.
Diversity in the spoken
language and country of
participants has a
negative impact on
community engagement,
but a positive effect on
market success.
Dispersion in project
participant roles
positively influences
community engagement
and market success.
Diversity’s impact on
market success is
conditional on the project
stage; it is most
important at the very
beginning and toward the
end.

Polycentric governance
of information facilitates
greater diversity that, in
turn, enhances
outcomes. Diversity is
especially important in
the birth stage and when
reaching maturity. During
the growing stage,
diversity is less desirable.

Daniel et
al. 2013
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pollution;
violation;
provision;
shared
accountability
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Dellaroca
s 2005

Presents a
theoretical
analysis of
reputation
mechanism
design in trading
environments
with pure moral
hazard

Reputation mechanisms
on eBay mitigate moral
hazard and adverse
selection, thus increasing
efficiency in markets. No
one-size-fits-all set of
guidelines exists for
reputation mechanism
design. Depending on
the context, reputation
mechanisms can act as a
sanctioning tool or as a
signaling mechanism.

An externality of
reputation information
commons is increased
efficiency in markets. No
one-size-fits-all set of
guidelines exists for
reputation mechanism
design. Depending on the
context, reputation
mechanisms can act as a
sanctioning tool or as a
signaling mechanism.

pollution;
producers;
shared
accountability

Dewan &
Ramapra
s 2012

Examines the
relationship
between music
blogs and music
sales

Music sharing reduces
the sales of songs.

P2P sharing causes an
economic externality.

appropriation;
appropriator
value

Examines the
impact of music
blogs on music
consumption

Niche music receives
substantially more
attention in blogs. This
increased exposure
leads to more
consumption of niche
music.

Polycentric information
commons produce more
diverse information; that,
in turn, leads to a
decrease in the influence
of monocentric
information sources.

Individuals do exhibit
herd behavior when
choosing software; online
reviews have particular
impact on the demand for
lesser known products.

The opportunity cost of
information search
impacts the intensity of
appropriation. Online
reviews improve the odds
of marginal products and
services at the expense
of more established
products and services;
this displacement can be
viewed as an externality.

Infrastructure impacts
social interactions.
Shared goals and norms
drive collaboration, along
with the ability to impose
collective sanctions on
those who violate the
shared norms.

Polycentric governance
of information commons
is a socio-technical
process in which social
interactions that drive
governance of
information depend on
the physical architecture
of the commons. Shared
norms and goals drive
collaboration between
providers.

Dewan &
Ramapra
s 2014

Duan et
al. 2009

Feller et
al. 2008

Examines
whether
individuals
exhibit a herd
behavior pattern
when choosing
software online

Examines how a
network of firms
manages OSS
development
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appropriator
value;
exploration

appropriation

production;
provision;
boundary
setting;
shared
accountability
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Challenges the
notion that open
source is driven
by volunteers
and the notion of
collective
intelligence

The open source model
moved toward greater
“professionalism” with
more planning and less
spontaneous and paid
contributors.

Open source moves from
open access regime to
common property regime.

regimes

Forman et
al. 2008

Examines the
relationship
between identity
disclosure and
perceived
usefulness of
reviews

Community norms impact
disclosure of personal
identity. Disclosure of
identity of review
contributors increases
the perceived
helpfulness of the review.
In addition, prevalence of
identified reviewers
increases sales.

Information commons’
operational rules and
norms impact providers’
choice to disclose their
identity. Appropriators
tend to value information
from non-anonymous
providers. A culture of
transparency adds value
to the information
commons.

operational
rules;
provision;
appropriation;
appropriator
value

Ghose
2009

Examines how
online reviews
impact seller
and product
uncertainty,
consequently
impacting
information
asymmetry

Reputation signals do not
mitigate seller or product
uncertainty.

This contradicts other
findings. Online reviews
do not mitigate
information asymmetry;
information does not
relate a positive
externality.

externalities

Goes et
al. 2014

Examines the
change review
writers undergo
as users
subscribe to
them

As review writers
become more popular,
they produce more
reviews and more
objective reviews;
however, their numeric
ratings also
systematically change
and become more
negative and more
varied.

Information providers are
motivated by demand
from appropriators. As
time passes, they learn to
provide more objective
information.

provision;
provider
value;
appropriation

Goh et al.
2013

Compares the
impact of both
user-generated
content and
marketed
content on
purchasing
behavior

User-generated content
is significantly more
influential in driving
purchasing behavior.

Polycentric information
can have a direct
economic impact on its
subject source.

direct effect;
appropriation;
appropriator
value

Fitzgerald
2006
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Gu et al.
2007

Examines how
users value
virtual
communities
and how virtual
communities
differ in their
value
propositions

Gu et al.
2012

Examines the
difference in
impact of
reviews on sales
of a “highinvolvement”
product
(cameras)
between reviews
found on the
retailer site and
external review
sources

Quality of information is
more important than
quantity for the growth of
virtual investment
communities.

Information quality is
more important than
quantity because of the
cognitive cost associated
with processing
information. High-quality
information is more likely
to lead to externalities.

appropriation;
appropriator
value

External sources play a
greater role in impacting
sales of high-involvement
products compared to
reviews posted on the
retailer site.

Appropriators triangulate
information from different
information commons
prior to making major
purchasing decisions.

appropriation

Hahn et
al. 2008

Examines how
OSS
development
teams are
formed and how
individuals make
decisions about
which teams to
join

Past ties between
initiator and collaborator
impact present
participation.

Past relationships
between core providers
and peripheral providers
play a role in the
formation of provision
network on a polycentric
information commons.

provision

Han et al.
2012

Examines the
business and
strategic value
of an open,
collaborative
organizational
form in which
participating
firms co-create
economic value
by jointly
developing and
co-marketing of
IT innovations

Participating firm’s
market valuation
increased; not
participating benefited
rivals due to knowledge
spillover. Heterogeneity
is not associated with
value creation.
Development of radical
innovation adds more
value to the firm. Limited
access and decision
authority is better than
unlimited access and
decision authority.

Polycentric governance
of information creates
synergy, especially when
rules and boundaries are
well defined.
Stakeholders’ level of
heterogeneity is
irrelevant to quality.
Information created spills
over— and other firms
benefit as well.

Hann et
al. 2013

Examines
whether open
source
programmers
get higher
wages due to
their experience
in open source

Credentials obtained
from programming OSS
are associated with up to
an 18% increase in
wages.

Volunteer information
providers can potentially
benefit financially.
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provision;
provider
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Hardaway
& Scamell
2012

Proposes
changes in the
academic
research
publication
process to
incorporate
greater
transparency,
inclusivity, and
openness in
reviews as well
as publication
decisions.

An inclusive review
process that is open to
participants (but not too
open) will improve the
quality of published
research and the fairness
of the publication
process.

Polycentric information
commons of academic
information will increase
the suitability and quality
of academic research
over time.

production;
producer
value;
provision;
provider
value

Hildebran
d et al.
2013

Examines how
feedback from
other users
impacts the
satisfaction and
creativity of
individuals
designing their
own products

Early feedback from
community members
reduces the boldness of
the design and reduces
creativity.

Providers check and
balance each other to a
point of reducing
creativity and individual
expression.

provision

Howison
&
Crowston
2014

Presents a
theory about
building artifacts
out of
information and
the
organizational
affordances of
those artifacts

OSS development is
more about work
redesign than about how
to run an effective virtual
team, and more about
task work in context than
generic team work
processes. Layerability,
open distribution,
irrevocable contribution,
and time are conditions
that contribute to open
source success.

Polycentric information
commons is individual
rather than team driven.
Polycentric information
commons are
characterized by
compartmentalization
and incremental
improvements that can
take time. Information
providers respect the
autonomy of other
providers.

provision;
production;
incremental
adaptation

HsienTung &
Bagozzi
2014

Examines the
factors driving
contribution in
virtual
communities

Social identity and group
norms drive decisions to
contribute.

Information providers in
the commons assume a
certain collective identity
relating to the
information’s subject
matter.

provision;
provider
value; shared
goal; provider
recognition

Examines the
factors driving
contribution in
online technical
support forums

Peer feedback
mechanisms are
associated with better
quality and technical
support compared to
quantity feedback (just a
count of contribution).
The results indicate that
problem solvers are
partially motivated by the
need to be recognized by
their peers.

Information providers
value the feedback from
other providers and are
partially motivated by it.
Existence of peer
feedback mechanisms
thus increase the
likelihood of long-term
sustainability of the
information commons.

Jabr et al.
2014
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Jarvenpa
a&
Majchrzak
2010

Commentary on
how trust
asymmetry,
deception, and
novelty impact
collaboration
online

Participants manage
vigilant interactions in
different ways.

Conflict between
providers impacts
relationships in
information commons.

provision;
violation;
shared
accountability

Johar et
al. 2011

Examines how
P2P congestion
impacts
propensity to
share

Sharing increases as the
network grows, reducing
congestion. The
community can reduce
the impact of free-riding
by increasing individual
sharing.

Information is a resource
that can be subjected to
congestion and freeriding.

free-riding;
congestion;
provision

Johnson
et al.
2014

Examines the
emergence of
power law
distributions via
the mechanisms
of preferential
attachment,
least efforts,
direct
reciprocity, and
indirect
reciprocity

No single unitary
motivation drives
participation in online
communities but many
different—sometimes
competing, sometimes
complimentary—
motivations exist. New
participants can become
popular at any time,
replacing previously
popular participants as
social centers.

Polycentric governance
of information is dynamic,
and new autonomous
centers of authority
emerge and disappear
constantly without a
pattern. Multiple
individual motivations
drive information
provision.

provision;
provider
value;
polycentricity

Kane et
al. 2014

Outlines a set of
theoretically
distinct
questions raised
by the
introduction of
social media in
and by
organizations to
formulate a
research agenda

Social media introduces
questions of platform
design into social
network analysis. Social
media gives users
capabilities that they do
not possess in traditional
offline social networks;
these capabilities include
visualizing network
structure and searching
for content in a network
without using relational
ties.

The architectural features
of the polycentric
information commons
directly impact
stakeholders and
indirectly impact the
prospects of long-term
sustainability. Polycentric
information commons
characterized by
transparency and open
access to information.

production;
appropriation;

Levina &
Arriaga
2014

Presents an
analytical lens
for studying
social status
production
processes
across different
user-generated
content
platforms

Content production is a
social process that
occurs in different
specific contexts in which
different status signals
play a role.

Provision of information
is a context-dependent
social process.

provision;
provider
value;
provider
recognition
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Tests whether
online reviews
more closely
reflect a
product’s quality
or its price value

Online review are biased
towards the product
value—that is, ratings
reflect price more than
they reflect value.

An example of
unintentional information
pollution.

provision;
appropriation;
pollution

Examines to
what extent
communicationstyle alignment
impacts
participation
quantity and
quality

Stronger trend of
alignment leads to
greater participation
quantity and quality. At a
community level, greater
synchronicity in the
linguistic style across all
community members
fosters individual
members’ participation
behavior.

Operational rules (norms)
of communication impact
provision.

operational
rules;
provision

Lukyanen
ko et al.
2014

Examines the
impact of
modeling
decisions on
information
quality in
amateur
content-creation
settings

Participants provide more
accurate information
when classifying
phenomena at a more
general level. In addition,
we found greater overall
accuracy when
participants could provide
free-form data compared
to a condition in which
they selected from
constrained choices.

Polycentric information
provision benefits from
freedom of action.

provision;
autonomy

Ma &
Agarwal
2007

Examines a
feature that
supports
reputation and
identity
management, as
well as archives
of past
interactions, to
assess the
impact on online
community
members’
satisfaction and
willingness to
contribute

IT artifacts that allow
reputation management
improve perceived
identity verification,
cause greater
satisfaction, and increase
contributions by
members.

Appropriators and peer
providers prefer to
interact with those who
have an online persona
(not complete
transparency or complete
anonymity) and also
need to have an online
persona to feel validated
by others. Interaction with
those who have an online
persona leads to greater
satisfaction with the
commons and increases
the likelihood of
provision.

provision;
provider
value;
appropriation;
operational
rules; peer
recognition

Ma et al.
2014

Examines the
impact of prerelease movie
piracy on movie
sales

Sales decrease
approximately 20% due
to piracy.

Example of an economic
externality that impacts
the film industry.

appropriation;
appropriator
value;
externalities

McLure
Wasko &
Faraj
2005

Examines why
people
contribute to

People contribute their
knowledge when they
perceive that it enhances
their professional

Provision of information
is driven by mostly
personal reasons and not
by social motivations.

provision;
provider
value
free-riding

Li & Hitt
2010

Ludwig et
al. 2014
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discussion
forums

reputations, when they
have the experience to
share, and when they are
structurally embedded in
the network. Surprisingly,
contributions occur
without
regard to expectations of
reciprocity from others or
high levels of
commitment to the
network.

Polycentric information
commons tolerate freeriding.

Examines how
individuals filter
knowledge
encountered in
online forums

Peripheral cues (source
expertise and validation)
have a greater influence
on knowledge filtering
decisions than does the
content quality of the
solution.

Appropriators rely on
heuristics when
evaluating information.
Provider’s status and
perceived expertise are
used as a proxy for
quality of information.

appropriation

Moon &
Spraull
2008

Examines the
role of feedback
on participation
in online
communities

In forums that
incorporate a systematic
quality feedback system,
answer providers
contribute more often
and technical problem
resolution is more
effective. Volunteers who
produce higher-quality
contributions have longer
participation duration,
and participation duration
is positively associated
with community
maintenance
contributions.

Feedback from
appropriators and peer
providers motivates
provision and increases
its overall quality.

provision;
provider
value;
provider
recognition

Nan & Lu
2014

Examines
patterns of crisis
management
arising
unintentionally
from
decentralized
and
spontaneous
actions in an
online
community
during an
earthquake

Fluctuation of message
content themes in this
online community served
to energize continuous
input from ordinary
organization members.
Self-organization is a
viable source of
organizational order that
complements the
traditional centralized
plan-and-control
approach.

Polycentric information
governance is
characterized by diverse
provision patterns that
attract further diverse
provision, resulting in
synergy.

polycentricity;
provision

Meservy
et al.
2014

93

Polycentric Information Commons  V. Mindel  2018

Examines how
an infrastructure
that facilitates
consumer
reviews and
recommendation
s impacts the
perceived
usefulness and
social presence
of the website
incorporating
them

Infrastructure that
facilitates consumer
reviews and
recommendations
impacts positively the
perceived usefulness
and social presence of
the website incorporating
them.

Producers of platforms
that facilitate provision of
eWOM benefit because
appropriators of eWOM
information see the
websites as more useful
and pleasing.

appropriation;
appropriator
value

Oh et al.
2013

Examines the
factors causing
rumors on twitter

Source ambiguity is the
most important factor in
creating rumors, followed
by personal involvement;
anxiety is the least yet
marginally important
rumor-causing factor.

Information source
ambiguity impacts
information provision.

provision;
pollution

Park et al.
2013

Examines the
impact of
information on
expectation and
trading behavior
in the context of
a stock
investment
discussion forum

Investors tend to cluster
with similar investors and
generally do not benefit
from the diversity offered
by the community.

Appropriators do not
always benefit from the
diversity of information
found in the information
commons, as different
biases lead them to
primarily seek information
that suits their
preconceived knowledge.

appropriation

Pavlou &
Dimoka
(2006)

Examines the
impact of written
reviews on trust
in sellers and
the price
premiums they
receive from
their online
reputation

Written reviews explain
50% of the variance in
price premiums,
suggesting that reviews
act a information
asymmetry-mitigating
mechanism.

Polycentric governance
of reputation information
mitigates information
asymmetry in markets,
subsequently increasing
market efficiency.

appropriation;
shared
accountability

Ransboth
am &
Kane
2011

Examines
longitudinally
how retention
and turnover of
contributors
impacts the
status of
Wikipedia
articles

Membership retention
relates in a curvilinear
fashion to effective
collaboration: it’s
important in initial stages,
but becomes less
important and turnovers
become more important;
moderate levels of
membership turnover are
desirable.

Polycentric information
provision is dynamic as
providers replace
previous core providers
in a continuous manner.

provision;
polycentricity

Ray et al.
2014

Develops the
concept of
engagement in
online
communities as

Engagement is a key
factor driving knowledge
contribution, but not
necessarily satisfaction.
Engagement and

Providers and
appropriators must feel a
sense of engagement to
gain a sense of collective
purpose that leads to

provision;
provider
value;
appropriation

Kumar &
Benbasat
2006
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key variable for
driving
knowledge
contribution and
diffusion across
the community
through word of
mouth.
Engagement
and satisfaction
are parallel
mediating forces
at work in online
communities

satisfaction together
drive positive word of
mouth and subsequent
growth.

information provision and
appropriation.
Engagement motivates
providers of information
and, together with
satisfaction, is associated
with being a member of
the information commons
and drives positive word
of mouth, contributing to
its growth.

Examines how
identity and
communication
features impact
the attachment
of online
community
members over
time

Group identity features
that allow members to
see profiles and facilitate
repeated exposure to the
group activities impact
traffic twice as much as
interpersonal bond
features.

Providers and
appropriators are more
motivated by group
identity than personal
ties.

Rice 2012

Examines how
reputation is
evolving and
how it affects
transactions

Reputation mechanisms
are significant for
purchase decisions
regarding specific sellers,
while specific reputation
information is associated
with the overall decision
of whether to transact in
the marketplace. When
reputations are
increasingly noisy,
buyers are less likely to
react negatively to poor
ratings and are more
likely to give sellers the
benefit of the doubt.

Polycentric governance
of reputation information
mitigates information
asymmetry in markets,
subsequently increasing
markets efficiency.
Pollution of reputation
information confuses
appropriators and
decreases efficiency.

Setia et
al. 2012

Examines the
role of peripheral
developers in
the creation of
OSS

Peripheral developers
are instrumental,
especially when the
project reaches maturity.

While core information
providers are important at
the beginning, as time
passes, peripheral
providers become
increasingly important.

provision

Shi et al.
2014

Examines
patterns of
information
diffusion on
Twitter

Unidirectional (weak)
rather than bidirectional
social ties exhibit the
fastest pattern of
information diffusion as
users pass content to
other users.

Information diffusion is
the fastest through
encounter dynamics of
provision and
appropriation in
information commons.

provision;
appropriation;
relationship
dynamics

Ren et al.
2012
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Examines to
which extent
individuals
involved in OSS
development
learn from their
own experience
and from
interacting with
peers

Learning from peers is
most important for
developers. Developers
benefit from discussions
they initiate in the middle
of the project; at the
beginning and end of the
project, developers
benefit more from
participating in
discussions initiated by
others.

Providers learn both from
other providers
(especially in the middle
of the project) as well as
from their own
experiences.

provision;
operational
rules

Examines how
text
characteristics
attract readers
of blogs

Sentimental textual
characteristics (negative,
positive, or controversial
tone) attract and retain
readers, while quality
textual characteristics
(grammar, readability,
and comprehensiveness)
have no impact on
attracting readers, but do
impact retention.

Appropriators care more
about the content of the
information than about
how well it presented;
however, presentation
plays a role in retaining
appropriators.

appropriation;
appropriator
value

Looks at the
effect of piracy
on sales of
movies

Giving away content in
one channel can
stimulate sales in a paid
channel if the free
content is sufficiently
differentiated from its
paid counterpart.

Piracy (information
commons) can have a
positive effect of sales if
the content is sufficiently
differentiated.

externalities;
direct effect

Stewart &
Gosain
2006

Examines the
role of ideology
in OSS

Generally, team
members’ adherence to
the tenets of the OSS
community ideology
impact trust and
communication in teams,
which positively relates to
effectiveness.

Provision outcomes in
relationship dynamics are
impacted by ideological
alignment between
providers.

provision;
provider
value; shared
goal

Stewart et
al. 2006

Develops and
tests a model of
the impacts of
license
restrictiveness
and
organizational
sponsorship on
two indicators of
success: user
interest in, and
development
activity on, OSS
development
projects

Users are mainly
attracted to OSS projects
initiated by
noncommercial interests
that do not employ
restrictive licenses.
Identity of the sponsor of
the projects impacts
developer participation.

Ideological
synchronization between
producers and providers
is a condition for an
information commons’
ability to attract providers
and achieve
sustainability. Providers
prefer constitutional rules
that are flexible.

provision;
provider
value;
production;
producer
value;
constitutional
rules;
rebellion

Singh et
al. 2011

Singh et
al. 2013

Smith &
Telang
2009
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Turel et
al. 2011

Examines how
user cognition
and ultimately
usage intentions
toward an
information
technology are
distorted by
addiction to the
technology

The level of online
auction addiction distorts
the way the IT artifact is
perceived.

Over appropriation can
lead to addiction.

appropriation

von Krogh
et al.
2012

Reviews the
literature on the
motivations of
OSS developers

Current research on the
motivation of software
developers does not go
deep enough.

Provision of information
is motivated by multiples
variables.

provision;
provider
value

Wen et al.
2013

Examines the
effect of
copyright
infringement
lawsuits both on
the open source
development
projects being
sued and on
related projects
that employ the
disputed
technology

Projects that exhibit high
technology overlap with
the disputed OSS
experienced a 15%
greater decline in user
interest and 45% less
developer activity than
projects in the control
group; OSS projects that
are intended for business
and specific to the
disputed OSS platform
had a 34% greater
decline in user interest
and 86% less developer
activity than the control
group.

Challenge from the
outside by powerful
interests threatens the
sustainability of a
polycentric information
commons. The impact is
stronger on providers
than on appropriators.

provision;
appropriation

Xu &
Zhang
2013

Examines the
impact of firm
information on
Wikipedia on
insider trading

Information on Wikipedia
causes firm bosses to
disclose negative news
about the firm’s financial
performance faster,
reducing the potential
gain from insider trading.

An example of market
externality of an
information commons.

appropriation;
externalities

Examines
whether social
support
exchanged in an
online
healthcare
community
benefits patients’
mental health

Patients benefit from
learning from others, and
their participation in the
online community helps
them improve their health
and better engage in
their disease selfmanagement process.
Evidence exists that
informational support is
the most prevalent type
in the online healthcare
community, but

An example of a direct
effect of a polycentric
information commons;
appropriation can be
psychologically
beneficial.

appropriation;
appropriator
value

Yan &
Tan 2014
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emotional support plays
the most significant role
in helping patients move
to a healthier state.

Ye et al.
2014

Zhang et
al. 2013

Examines how
sellers respond
to changes in
the design of
eBay’s
reputation
systems

Coercing buyers to
revoke their negative
feedback through
retaliation enables lowquality sellers to
manipulate their
reputations and
masquerade as highquality sellers. Lowquality sellers exerted
additional efforts to
improve their reputation
scores after the system
changed.

Opportunistic information
providers pollute the
information in the
commons to advance
their interests. Change in
constitutional rules by
producers changed the
balance of power
between providers and
appropriators, and
subsequently reduced
pollution.

Examines the
factors that
influence online
innovation and
community
members’
continued
participation

Both users and software
modifiers are influenced
by community response,
but users seem to be
influenced by it more.
Participation is primarily
motivated by software
needs, the enjoyment of
programming, the desire
to improve the software,
the opportunity to learn
about others’
improvements to the
software, and the
gratification of helping
others and giving back to
the community.

Engagement of
appropriators leads to
continuous appropriation.
Providers are partially
motivated by feedback
from appropriators, but
mostly by personal
reasons.
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CHAPTER 3: HARNESSING DIGITAL ACTIVISM FOR
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COLLECTIVE-ACTION PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT
Interest in how information technology is impacting societal issues is growing. Although
considerable evidence shows that online communities and social media spur social activism online
and offline, we know little about whether—and under what conditions—this digital activism
translates into institutional change. To address this void, we draw on Polycentric Information
Commons theory to advance knowledge on how partisan actors can harness digital activism to
create institutional change. We assert that the success of such efforts depends on the actors’
capacity to use a dedicated information commons to generate legitimate collective action. To
inform this theorizing, we examine the case of Cabotagestudien, in which partisan actors used
social media and smartphone-based crowdsourcing to mobilize and drive collective action that
successfully fended off attacks from other institutional actors and changed haulage regulations and
supply chain practices in Northern Europe.

Key Words: Digital activism, institutional change, collective action, polycentric information
commons, legitimacy
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3.1 Decentralized Systems Online and Societal Change
Information systems (IS) scholars increasingly identify a need for research on the impact of
information technology (IT) on societal issues (Saunders 2007; Walsham et al. 2007, Majchrzak
et al. 2016). In recent years, researchers have published many important studies on topics such as
the digital divide and poverty (Agarwal et al. 2009; Hsieh et al. 2008), IT in developing countries
(Braa et al. 2004; Leonardi et al. 2016; Venkatesh, and Sykes 2013), the impact of E-governance
on corruption (Srivastava et al. 2016), and IT’s impact on environmental sustainability (Elliot
2001; Melville 2010). Increasingly, researchers are examining how online-based technologies such
as crowdsourcing and online communities are used in promoting societal issues (Ketter et al. 2016;
Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016). It is increasingly evident that the internet can be useful for driving
activism online and for mobilizing activists in the physical world, however, we still lack theoretical
understanding on how it can be purposefully harnessed to change institutional dynamics in
substantial and lasting ways. Following calls for greater theoretical grounding in research on the
impact of technology on societal issues (Majchrzak et al. 2016), we closely examine how online
technologies can be harnessed to promote institutional change.
In the late 1990s, the internet began transitioning from a novel broadcast media that business and
government organizations used to pass content to passively browsing users, to a decidedly more
open medium in which participating users actively create content, write posts and blogs, upload
images and videos, and even develop code (Tapscott and Williams 2008). This transition
challenged long-standing economic theories of production by demonstrating that loosely organized
private individuals can produce outcomes previously thought possible only by hierarchical systems
with clear incentive structures (Tapscott and Williams 2008). For two decades now, various
academics and other interested observers have studied these new open access systems that rely on
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self-selecting individuals for content and information. This research area is rather broad and
touches on many questions, including how we might better understand user motivations (Von
Krogh et al. 2012), underlying dynamics (Levina and Arriaga 2014), network effects (Ganley and
Lampe 2009), performance of specific tasks (Majchrzak and Malhotra 2013), and direct impacts
on user well-being (Yan and Tan 2014). A small but growing subset of this research stream focuses
on how open access systems might affect broader societal outcomes, including business (Andriole
2010), financial markets (Xu and Zhang 2013), political campaigns (Wattal et al. 2010), and public
health (Goh et al. 2016).
Evidence demonstrates that online communities and social media can be a fertile ground for
spurring social activism on- and offline (Enjolras et al. 2013; White 2016). Still, we lack a
theoretical understanding of whether, and under what conditions, this digital activism translates
into institutional change—that is, a high-impact transformation of existing social, political, and
economic arrangements. Researchers have noted that digital activism campaigns online, while
effective in achieving short-term impacts, typically lose steam rather quickly and generally fail to
generate more permanent change in the institutions of society (Obar et al. 2012; Selander and
Jarvenpaa 2016). Although institutional change is not necessarily the main objective of digital
activism online, evidence from other campaigns that openly challenge institutional order and rely
heavily on online technologies for mobilization show that they are rarely successful. As a case in
point, we might consider the well-known Occupy Wall-Street and Arab Spring movements which,
according to their founders, failed to achieve institutional change (White 2016, 2017). Given the
growing visibility—and shortcomings—of digital activism, it becomes increasingly important to
understand, theoretically, what might be holding it back and how it can be more effectively
leveraged to drive high-impact change.
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Polycentric Information Commons (PIC) theory focuses on the fundamental question of how to
sustain open access systems in the face of degenerative collective-action threats that are amplified
because of the systems’ relatively high degree of openness (Mindel et al. 2018). The theory asserts
that the integration of polycentric governance practices in the design of the rules and features of
these systems may help reduce their vulnerability. Based on the logic of collective action, the
theory provides an analytical framework for examining governance issues related to the
sustainability and governance of open access systems. Still, PIC lacks some important nuances.
While Mindel et al. (2018) assert that information commons must be sustainable to realize their
overarching goal for the benefit of their stakeholders, they acknowledge that information commons
differ in their goals and that further theorizing is needed to gain more nuance on the different
“types” of information commons (Mindel et al. 2018).
Building on previous literature on digital activism and the blueprints of PIC theory, we theorize
on information commons that seek to drive institutional change in society. As a complementary
lens, we draw on institutional theory on legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002)
and on change through collective action (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002) to
propose that digital activism’s success depends on its capacity to achieve appropriate sustainability
in order to drive legitimate collective action. As basis for this theorizing, we examine a case in
which actors harnessed social media and smartphone-based crowdsourcing to mobilize and drive
collective action that caused institutional change.

3.2 Digital Activism
In the early 1990s, social activists were already creating websites and using email chains to pass
information, solicit support, and coordinate activities (Butler 2011). Although the new medium
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made some aspects of outreach and coordination easier, it did not radically change the longexisting traditional and centralized model of activism. Things began to change, however, as the
internet gradually evolved from a broadcast to a participatory medium that enables private
individuals to add content, organize as online communities, and connect with each other on social
network platforms (Von Krogh et al. 2012). This shift let activist organizations more easily tap
into large existing networks (Obar et al. 2012), as well as more easily recruit new activists, raise
funds, and communicate the message to the general public.
Defined as an “organized public effort, making collective claim(s) of target authority(s), in which
civic initiators or supporters use digital media” (Edwards et al. 2013. pp. 10), digital activism can
be split into two types10: (i) digital online activism, and (ii) digital offline activism. Although these
types of activism may overlap in terms of tactics and objectives, the key distinction is spatial.
Online activism mostly occurs on the internet among dispersed individuals, while offline activism
uses open access systems to mobilize people in the physical world. Both types have successful at
mobilizing people for various causes, but each has its limitations.
3.2.1 Digital Online Activism
In the not-so-distant past, to raise funds and promote the change of rules, laws, or policies, activists
spent long hours standing on street corners to gather signatures, going door to door to solicit
support, and waiting in well-stretched lines in bureaucratic offices to obtain documents and
permits. However, in recent years, open access systems significantly lowered the barriers of entry
to the activism arena (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010). Nowadays, anyone—regardless of gender,

10

At present, we do not address hacker activism, or hacktivism, which is a form of illicit digitally enabled online
activism occurring mostly on the dark web.
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race, sexual orientation, or age—can rather easily engage in promoting various causes through
their devices, as long they can access the internet. Thus, instead of braving the elements outdoors
for hours to gather a few dozen signatures, open access systems afford activists the opportunity to
effectively reach numerous individuals anywhere.
The literature on digital online activism is split between cautious optimism regarding its potential
and a dose of sober realism on its actual impact. There is consensus, however, that digital online
activism makes it much easier and faster to raise awareness about various causes, collect
signatures, and raise funds. Perhaps one of the most memorable recent examples of digital online
activism is the 2014 “Ice Bucket Challenge”—a social-media-propelled campaign in which
citizens and celebrities from around the world dumped icy water on themselves to raise awareness
of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a rare and not very well-known neurological disease
affecting human muscles. Within only a few months, the viral Ice Bucket campaign increased ALS
society donations five-fold in comparison to the entire previous year (Diamond 2014). While the
Ice Bucket Challenge no doubt helped the ALS cause (Gebelhoff 2015), the campaign was not
universally popular; some argued that it diverted attention from other equally deserving causes
(Hiltzik 2014), while others claimed that it was mostly an attention-seeking gimmick and not real
activism. Approximately 17 million people posted online videos and pictures of themselves being
doused in icy water, but only a tiny fraction—an estimated 4–5%—bothered to donate to ALS
organizations. As one observer noted, people collectively spent more on ice and bucket purchases
than on actual ALS donations (Kosinski 2014).
Still, despite the skepticism about the motivations of online activists, research suggests that
involvement in such campaign leads to increased civic mindfulness and can generate other positive
externalities (Kristofferson et al. 2013). For instance, researchers found that taking part in online
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campaigns increases the likelihood that participants join charitable organizations (Lee and Hsieh
2013). Researchers also find that online activism gives those who usually do not take part in
activism an opportunity to participate (Bonilla and Rosa 2015). Some research asserts that online
activism is a useful tactical tool for promoting good causes (Karpf 2010), and that even small
gestures can be powerful when combined (Christensen 2011; Vie 2014).
The growing body of research examining online activism primarily focuses on its short-term
impact on campaigns and specific events (Agarwal et al. 2014; Ghobadi and Clegg 2015; Wattal
et al. 2010). Although recent research has begun to examine factors that impact participation in
long-term online activism (Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016), the question of whether online activism
can go beyond increasing awareness, petitioning, and fundraising to bring about actual institutional
change is presently unresolved (Lim 2013; Obar et al. 2012).
3.2.2 Digital Offline Activism
Open access systems have become a powerful medium for mobilizing people in the physical world
(Gerbaudo 2018). Notable examples include the Anti-Globalization, Occupy Wall Street, and

Black Lives Matter movements, as well as the Arab Spring protests (Carney 2016; Ghonim 2012;
Gleason 2013; Juris 2005; Kelly Garrett 2006). Over the past few years, scholars of those and other
digitally enabled social movements have uncovered their power and limitations.
Today, the rapid spread of messages and the sheer number of people receiving them through social
networks make mobilizing masses of people unequivocally cheaper and faster than in the past
(Eltantawy and Wiest 2011; Obar et al. 2012; Theocharis et al. 2015). Further, as with digitally
enabled online activism, the reduced cost of coordination gives traditionally disenfranchised
groups—including minorities and the economically disadvantaged—an opportunity to organize
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and express themselves (Anduiza et al. 2014; Ghonim 2012). In a matter of hours, a call on social
media can translate into a flash crowd of protestors occupying a physical space, be it a street, a
shopping center, a highway, or an airport terminal (Doubek 2017).
Although digital offline activism may give a voice to the marginalized, such movements too often
succumb to the echo-chamber effect—that is, rapidly growing discontent spreading like wildfire
among people echoing to each other similar beliefs (Garrett 2009), making the movement an outlet
for expression of frustration (Aouragh and Alexander 2011; Gillan 2009). Outside the ecochamber, some people who may be privately sympathetic to the cause can grow dismayed at the
aggressive tone or plainly agitated because of the disruptions caused by protests (Tankersley 2011;
White 2016). To the activists in the eye of the storm who are intensely involved with the protest,
the mobilization may appear revolutionary, while the rest of us may simply see an angry crowd
blocking roads and making our daily commute worse than usual.
Even when movements gain widespread public support, they often fail to achieve concrete gains
due to lack of consensus on the next steps following the initial mobilization (Gladwell 2010; Taub
2016; White 2016). This often results from an absence of leaders who are capable of unifying the
many decentralized parts enough to articulate a plan of action that the movement can get behind
(Gladwell 2010; Taub 2016). Thus, paradoxically, the major advantage of digitally enabled offline
activism—that is, its decentralized emergence—becomes its Achilles heel. Too many independent
centers are devoid of a common direction, and thus ineffective in achieving significant concrete
gains beyond the action of mobilization itself. Leadership is essential for social movements
(Morris and Staggenborg 2004), and when it is fragmented, it is very difficult having productive
dialogue with established institutions (White 2016). As he events of Occupy Wall-Street illustrate,
weathering the storm—that is, holding steady until protesters get tired and go home—is in effect
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the default tactic that established institutions use when challenged on the streets (White 2016).
Even when protests are successful at overthrowing entrenched institutions, the lack of leadership
becomes a problem in the aftermath. The events of the Arab-Spring revolution in Egypt illustrate
how successful digital activism mobilization failed to achieve institutional change 11. The lack of
unified leadership on the side of the activists following the collapse of the Mubarak regime allowed
entrenched political and military institutions to reclaim power (Howard and Hussain 2011;
Gunitsky 2015).
So, when examining digital on- and offline activism, we see their advantages as well as their
limitations in promoting institutional change. Digital online activism is too “soft”—that is, it is
somewhat ineffective beyond low-risk actions (Lim 2013) such as raising awareness and funds.
Moreover, some perceive it as a form of lazy clicktivism (Gladwell 2010). On the other hand,
digital offline activism is too “hard”—that is, it is effective at punching a hole in public opinion,
but too aggressive and disjointed to facilitate lasting change (White 2016).

3.3 Theoretical Framing
To better understand how digital activism may be harnessed to promote change in the institutional
foundations of society, we merge two theoretical perspectives—PIC (Mindel et al. 2018) and
institutional change and legitimacy (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002;
Suchman 1995)—to offer a detailed case study analysis of Cabotagestudien (CS). Using collective
action as a shared perspective that merges these two theoretical lenses, we were able to examine

Calhoun (2013) notes that it is too early to judge the true long-term impact of offline activism movements, but
even some of the prominent figures leading Occupy Wall-Street and the Arab Spring concede failure due to the lack
of coordinated leadership in the aftermath of mobilization (White 2016, 2017).
11
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this case with a focus on the mutually constitutive duality (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones
et al. 2004) between the digital activism and the institutional context it aims to change.
3.3.1 Digital Activism as Polycentric Information Commons
PIC theory (Mindel et al. 2018) examines open access systems online that integrate user-generated
content and information as “common grounds.” According to this lens, social media and other
open access systems online that enable digital activism may be conceptualized as “information
commons,” that is, as manifestations of collective action taking place in cyberspace. This is a
departure from prior research on digital activism, which primarily examines the enabling online
systems as communication tools (Harlow and Harp 2012; Obar et al. 2012; Segerberg and Bennett
2011).
When examining the use of new technologies to promote change, digital activism literature broadly
distinguishes between two types of actors: institutional and non-institutional (Bimber et al. 2012;
Selander and Jarvenpaa 2016). This distinction works well when examining the dynamics between
a single, identifiable organization (an institutional actor) and everyone else outside of this
organization (non-institutional actors). The challenge, however, is that activism often involves
multiple organizations and actors entangled as part of an “institutional field,” which obscures the
institutional/non-institutional dichotomy. In the dichotomous view, for example, a social
movement organization dedicated to a cause is an institutional actor, while the individuals
accessing the organization’s social media page to make comments or acquire information are noninstitutional actors. However, people accessing the organization’s information may be politicians,
reporters, business owners, and other actors who belong to various organizations and whose
individual actions impact institutional change. To avoid the confusion, we appropriate PIC
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theory’s distinction between three types of actors relevant to digital activism as follows: (1)
producers: the architects and organizers of the digital activism platform; (2) providers: the people
who supply information by posting content; and (3) appropriators: the people who acquire
information for various reasons (Mindel et al. 2018).
While collective action is typically viewed as a generative mechanism (Hargrave and Van de Ven
2006), PIC theory sees it as potentially degenerative to the point that it might undermine the
system’s sustainability (Mindel et al. 2018). In the same way that commons in the physical world
face sustainability pressures as the aggregate result of smaller-scale actions (Ostrom 1990),
information commons in digital activism are vulnerable because of their high degree of open
access, widespread anonymity, and lack of hierarchical control (Mindel et al. 2018). Thus, as with
common pool physical resources such as forests or grazing grounds, these information commons
are likely to experience pressure due to pollution, congestion, violations, and rebellion.
Low barriers for participation in digital activism increase the odds that a certain portion of the
uploaded content may be polluted by inaccurate or even deliberately manipulated information.
Information pollution—defined as “the extent to which information is contaminated and fails to
align with the information commons overarching goal” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617)—is a problem
for platforms that invite users to contribute content and information (Gu et al. 2007; Hu et al. 2012;
Kittur et al. 2008). Further, prior research finds that the spread of misinformation online reinforces
echo chamber effects, which can lead to increased polarization and other negative spillover effects
(Del Vicario et al. 2016; Kata 2012; Silverman and Singer-Vine 2016).
Digital activism can also suffer from activity spikes that jam the system. Such congestion—that
is, “the extent to which appropriation and provision clog the information commons” (Mindel et al.
2018, p. 616)—may cause the system to crash and create information overload. Digital activism
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research finds that simultaneous uploads of posts can create messy feeds and cause confusion and
information overload, which in turn may lead to fatigue among activists (Branagan 2013; Kelly
Garrett 2006). Frequent crashes caused by congestion may frustrate existing and potential activists
alike; moreover, it may prevent important messages from spreading, subsequently muffling the
potential impact of digital activism.
Because digital activism that touches on political issues is likely to be controversial and heated
(Lee 2005), it can be a fertile ground for harassment, cyberbullying, hate speech, and trolling (Li
2005; Warzel 2016). Defined as “the extent to which providers in an information commons violate
rules and laws” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617), violations such as harassment may cause some
activists to quit and may even attract pressure from outside actors. Although digital activism
literature does not address harassment specifically, plenty of anecdotal evidence suggests that it is
indeed a problem (Larkin 2016).
In digital activism, rifts between producers and providers may cause the latter to desert or rebel.
Rebellion—that is, “the extent to which providers in an information commons are dissatisfied and
exit it” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 617)—jeopardizes the supply of content (Clifford 2010; GrahamFelsen 2006; Gross 2012). So, while digital activism can grow exponentially because of low
participation barriers, it can also experience rapid participation decline. Donor reactions to reports
that Red Cross stashed money donated to help the 2010 Haiti earthquake victims (Sullivan 2015)
exemplifies how rebellion can adversely affect digital activism.
To reduce the prevalence and impact of collective-action threats in digital activism, PIC theory
proposes four mutually reinforcing governance practices that may help actors balance openness
and order to achieve stability. These practices (Table 3.1) may be embedded in the system’s
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technical features and design, as well as in its official and unofficial rules and norms of conduct
(Mindel et al. 2018).
Table 3.1 PIC Theory Appropriated to Digital Activism
Concept

Definition

Construct

Polycentric
governance
practices

Adverse aggregate effects
that are caused by
individual-level actions
during digital activism

Digital activism practices
that promote order
through independent
adjustments as part of an
emergent system of rules

References

The extent to which information is
contaminated and fails to align with
the overarching goal of digital
activism

Pollution

Collectiveaction
threats

Definition

Congestion

The extent to which appropriation and
provision of information clog the
system that enables digital activism

Violations

The extent to which providers of
information violate rules and laws
related to digital activism

Rebellion

The extent to which providers of
information are dissatisfied and exit a
digital activism effort

Boundary
regulation

The extent to which rules and
technical infrastructure features
regulate anonymity and content
during digital activism

Incremental
adaptation

The extent to which actors gradually
introduce changes in infrastructure
features and rules during digital
activism

Shared
accountability

The extent to which rules and
features afford peer monitoring and
gradual sanctioning of violators of
rules and norms during digital
activism

Provider
recognition

The extent to which providers of
information are acknowledged by
peers, appropriators, and producers
during digital activism

Kata 2012;
Kelly Garrett
2006;
Lampel and
Bhalla 2007;
Mindel et al.
2018; Stien
2016

Mindel et al.
2018;
Ostrom 1990

Boundaries that align with digital activism’s overarching goal reduce the prevalence and impact
of collective-action threats. Boundary regulation—defined as “the extent to which rules and
technical infrastructure features of the information commons regulate anonymity and content”
(Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—may therefore help reduce collective-action threats in information
commons (Butler and Wang 2012; Di Tullio and Staples 2013; Hertel et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa and
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Lang 2011; Ren et al. 2007) and thereby improve digital activism outcomes. For example, rules
and design features, such as login requirements, can reduce the adverse effect of anonymity, while
boundaries on content can prevent the discourse from getting overly heated.
Information providers and appropriators are sensitive to changes they perceive as too sudden or
radical. Given this, incremental adaptation—that is, “the extent to which changes in infrastructure
features and rules are gradually introduced” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—may reduce the
likelihood of alienating digital activism participants and, as a consequence, reduce instances of
rebellion and violations. PIC theory would suggest that a digital activism effort is more likely to
be sustained when it involves information providers in governance and incorporates community
feedback into an incremental adaptation of the system’s rules and features.
It is important that participants have a sense of collective responsibility toward digital activism
efforts. This self-emerging shared accountability—defined as “the extent to which rules and
features afford peer monitoring and gradual sanctioning of violators of rules and norms of the
information commons” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—can improve outcomes in various open
access systems (Chua et al. 2007; Wise et al. 2006). Consistent with this insight, we suggest that
actors adopt shared accountability and peer monitoring to reduce collective-action threats to their
digital activism efforts.
The more content providers feel recognized for their efforts by other stakeholders, the more likely
they are to continue participating and contributing (Lampel and Bhalla 2007). Given this, provider
recognition—defined as “the extent to which providers are acknowledged by peers, appropriators
and producers” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619)—is an important source of motivation (Von Krogh et
al. 2012). Recognition may come as direct congratulatory messages and posts, or as badges, icons,
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“likes,” and other features that tell providers that their efforts are noticed. Provider recognition is
an important driver of continued engagement during digital activism, which often succumbs to
drops in engagement level (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010).
We build on these PIC theory concepts (Table 3.1) to empirically examine and theorize about how
digital activism may be harnessed for institutional change. At the same time, we observe that PIC
theory is generally concerned about the sustainability of information commons, whereas digital
activism’s primary objective is to drive action and achieve some form of change Given this, we
suggest that digital activists not only sustain the information commons but also collectively
achieve a legitimacy threshold (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002) as a basis for maneuvering other
partisan actors and the complex institutional landscape in which they operate.
3.3.2 Digital Activism for Institutional Change
Institutions—that is, the significant practices, relationships, or organizations in a society 12 —
implicitly and explicitly impact most aspects of life. Hence, how institutions are altered is of great
interest to social scientists from multiple disciplines, including management research (Hargrave
and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002), political science (Streeck and Thelen 2009), and
information systems research (Mignerat and Rivard 2009; Orlikowski and Barley 2001).
Institutional change—defined as “a difference in form, quality, or state over time in an institution”
(Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006, p. 866)—can be manifested on the regulatory level, the practice
level, or both. As Table 3.2 shows, the regulatory level appertains to the formal laws, rules, and
policies that govern interactions among institutional actors, groups, and individuals, while the
practice level appertains to the informal behavioral norms of conduct.

12

Merriam-Webster
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As partisan actors harness digital activism to change regulations and practices in a specific
institution, they must maneuver the broader institutional field in which entrenched institutions are
likely to oppose the changes to preserve the status quo. For that reason, it is very difficult for actors
to spur institutional change on their own. On the other hand, a collective action in which multiple
actors maneuver simultaneously, even if not in unison, is less risky for the involved individuals
and has a better chance to succeed (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006). As outlined above, examining
the role of digital activism in collective action, institutional researchers have found that it is an
effective mechanism to reach and mobilize great numbers of individuals, but also that the intended
societal impact is rarely achieved or sustained.
Institutional theories posit that legitimacy is the key means by which intuitional actors obtain and
maintain resources and ultimately exert influence (Oliver 1991; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).
Accordingly, we suggest that the muffled impact of digital online and offline activism is largely
the result of weak legitimacy. Although legitimacy has many definitions (Deephouse and Suchman
2008), it generally concerns an institutional actor’s congruence with social laws, norms, and
values; an institutional actor is legitimate within its field if its actions are recognized as legal,
aligned with existing practices, and socially acceptable to its stakeholders and related institutional
actors. In his seminal work, Suchman (1995) identifies three broad types of legitimacy: pragmatic,
moral, and cognitive.
Without the continuous support of its most immediate stakeholders, an institutional actor is
unlikely to survive. For that reason, institutional actors must secure pragmatic legitimacy by
providing value to their immediate stakeholders (Suchman 1995). Pragmatic legitimacy is based
on a symbiotic dependency between an actor’s actions and the interests of an institution’s
immediate stakeholders; it is the most basic form of legitimacy that must be achieved. In the
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context of digital activism, the campaign—whether it aims to raise funds, collect signatures,
increase awareness, or get people on the streets—must first and foremost gain initial support from
first adopters. Once it gains traction, network effects (Ackland and O’neil 2011) propel further
growth in participation, thereby stabilizing pragmatic legitimacy.
To gain and maintain legitimacy, the actions of institutional actors must be generally perceived as
ethical by stakeholders and other institutional actors (Suchman 1995). As such, moral legitimacy
gives institutional actors the credence required to shore up support and fend off potential
challengers. Digital activism that is perceived to be “slacktivism” or “too aggressive” is less likely
to secure broad moral legitimacy.
Table 3.2 Institutional Theory Applied to Digital Activism
Concept

Institutional
change

Legitimate
action

Definition

A difference in form,
quality, or state over
time in the institution
targeted by digital
activism

An action that is
desirable, proper, or
appropriate within an
institution of regulations
and practices related to
digital activism

Construct
Institutional
regulations

Definition
Formal laws, rules, and policies that
govern the behaviors and actions within
the institution targeted by digital activism

Institutional
practices

Informal behavioral norms of conduct
within the institution targeted by digital
activism

Pragmatic
legitimacy

The extent to which the actions of an actor
are perceived to enhance the interests of
an institution’s immediate stakeholders

Moral
legitimacy

The extent to which the actions of an actor
are perceived to be the “right thing to do”
within an institution

Cognitive
legitimacy

The extent to which the actions of an actor
are perceived to be comprehensible,
factually valid, and “inevitable” within an
institution

References

Hargrave &
Van de Ven
2006

Suchman
1995

Institutional actors’ activities also must be perceived as comprehensible and rational by
stakeholders and other institutional actors in order to be “taken-for-granted” (Suchman 1995). This
high standard of cognitive legitimacy is not based on instinctive self-interest (pragmatic
legitimacy) or subjective evaluation (moral legitimacy), but rather on a rational consideration that
115

Polycentric Information Commons  V. Mindel  2018

an institutional action is inevitable because it is superior to other alternatives. As such, cognitive
legitimacy is the highest form of legitimacy and the most difficult to establish.

3.4 Research Method
Using the explanatory case study approach (Benbasat et al. 1987; Yin 2008), we examine CS, a
research collaboration between a logistics researcher from Lund University in Southern Sweden
and the Swedish Transportations Workers Union, that turned into a digital activism campaign with
widespread ramifications. CS is a unique contemporary case in which institutional actors
effectively leveraged on- and offline digital activism—through social media and smartphonebased crowdsourcing—to change road haulage regulations and practices in Northern Europe.
Through data crowdsourcing via smartphones, CS generated evidence on existing EU legislations’
adverse effects to prompt political, legislative, and industry changes far beyond what traditional
activism had achieved in the preceding 15 years. As such, CS offers important practical and
theoretical lessons on digital activism’s potential to promote institutional change.
We gathered case study data from three primary sources: interviews with key actors, electronic
records of communication among actors, and third-party reports. Interviews are essential
information sources for case study research as they provide the individual perspectives of key
actors in their own words (Yin 2008). Following the guidelines of Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007)
for case-study-based theory development, we sought a plurality of perspectives and interviewed
the actors who had the most knowledge of CS and its impact. Plurality of perspectives reduced the
narrative bias that might potentially impact subsequent theorization. As Table 3.3 shows, we
conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders: the principal producer of CS who
initiated the crowdsourcing study; the mathematician who analyzed the crowdsourced data; the
union leaders who financially supported the study and used the findings to push for institutional
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change; several truck drivers who were highly involved in data collection; a high-ranking politician
who used the crowdsourced data for campaigning and later for promoting new legislation; a
manager of a large retail transportation fleet who instituted changes to practice based on the
crowdsourced findings; CS supporters and the legal counsel for an opposition interest group who
lobbied against CS.
Table 3.3 Interviews
18 Semi-structured Interviews (in-person, unless indicated by “T” for telephone interviews)
#

Key Informants

Position

# Interviews

1

University Researcher

Principal producer of CS

2

Mathematician

Developer of CS data triangulation algorithm

3

3

Union Leader 1

The former head of the Swedish Transport Union

1

4

Union Leader 2

Assistant to the union leader in charge of operations

1

5

Union Leader 3

Assistant to the union leader in charge of lobbying

1

6

Driver 1

Leader of the protest movement “Sweden Comes to Halt“

1

7

Driver 2

Moderator of the CS Facebook page

1

8

Driver 3

High-volume data collector for CS

1

9

Driver 4

High-volume data collector for CS

1

10

Driver 5

Opinion leader in the online trucking community

1

11

Driver 6

Opinion leader in the online trucking community

1(T)

12

High-Ranking Politician

Former minister who used CS to promote new legislation

13

Industry Leader

Transport boss of a large Swedish retailor

14

Legal Council

Lawyer of a large logistics association (chief opponent of CS)

1

15

Company Owner

Retired haulage company owner (supporter of CS)

1

16

Whistle-blower

Former owner of a haulage firm (provided hacked data)

1(T)

1
1(T)

1(T)

Social media posts and communiqués are increasingly used as data sources in case study research
(Wattal et al. 2010; Yates and Paquette 2011) as they provide a wealth of mostly unfiltered insights
into the views, opinions, and conversational dynamics of actors in real-time. The electronic time
stamping also helps create a chronology that lets researchers trace changes over time. We reviewed
a total of 95 email messages, 47 communication streams on Facebook instant messaging, and 439
Facebook posts to help develop a more comprehensive account of our case. Case study researchers
also often use third-party reports to obtain an outsider perspective on the events in question (Myers
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1997). We therefore collected a total of 621 media reports on the crowdsourcing project, as well
as 7 official reports related to the case.
In accordance with Eisenhardt (1989), we aimed to develop a theory-informed narrative for the
case study. We followed prior case study research to distill insights from the multiple qualitative
data sources into a cohesive interpretation by analyzing key episodes and events (Newman and
Robey 1992; Lyytinen and Newman 2008). We used temporal bracketing to organize the key
events into five thematically cohesive episodes: episode one (September 2012–March 2013)
focuses on the events related to the instigation of institutional change; episode two (April 2013–
July 2013) focuses on the events related to the emerging collective action; episode three (May–
September 2013) centers on the enactment of polycentric governance practices; episode four (May
2013–March 2014) examines how the collective action further cascaded; and episode five
(November 2014–February 2015) focuses on how information-provider rebellion was avoided. To
provide context for the five episodes, we first described the intuitional field and summarized the
resulting institutional changes on both the regulation and practice levels.
To develop our inductive theory, we followed the recommendations by Eisenhardt (1989) and
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). First, we used the theoretical framing (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) to
identify collective-action threats, polycentric governance practices, legitimate digital activism, and
institutional changes across the various episodes. The first author analyzed all of the material based
on the theoretical framework’s concepts and constructs, while the second and third authors
reviewed the analyses results. Based on their feedback, the first author revisited the data and, when
needed, conducted follow-up interviews with the CS’s principle producer. Following three
iterations of this analysis, critical review, data review, and follow-up interview, we achieved the
analysis provided below. Next, relying on analytical generalization (Lee and Baskerville 2003;
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Yin 2008), we used the analysis in conjunction with existing literature to develop a series of
propositions; we then tied these propositions together in a conceptual model that theorizes on the
relationship between legitimate digital activism, institutional change, collective-action threats,
institutional resistance, and polycentric governance.

3.5 Case Study Analysis
Here, using PIC and institutional theories to frame the analysis, we provide a detailed account of
the case study (summarized in Table 3.4). We begin by describing the institutional field in which
the digital activism operated and conclude with the resulting regulatory and practice changes in
the targeted road haulage institutions in Northern Europe.
3.5.1 Institutional Field
In the 1990s, The European Union (EU) integration accelerated and debates over the impact of
opening borders to newly admitted Eastern European member countries began to dominate
European politics (Richardson and Mazey 2015; Schimmelfennig 2001). One such debate focuses
on the impact of EU Regulation directive 1072/2009 (2009), which concerns domestic road
haulage regulations. To reduce CO2 emissions, Regulation 1072/2009 grants the right to longdistance international road haulage operators to stay in a country for up to a week and carry up to
three domestic loads. This practice is known as cabotage.
Regulation 1072/2009’s intention was to increase the fill-rate of large trucks so that they could be
used economically and not travel empty. The regulation was hailed as a good example of how
environmental mindfulness can be applied in a practical manner. Indeed, data submitted by
member state statistics bureaus to Eurostat13 showed that, following the regulation’s enactment,

13

Eurostat is the Luxemburg-based EU administration branch dedicated to compiling statistical data.
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fewer empty trucks were operating at any given moment across the EU. The policy’s success
prompted EU legislators to schedule further cross-border haulage deregulations.
However, as Regulation 1072/2009 took effect, haulers from newly admitted Eastern EU member
states began inundating the domestic markets of Western European countries (Hilal 2008; Kummer
et al. 2014). Reports emerged of widespread exploitation of cheaper Eastern European drivers by
haulage companies (Hilal 2008). Anecdotal reports also suggested that cabotage regulations—that
is, the provisions limiting local carries to a maximum of three per week—were largely ignored,
and that underpaid Eastern European drivers were driving around with empty containers in the
hope of getting assignments. A retired haulage company owner explained to us the chief reason
that haulage companies were ignoring the cabotage rules: “I [and other haulage companies] could
get four or five Romanian drivers for the price of one Swedish driver.” On top of that, he said that
“nobody was enforcing the rules” limiting cabotage to three assignments per week. The availability
of cheap labor launched a race to the bottom, driving haulage companies to let go of West European
drivers while recruiting more East Europeans to compete for transportation assignment bids. The
big-box retailers and other haulage customers, who benefitted from lower transportation costs,
simply turned their heads, according to the retired haulage company owner. So, in effect, EU crossborder transport deregulation gave rise to institutional exploitation of East European drivers,
harmed rather than improved environmental sustainability, and disrupted the livelihood of West
European drivers.
3.5.2 Instigating Institutional Change (September 2012–March 2013)
Witnessing its members hurting, the Swedish Transportation Union pushed the first domino to
challenge the status quo. Established in 1897, the Union is tasked with protecting the rights and
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interest of its 60,000 transport industry members. To maintain pragmatic legitimacy in the eyes of
its stakeholders, the Union engages in different activities, including negotiating collective
bargaining agreements on working conditions with various commercial and governmental
organizations, and lobbying for or against policies impacting its members. Naturally, the Union
opposed Regulation 1072/2009 prior to its enactment and continued arguing against it, but without
success. In political circles, Regulation 1072/2009 was seen as environmentally friendly,
economically efficient, and undisruptive. Although the Union had considerable anecdotal evidence
on widespread disregard for cabotage laws and exploitation of Eastern European drivers, the
evidence was largely dismissed by the political establishment as merely isolated incidents and
rumors. As one Union leader explained it to us: “We needed real data and statistics to get the
attention of policy makers.”
To challenge the status quo, the Union decided to sponsor scientific research that could contradict
or at least seriously question Eurostat’s data to show that Regulation 1072/2009 was not nearly as
good for the environment. The Union leadership contacted a logistics researcher and asked him to
examine Regulation 1072/2009’s environmental impact. The researcher first contacted various
haulage companies and retailors with their own transportation fleets to request access to their
internal data logs on transportation assignments. Not a single company agreed to release its data,
however. The researcher and his team then began manually recording the movements of trucks in
and out of Gothenburg port, the major entry point of foreign trucks into Sweden. However, while
this data collection approach showed a disproportionate traffic volume of Eastern European trucks,
it said nothing about their environmental impact.
To gather the requisite empirical observations, the researcher considered crowdsourcing
techniques. Although relying on crowds of volunteers to collect data had been attempted in other
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research contexts—including emergency response, noise pollution mapping, medical research, and
map making (Goodchild and Glennon 2010; Heipke 2010; Stevens and D’Hondt 2010)—it had
not been used to map moving targets on such a vast geographical scale. To facilitate this mapping,
the research team designed a simple smartphone application that let users record truck license
plates and automatically extract the time-stamp and coordinates from the phone’s GPS.
At this point, the team’s main challenge was to legitimize the data crowdsourcing to motivate users
to participate. The Union issued an announcement through its webpage, newsletter, and official
Facebook page with the goal of getting its members to download the app and participate in data
collection. Initially, the call was largely ignored, and hardly anyone downloaded the app.
Moreover, several truckers prominent on the Facebook community page “Trucker’s Paradise”—
with more than 12,000 members, most of whom are Swedish truck drivers—openly ridiculed the
idea, questioning both its practicality and usefulness. As one truck driver put it: “The entire thing
seems like a waste of time.”
The researcher, henceforth referred to as the “producer” of the information commons14, personally
contacted every driver who expressed skepticism about the data crowdsourcing initiative. Using
Facebook messenger as his main tool of communication, he urged the skeptics to participate by
empathetically addressing the basic collective need of Swedish truck drivers: to secure their
livelihood. As the producer noted to a skeptic truck driver: “You have nothing to lose and a lot to
gain.” Although still hesitant, the drivers that he contacted gave their word that they would
participate in data collection and that they would urge other truckers to join in as well.

The entity leading the information commons—setting its overarching goal and organizing it rules and
infrastructure, called a “producer” in PIC theory.
14
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To coordinate the data collection efforts, the producer created a new Facebook group page titled
“Cabotagestudien.” Although the study’s stated goal was to examine the environmental and social
impact of Regulation 1072/2009, the chosen name of the project and the associated Facebook page
purposefully zoomed in on the issue of cabotage—specifically, the practice of local carries by East
European trucks in the Nordic countries. The producer and his team reasoned that it was easier to
rouse the crowd to participate in data collection if it spoke to their basic concerns about the
deteriorating conditions in the industry, job security and accurate statistics rather than to an abstract
notion of environmentalism.
In summary, the implicit rebellion, on social media, of truck drivers who initially refused to partake
in data crowdsourcing was threatening the pragmatic legitimacy of the digital offline activism
(Table 3.4). However, through direct recognition of key opinion leaders in the trucking
community, the producer secured initial pragmatic legitimacy to support CS. The resulting
partnership between the university researcher (producer), the Transport Union leadership, and the
trucking community’s online opinion leader signaled an initial shift in the institutional field.
3.5.3 Emerging Collective Action (April 2013–July 2013)
The Union’s engagement of the producer to obtain data that could be used to challenge Regulation
1072/2009 suddenly expanded into a collective action. Hundreds of truck drivers from rival
factions—union members, anti-union private trucking group members, and independent operators
alike—downloaded the app and used it to tag the license plates of trucks. As one non-union
member truck driver put it when committing to the data crowdsourcing: “I hate the Union, but I
will tag.”
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The volume of participation and the stream of truck observations steadily grew over the six weeks
of the first crowdsourcing run, providing thousands of data points used to triangulate truck
movement (Figure 3.1). For the first time ever, an observation-based account of truck movement
was available. As Figure 3.2 shows, the producer and his team created a website to show
information appropriators the movement patterns of trucks on an interactive map.
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Figure 3.1 First Crowdsourcing Run, April–June 2013

The observed movement patterns largely confirmed the suspicion that East European trucks did
not exit the country as required, but instead drove around scrambling for local assignments.
Moreover, the observations suggested that East European trucks were often traveling without
cargo. In addition to tagging trucks, some drivers began recording and posting videos showing the
horrid unsanitary living conditions of East European drivers in their makeshift camps. In just six
weeks of data crowdsourcing and on t=other on the ground activism, CS could provide evidence
of the adverse consequences of Regulation 1072/2009: rampant breaking of cabotage practices and
widespread marginalization of East European drivers.
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The openness of the information commons—that is, the study’s Facebook page and the
crowdsourcing app—almost immediately gave rise to collective-action threats. After maps of truck
movement patterns were made accessible to the public online, increased internet traffic caused
congestion in appropriation and frequent crashes of the website. More concerning, the production
team began noticing an increase in nonsensical observations submitted to the data pool. While
some of that information pollution was attributed to simple human error in punching numbers, the
appearance of observations of trucks on open water and other suspicious data suggested that the
app also was being deliberately abused. It was unclear what proportion of this deliberate data
pollution was the result of juvenile vandalism and what was sabotage by those who opposed the
CS objectives, but we do know that the latter occurred. For example, we interviewed the legal
counsel for an organization supporting Regulation 1072/2009, and he openly bragged about
tagging the license plates of trucks he knew for a fact were on assignments in other parts of Europe.
The concern at the time was that data pollution might compromise the accuracy of the
mathematical triangulation used to map truck movements, subsequently hurting CS’s cognitive
legitimacy.
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Figure 3.2 Example Movement Patterns of a Truck Violating Cabotage Regulations

In addition to pollution, violations began emerging, threatening the digital activism’s moral
legitimacy. After the findings became public and exposed the scope of the problems that
Regulation 1072/2009 caused, an increasing number of frustrated Swedish truck drivers began
openly expressing vicious—and at times racist and xenophobic—sentiments toward the East
European drivers on the study’s Facebook page. One truck driver, for example, posted the angry
message: “The [expletive] Polish drivers are stealing our jobs!” Although the East European
drivers were themselves often victims of institutional exploitation (Hilal 2008), some Swedish
drivers perceived them to be the problem. In our interviews, the principle producer, Union leaders,
and high-ranking politicians all expressed concern that such antagonistic rhetoric could alienate
public opinion and other political allies.
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In summary, collective action emerged as an increasing number of truckers and others downloaded
the data-crowdsourcing app (Table 3.4). In response to growing interest in the digital activism, the
producers launched a website that showed visitors the preliminary results of the data analysis on
an interactive map; however, the website frequently crashed because of congestion in
appropriation. Further, as PIC theory predicts, other collective-action threats—including violations
(in the form of xenophobic comments) and pollution (in the form of invalid tags)—began
emerging.
3.5.4 Enacting Polycentric Governance (May 2013–September 2013)
The first version of the app and the associated website were rather rudimentary, and the production
team realized that several incremental adaptations were needed to respond to the collective-action
threats following the first data crowdsourcing run. To deal with the study website’s frequent
crashes, the principle producer acquired additional server capacity to increase data availability to
the appropriators. At first, most of the people accessing the website were the Swedish drivers
involved in data collection, but other institutional actors—including the media, politicians, and
various transport industry actors—quickly began accessing the findings as well.
To combat data pollution, the production team took several steps. First, it devised detailed
protocols for cleaning data prior to analysis. Second, the team required app users to register. The
team was initially concerned that eliminating anonymity might reduce participation. However,
after deliberations that included feedback from core information providers, the team decided that
data accuracy (cognitive legitimacy) was more important than user anonymity. Rather than block
polluters, the CS mathematician used the polluted data to further calibrate the triangulation
algorithm. As the mathematician noted, paradoxically, “knowing which tags were deliberately
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manipulated made it easier to detect other unintentionally polluted observations and thus focus
the analysis on the untainted data.”
To combat violations on the Facebook page, the production team and other participants tried to
post conciliatory messages to urge people to focus on the data collection and avoid xenophobic
posts. For example, one truck driver commented on another trucker’s xenophobic post on the study
Facebook page as follows: “Please stop with the hate posts. They [the East European drivers] are
not the problem.” However well intended, those calls for civility were largely ignored. The
principle producer then contacted core providers to discuss the harmful impact of xenophobic
rhetoric on public perception of the study. Some providers volunteered to act as peer reviewers,
and norms of shared accountability began emerging as these fellow drivers systematically urged
peers to avoid using derogatory language. Subsequently, though not eliminated, the volume and
viciousness level of xenophobic posts dropped substantially.
To encourage the crowd, the production team also started to post updates on the data collection
effort’s progress, along with links to media stories, on the Facebook page. More than hundred such
posts—ranging from two to five paragraphs long—were made over a two-year period. Additional
recognition came from the Scandinavian trucker magazines as well as other supporters, who began
offering modest prizes to top information providers. In addition, the producer team created a
ranking system that included medals and other achievement icons to recognize top data providers.
The principle producer also personally contacted top data providers to commend their effort.
Although, initially, concerns about the future of their livelihood was the main motivation for truck
drivers to participate, the various forms of recognition helped to prevent the flame from sizzling
and strengthened the needed pragmatic legitimacy.
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In summary, following the emergence of collective action and the collective-action threats, CS
producers enacted a series of polycentric responses: they incrementally adapted server capacity,
set a boundary on anonymity, recruited responsible activists to act as Facebook page moderators,
and added a rating system to recognize top data taggers. These improvements helped to increase
the moral and cognitive legitimacy of the digital activism.
3.5.5 Cascading Collective Action (May 2013–March 2014)
Following the release of the crowdsourced data, multiple dormant actors in the institutional field
began taking steps to protect and enhance their own legitimacy. Although such maneuvers were
largely uncoordinated, they nonetheless culminated in an expanding collective action.
During the first data crowdsourcing run in May 2013, CS received increasing interest from
politicians and the media. For example, the Swedish infrastructure minister stated: “We need to
investigate the matter [cabotage] to address the issues. I myself downloaded the application and
used it.” The minister also called for the creation of a committee to reexamine Regulation
1072/2009’s impact. At the same time, reports on CS began appearing on national news coverage,
including a featured story on the primetime evening news broadcast. Further, politicians opposing
rapid EU expansion began citing CS to bolster their legitimacy with potential backers and voters
during the 2014 Swedish Parliamentary elections. The high-ranking politician we interviewed
stated that CS provided an “important window to the larger issue of the impact of EU rapid
expansion on blue-collar labor in Sweden.”
As the publicity of CS grew, major transport buyers began paying greater attention to their
transportation sourcing practices, and some even allied themselves with CS—presumably to
bolster their own legitimacy. For instance, following the first data crowdsourcing run, one of
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Sweden’s largest retailers released its data logs to the production team. This data was instrumental
for determining the environmental impact of the transportation fleet, which further bolstered the
cognitive legitimacy of CS. In our interview, the transportation boss of the retailor praised CS for
“raising the awareness of the issue of exploitation of East European drivers and rampant law
breaking.” Public opinion pressure following the explosion of the issue in the media and political
arena likely pressured the retailer to release the data logs.
In September 2013, following CS’s initial success, the Union provided additional funding. When
a second data crowdsourcing run was launched in October 2013, the response from the crowd was
even stronger, and for the first time CS surpassed a thousand daily app users (Figure 3.3). This
time around, it took only four weeks to gather enough observations to gain meaningful
triangulation of movement patterns. The second data crowdsourcing run’s success spurred
additional media coverage and political posturing, and some haulers began seeing the value in
being associated with the increasingly high-profile study. Three haulers opened their data logs to
the producer’s team. In exchange for the data, the haulers asked for a certification for being honest
players, presumably to improve their legitimacy. Gaining access to the haulers’ data further
increased the cognitive legitimacy of the crowdsourced data; the production team could now
clearly show that the crowdsourced observation closely aligned with haulers GPS logs. Even the
mathematician was somewhat surprised by how well the data was aligned.
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Figure 3.3 Second Crowdsourcing Run, October–November 2013

While the attention CS received helped enhance its legitimacy and impact in the institutional field,
it also began attracting attacks from institutional actors who supported Regulation 1072/2009 as
well as further deregulations. Such opponents often criticized the cognitive legitimacy of the data
collection method by questioning the notions that isolated field observations could be used to map
truck movements across a distance or that the CS algorithm could say anything about the
environmental impact of East European trucks. Opponents also questioned the moral legitimacy
of CS by repeatedly pointing to the xenophobic sentiments it was steering during the election
season. Detractors opposed CS for various reasons. The former legal counsel for a major
Forwarders’ Association openly admitted opposing CS initially because it reduced his client’s
ability to be “flexible” with transportation labor costs. He also cited various other legal and
ideological objections to CS.
In summary, the digital activism’s success motivated attacks on its cognitive legitimacy from
established interests (Table 3.4). However, early success also expanded shared accountability
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across the institutional field, and other actors supplied additional data that helped to stabilize the
cognitive legitimacy of the digital activism.
3.5.6 Avoiding Provider Rebellion (November 2014–December 2014)
When an East European trucker was arrested for driving with fake documents and released with
no charges in the end of 2014, frustrations with the status-quo among Swedish truckers reached a
boiling point. Some truckers began discussing roadside protests across the country, including
calling for synchronized 15-minute traffic blockades on a newly created Facebook page (Figure
3.4). Many of the participants in this new protest movement—called HÄR STANNAR SVERIGE!
(Sweden comes to a halt!)—were information providers in the crowdsourcing project who met
through the CS Facebook page. One trucker urged his peers to engage in protests on the newly
created Facebook page: “Enough with tagging [data collection]; it is time for action.”
Now that the initial objective—revealing the movement patterns of foreign trucks—was achieved,
perceptions of CS’s overarching goal began to diverge. The producer’s team focused on further
validating the findings and analyzing their implications. At the same time, an increasing proportion
of information providers became impatient with the pace of change. After creating its own
Facebook page, the new movement launched its own application to coordinate and trace roadside
protests.
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Figure 3.4 The “Sweden Comes to a Halt!” Movement Called on West European Truck Drivers to Stop
for 15 Minutes, twice ad, for a Month to Protest Cabotage Laws

The producer was concerned that the aggressive tactics that disrupt traffic could backfire and
turn public opinion against the truckers, subsequently reducing political support for change. He
urged truckers to avoid roadside protest, warning them that: “You are going to undermine
everything we worked for and achieve nothing.” Many truckers shared those concerns and were
reluctant to join the rebellion. Although attempts to disrupt traffic did not gain critical mass
support and essentially failed, the rift in the CS community suggested that many truckers were no
longer interested in participating in the next scheduled crowdsourcing run. To save CS, the
producer have initiated contact with the leaders of the new movement, many of whom were the
same skeptical online opinion leaders he had previously engaged to secure support for the initial
crowdsourcing run. Through a series of online communications and offline meetings, the
producer convinced most of the detractors that antagonistic tactics would likely result in loss of
the legitimacy they had painstakingly gained since the study began. The producer—by now
perceived as “one of us” by the truckers—used his social capital to secure most detractors’
verbal commitment to not engage in road blockades, but instead to recommit to CS.
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Coincidently, as the protest movement was disintegrating, new stricter laws against cabotage
were passed (see the “Institutional Change” section below for more details). Although the laws
had little to do with the protests—and were initiated several months before they occurred—
following validation of the crowdsourced data, the rebellion leaders took credit for the
toughening laws, while also reasserting their reengagement in CS. The last crowdsourcing run
took place in May 2015 and was even more successful than the previous two in terms of speed,
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Figure 3.5 Third Data Crowdsourcing Run, May–June 2015

In summary, dissatisfied activists decide to move from tagging data to launching roadside
protests—a move that had the potential to hurt the CS’s pragmatic and moral legitimacy (Table
3.4). Direct talks with and recognition of core providers reduced the rebellion’s intensity, and most
of the opinion leaders in the trucker community recommitted to data crowdsourcing. This
subsequently stabilized the pragmatic and moral legitimacy of the digital activism.
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Collective-Action
Polycentric
Threats
Governance Practices

Legitimate Digital
Activism

Institutional
Change

Instigating Institutional Change
(Sept. 2012–March 2013)

• Provider Recognition: The
• Rebellion: Truckers
university researcher
are highly skeptical
personally asks opinion
about the
leaders in the trucking
crowdsourcing
community to help him, as
initiative even before it
principle producer, to address
begins
concerns about the livelihood
of Swedish truck drivers

• Pragmatic Legitimacy: The
Swedish Transportation
Union provided financial
support for the research,
which boosted its initial
pragmatic legitimacy
• Pragmatic Legitimacy:
Opinion leaders in the
trucking community commit
themselves to CS

• Institutional Practices:
New research initiative to
examine the impact of
Policy 1072/2009

Emerging Collective Action
(April 2013 - July 2013)

• Congestion: Study
website repeatedly
crashes due to highvolume information
appropriation traffic
• Incremental Adaptation: CS
• Pollution: Detection
website was launched to give
of nonsensical
information appropriators
observations in data
access to interactive maps
• Violation:
Xenophobic
sentiments expressed
on the study’s
Facebook page

• Pragmatic Legitimacy:
Increases as more people
join data crowdsourcing
• Moral Legitimacy:
Decreases because of
xenophobia
• Cognitive Legitimacy:
Decreases because of data
pollution

• Incremental Adaptation:
Expansion of the information
commons’ server capacity
• Boundary Regulation:
Creation of app registration
and banning of polluters
• Shared Accountability:
Monitoring team for Facebook
page and unofficial
reprimanding of xenophobic
comments
• Provider Recognition:
Ranking of top providers

Cascading Collective Action
(May 2013–March 2014)

Episode

Enacting Polycentric Governance
(May 2013–September 2013)

Table 3.4 Summary of the Case Study Analysis

N/A

• Attacks: Supporters
of Policy 1072/2009
question the study’s
cognitive and moral
legitimacy

• Shared Accountability:
Additional institutional actors
join the study and provide
data; a large retailer in
Sweden and three haulage
firms share data

135

• Institutional Practices:
Emergence of collective
action involving truckers
from opposing factions of
the transport industry

• Moral Legitimacy: Increases
• Institutional Practices:
following the reduction of
Trucker magazines and
xenophobic posts
other supporters begin
• Cognitive Legitimacy:
offering modest prizes to
Increases as registration is
encourage information
required and polluters are
provision
banned

• Institutional Practices:
• Cognitive Legitimacy:
Big retailers revamp their
Increases as new data from
haulage sourcing
industry actors enhances the
practices
study’s factual accuracy; as a
• Institutional
result, that accuracy is
Regulations: The
increasingly taken for
Swedish Parliament
granted, and its publicity and
passes new laws to
use in political discourse
crackdown on illegal
grows
practices

Evading Provider Rebellion
(Nov 2014: Feb 2015)
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• Rebellion:
Dissatisfied truckers
abandon the study
and initiate road-side
protests

• Provider Recognition: The
principle producer personally
engages protestors to
convince them to abandon
road-side protests in favor of
data crowdsourcing

• Pragmatic legitimacyStabilizes as truckers
recommit to data collection
• Moral Legitimacy: Stable,
as roadside protests do not
get out of hand

• Institutional Practices: A
protest movement
emerges

3.5.7 Institutional Change
More than three years after CS launch, we can see its institutional impact on both the regulatory
and practice levels. Some of those changes occurred earlier on, while others are still unfolding. In
response to the new revelations that CS brought to light, the Swedish Parliament passed new laws
targeting violators of haulage regulations. The new provisions substantially increased the authority
of Swedish traffic police to stop and inspect suspicious trucks, as well as to issue fines on the spot
outside the regular legal due process. So, instead of issuing a ticket and setting a court date, the
new provisions let police boot the trucks violating the law, immobilizing them on the roadside
until the fines were paid. The fines also were increased: violations that were previously 3,000 SEK
(approximately $350 USD) were increased to 40,000 SEK (approximately $5,000 USD). Haulers
caught breaking the law also were fined heavily and potentially faced revocation of their business
licenses. Similar fines and violator crackdowns were introduced in neighboring Denmark, Norway,
and Finland. In our interviews with Union leaders and the high-ranking politician, we also learned
that additional regulations are being initiated and discussed in the legislature; those regulations
include better mechanisms for inspections, increases in booting times, and a provision making
transport buyers legally liable for their subcontractors’ offenses.
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Prior to CS, Swedish political parties were split between those supporting further EU deregulations
of cross-border transport and those opposing them. Following CS, however, all major Swedish
parties vehemently opposed further EU cabotage deregulation. The Swedish representatives in the
EU parliament built a coalition of West European countries to halt scheduled deregulations. Now,
in 2018, previously scheduled deregulations are on hold, and the EU committee of cross-border
commerce is currently engaging in a debate—with West European countries on one side, East
European countries on the other—about increasing the regulations on working conditions and
requiring safe-driving training of all truck drivers across the EU. The committee is tasked with
redefining cabotage and suggesting a sensible way to regulate it.
The biggest practical impact of CS cited by all actors we interviewed was on public awareness. A
little-known problem affecting an industry that few people think about became a central issue on
the evening news and in the political arena on both national and international levels. CS brought
to light the ugly unintended consequences of EU cross-border deregulations—rampant
exploitation of East European labor (modern day “slaves” according to many of the people we
interviewed), broken laws, safety issues associated with poorly trained truck drivers, an increase
in CO2 emissions, and adverse effects on Swedish labor. The issue’s visibility caused many actors
in the institutional field to alter their practices. Several retail companies and other transport buyers
began openly questioning haulage companies about their practices to ensure that those companies
were not breaking the law. For instance, ICA, Sweden’s largest retailer, and Elgiganten, its largest
home electronics retailer, began requiring in their transport purchase agreements that all drivers
be paid in accordance with the level of the Swedish Transport Union collective bargaining
agreement. Other industry executives we spoke with advocated for improving working conditions
for East European drivers, even if it meant increase their transportation costs. Reacting to pressure
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from transport buyers, some haulage companies began cleaning house to reform their exploitative
practices. The increase in enforcement and fines caused small East European haulage operators to
leave Sweden and go elsewhere in the EU. Although many East European trucks continue
operating in Sweden and Denmark, they typically belong to large haulage firms based in East
Europe, which are less likely to break cabotage regulations than small-time independent truckers.
Finally—and somewhat unexpectedly—the attitude of Swedish drivers toward their East European
counterparts has drastically shifted over the past few years. The initial resentment and calls for
tougher punishments gradually turned to sympathy and calls for equal conditions. All truck drivers
we spoke to expressed sympathy for the situation of East European drivers, many of whom they
have come to know on a personal level.

3.6 Discussion and Theory Development
Using collective action as a shared perspective, we merged PIC theory (Mindel et al. 2018) and
theory of institutional change (Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Seo and Creed 2002) to advance
knowledge on the mutually constitutive duality (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones et al. 2004)
between digital activism and the institutional context it aims to change. In addition, we drew on
institutional theory on legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002) to propose that
digital activism’s success in institutional fields depends on its capacity to drive legitimate
collective action. As the empirical foundation for our theorizing, we examined the CS case, in
which actors harnessed social media and smartphone-based crowdsourcing to mobilize and drive
collective action that successfully caused institutional change. The theoretical framing we adopted
let us zoom in on the processes of and the relationships between establishing legitimacy,
mobilizing collective action, and changing institutions through digital activism; it also let us focus
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on how digital activism overcomes the degenerative collective-action threats that often arise. As
Figure 6 shows, our work builds on PIC and institutional theories, the case study breakdown, and
prior digital activism literature to develop a conceptual model and related propositions that explain
how polycentric governance practices reduce collective-action threats to legitimate digital activism
aimed at changing the institutional field.
Prior research asserts that the greater the legitimacy of an institutional order, the harder it is for a
collective action to bring about change (Thomas et al. 1986; Walker et al. 1988). Our case study
expands this theoretical insight by demonstrating how digitally enabled collective action
undermined the legitimacy of an established intuitional order. As our analysis revealed, this
happened through a mutually constitutive process (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones et al.
2004) in which the digital activism established its own legitimacy, while at the same time eroding
the legitimacy of the institutional order. Furthermore, the more the institutional order’s legitimacy
eroded, the more the digital activism’s legitimacy grew. Hence, while CS was struggling to
establish and maintain its legitimacy, once it secured that requisite pragmatic, moral, and cognitive
legitimacy it was able to erode the legitimacy of the previous institutional order set by Regulation
1072/2009.
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Figure 3.6 Conceptual Model

As the case demonstrates, it is difficult for digital activism—with its online and offline
components—to establish and sustain legitimacy within an institutional field. The opportunity cost
of participating in online activism is substantially lower in comparison. However, its pragmatic
legitimacy often dissipates because it is hard for campaigns to remain continuously relevant in the
fast-paced online environment, which has numerous competing causes and other attentiongrabbing stimulations (Wasik 2009). At best, and however welcomed they might be, online
campaigns are perceived as short-lived pushes to achieve a predefined goal—such as obtaining
signatures or raising funds—rather than as long-term solutions (Kosinski 2014).
Where digital online activism is disadvantaged because of its focus on narrow goals, offline
activism is disadvantaged because it often lacks focus (Indiviglio 2011). Digital offline activism
typically aims to alter deep-rooted social, political, and economic institutions, and is therefore less
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focused on specifics. Further, the fact that offline movements often lack a centralized voice—and
various participants often demand different things—makes them seem naive or lacking a solid
intellectual argument (Bhagwati 2004; Friedersdorf 2015; Indiviglio 2011). So, where online
activism is often perceived as an exercise in clicktivism and therefore suffers from low moral
legitimacy, offline activism suffers a similar fate because it trends toward echo-chamber effects
and violent eruptions (White 2016).
Against these schisms, the CS case illustrates how digital activism online can usefully mix with
and support offline activism. Without having recruited core participants through Facebook in the
days prior to its first crowdsourcing run, CS would likely have failed to obtain the needed
pragmatic legitimacy. As the validity of the data collected by the crowds increased over time,
public support for the cause of addressing the problems created by Regulation 1072/2009 grew,
increasing the moral legitimacy of the digital activism offline carried out through data
crowdsourcing. In turn, CS’s increased public awareness and moral legitimacy—playing out in the
media and the political arena—fueled participation online and offline, which stabilized the
campaign’s pragmatic legitimacy. During its two-plus years, CS had only three relatively short
data crowdsourcing runs—of six, four, and two weeks, respectively—but the results were
impactful enough to sustain adequate activity online. Thus, when the next offline push was needed,
activists were ready. In a sense, the online activities were the continuous, low-burning flame that
could be turned up for short bursts of intense offline activity. Likewise, the offline activism’s
success helped ensure the online flame continued burning. Hence, we propose:

Proposition 1a: Digital activism will more likely achieve institutional change
when it is pragmatically, morally, and cognitively legitimate.
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Proposition 1b: Online and offline digital activism reinforce each other’s
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy.

Digital activism’s openness is simultaneously a source of strength and of weakness. On one hand,
the aggregate effect of collective action carried out by many dispersed, loosely coordinated
individuals can generate remarkable and significant outcomes. On the other hand, within the
parameters of the primary collective action, other forms of degenerative collective actions may
emerge (Mindel et al. 2018). Seo and Creed (2002) address the importance of establishing
legitimacy for change, but they do not detail the process through which that legitimacy is
established. The CS case expands their theoretical proposition by illustrating digital activism’s
potential role in establishing legitimacy for mobilizing collective action, and by zeroing in how
Suchman’s three forms of legitimacy (1995) stabilize in the face of emerging collective-action
threats caused by the open-access nature of digital activism.
Information pollution is increasingly recognized as characteristic of information commons online
that primarily depend on anonymous amateurs for content and information (Mindel et al. 2018).
When data pollution emerged in CS, its cognitive legitimacy was seriously jeopardized as
supporters of Regulation 1072/2009 who opposed CS questioned the data’s validity in an effort to
undermine the study. However, information pollution was not the only problem arising that
challenged the CS effort’s legitimacy. Given the crowdsourcing initiative’s early success, the study
website suffered from congestion and repeatedly crashed due to high-volume information
appropriation traffic. Later, when various violations such as xenophobic posts and harassments
emerged online, CS’s moral legitimacy was at risk, as supporters of Regulation 1072/2009
attempted to discredit the activist movement by questioning the motivations of study participants
and other institutional actors associated with CS.
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In-fighting can also weaken activism, and prior research finds that competition for resources
among activist movements addressing similar issues hurts the overall cause (Zald and McCarthy
1979). In the CS case, many of the truckers decided to quit and form their own activist group
because they were dissatisfied with the pace and magnitude of change; as a result, the study’s
foundational support was on shaky ground, undermining its pragmatic legitimacy. While CS’s
openness to anyone willing to participate helped it to achieve a remarkable feat—mapping the
movement of mobile targets on an unprecedented geographical scale—this openness also created
the conditions for sudden dropout when this trucker rebellion created a competing movement.
Besides the risk that road blockades might alienate the public, producers of CS were concerned
that there were not enough resources in terms of committed time and energy to support two
separate movements. All in all, this case study shows that digital activism’s open nature created
the conditions for individual level actions that, when aggregated, could undermine the legitimacy
of CS. Drawing on these insights, we propose:
Proposition 2: Collective-action threats of congestion, pollution, violation, and
rebellion will likely reduce the legitimacy of digital activism.
Although the producer’s team did not necessarily see it at the time, in retrospect, adopting
polycentric governance principles (Mindel et al. 2018) was crucial for CS success. Research is
conflicted on the question of whether setting boundaries on anonymity is beneficial; some studies
find that registration requirements do not necessarily increase content quality and credibility (Fogg
et al. 2001), while other research shows that it clearly helps to reduce vandalism (Van Oorschot
and Stubblebine 2006). Other work asserts that the overarching goal of the information commons
should determine the boundaries on anonymity (Ren et al. 2007). In this case, requiring users to
register to participate in the crowdsourcing initiatives substantially reduced information pollution
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and let the producers flag suspicious tags, which further helped calibrate the data analysis
algorithm.
On the question of incremental versus rapid innovation and system design, the literature is split
(Norman and Verganti 2014). We observe that incremental adaptation of the CS app and associated
website, as well as a stepwise approach to adjusting community governance practices on the
Facebook page, effectively balanced the need for improvements and the danger of alienating
participants. Changes made to the app, such as adding a registration requirement, were introduced
gradually and in response to information pollution. Even then, however, the producers did not
immediately ban suspicious taggers; instead, they used the contaminated data to their advantage,
improving the triangulation algorithm.
Shared accountability helped CS improve its moral legitimacy. In line with previous findings on
the role of peer monitoring in information commons (Chua et al. 2007; Williams and Cothrel 2000;
Wise et al. 2006), the emergence of shared accountability on the study’s Facebook page helped to
significantly reduce harassment and xenophobic posts. Peer drivers reprimanded posters who
crossed the line, and volunteer page monitors quickly identified and promptly removed posts that
might undermine the study’s moral legitimacy.
Prior research finds that attention and recognition through direct feedback, “likes,” followers,
icons, avatars, and other status symbols often motivates engagement in information commons,
whether in social media, crowdsourcing, or online communities (Huberman et al. 2009; Lampel
and Bhalla 2007; Moon and Sproull 2008). Our interviews showed us how much the hundreds of
encouraging posts, the ranking system of top taggers, and the personal messages from the producer
team helped to keep the drivers motivated. Similarly, posts and messages online and offline
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between information providers—mostly drivers—helped to maintain a robust core of participants
who recruited others, giving CS the momentum it needed during the crowdsourcing phases.
Provider recognition also served to create relationships and a sense of trust among providers
toward the producer, who later used this social capital created overtime to convince drivers not to
quit CS. Drawing on these insights, we propose:
Proposition 3: Polycentric governance practices of boundary regulation,
incremental adaptation, shared accountability, and provider recognition will
likely lessen collective-action threats and increase the legitimacy of digital
activism.
Changes caused by introducing new technologies into an environment are likely to create feedback
effects on the technology’s trajectory (Orlikowski 2007) as expressions of a mutually constitutive
duality (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Jones et al. 2004). Similarly, the CS case study shows that,
as digital activism impacted change in the institutional field, it was also impacted by the events it
helped to set in motion. For instance, the attention CS received from the media and politicians
motivated information providers to keep tagging, which increased the study’s pragmatic
legitimacy; however, this increased attention simultaneously prompted an increase in the intensity
of xenophobic sentiments expressed online, which reduced the study’s moral legitimacy. The
decrease in moral legitimacy made many supporters uncomfortable, which prompted the “we need
to do something about it” discussions that caused the production team to adjust the polycentric
practices of CS. On the other hand, the more the CS legitimacy stabilized, and institutional
regulations and practices were set in motion, the less concerned the production team was about
adjusting polycentric practices. For instance, when the political establishment embraced CS and
began using it to promote the legislative agenda, producers became less concerned with adjusting
the app and less occupied with the Facebook page, and instead shifted their focus to further
disseminating the data. However, when the protest movement began brewing, the principle
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producer acted quickly to secure the commitment of truckers for the next CS crowdsourcing run.
Observing how developments in the institutional field informed the adjustments to the app and the
Facebook page activities, we propose:
Proposition 4: Polycentric governance practices will more likely be effective if
they are adjusted in response to changes in institutional regulations and
practices.

Institutions are reluctant to change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and, when challenged, vested
interests are likely to fight back to undermine the challenger and preserve their position (Seo and
Creed 2002). Prior research on online activism finds that powerful institutions may filter content
and use surveillance to combat online activism that they perceive as threatening to their position
(Ghobadi and Clegg 2015). The CS study also demonstrates how institutional actors may subtly
exploit vulnerabilities to undermine digital activism. We find that the emergence of collectiveaction threats due to digital activism’s openness was used as ammunition by opposition actors.
Opponents of CS openly questioned the integrity of the data and its analysis, both publicly and in
closed political circles. In some instances, opponents even engaged in deliberate data pollution to
further reduce CS’s cognitive legitimacy. While information pollution does not necessarily hurt
digital activism’s sustainability, it likely reduces its legitimacy and its ability to cause institutional
change. In our interviews with the principle CS producer and a CS opponent, both mentioned the
importance of establishing the credibility of CS to cause institutional change.
Similarly, violations in the form of xenophobia, racism, and harassment on the CS Facebook page
were used to discredit the digital activism’s moral legitimacy, as well as to endanger its pragmatic
legitimacy and make institutional actors—including politicians, media, and corporations—
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disassociate themselves from CS. In our interviews with the Union leaders, industry actors, the
high-ranking politician, and the CS producers, they all expressed those concerns.
Some institutional opponents continue to work to reverse the legislations caused by CS. These
opponents both challenge the legal standing of the new Swedish regulations and lobby the EU to
intervene in Swedish legislation. Evidently, an impactful digital activism within an institutional
field is bound to step on the toes of certain established institutional actors; they, in turn, are likely
to resist it and its impact. Exploiting information commons’ vulnerabilities, which are inevitable
due to their openness, is one tactic that opposing actors are likely to use to fight back when they
feel threatened. Building on those insights, we propose:
Proposition 5: Collective-action threats will likely strengthen institutional
resistance toward digital activism through attacks on its legitimacy and related
legal challenges.

3.7 Conclusion
There is considerable interest in how online technologies enable collective action and change
(Ghobadi and Clegg 2015; Kelly Garrett 2006; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010), with a focus on
how social network connectivity supports communication and lubricates mobilization (Bennett
and Segerberg 2012; Diani and McAdam 2003; Obar et al. 2012; Segerberg and Bennett 2011).
We extend this existing research by examining in detail the constitutive duality between the
collective action occurring at the digitally enabled social network level and the collective action
occurring at the broader institutional field level. Specifically, we focus on the process of
establishing legitimacy for impactful digital activism in the face of collective-action threats, which
arise due to digital activism’s open nature and decrease its pragmatic, moral, and cognitive
legitimacy. Building on PIC and institutional change theory, and informed by empirical
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observations, we posit that incorporating polycentric governance practices reduces the prevalence
of collective-action threats, which in turn leads to stronger digital activism legitimacy and a higher
likelihood of impactful institutional change.
In addition to contributing to digital activism literature, our CS case study advances PIC theory
(Mindel et al. 2018). At present, PIC theory is a general framework for examining the impact of
collective-action threats on information commons’ sustainability and how polycentric governance
practices can reduce those threats. Mindel et al. acknowledge the need for greater nuance for
studying different types of information commons with specific and varying objectives. By
conceptualizing digital activism as a type of information commons, we add to PIC theory,
examining how collective-action threats playout in this context and how polycentric governance
practices help stabilize digital activism allowing it to reach its objective of shaking the status quo
within an institutional field. The resulting hybrid model of PIC and institutional legitimacy theories
(Table 3.3 and Figure 3.6) was instrumental in providing a unique perspective on the question of
how digital activism could be harnessed for promoting institutional change.
The CS case study provides important practical lessons for those who wish to use digital activism
to promote change. Our findings suggest that it is not enough to tap into digitally enabled social
networks to support communication for collective action and mobilize accordingly. The key for
successful digital activism, we assert, is to continuously establish its pragmatic, moral, and
cognitive legitimacy within an institutional field. To improve the odds of establishing legitimacy,
digital activism must combat congestion, pollution, violations, and user rebellion. Further, we find
that polycentric online and offline digital activism reinforce each other’s legitimacy when
incorporated under an overarching institutional change goal. Finally, we find that institutional
actors who oppose that change are likely to exploit vulnerabilities that arise from digital activism’s
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openness to actively undermine the effort’s legitimacy. Although it by no means ensures success,
incorporating polycentric governance practices can help stabilize digital activism’s legitimacy and
thereby increase the likelihood of impactful institutional change.
Although we aim for our theorizing to apply across different forms of digital activism and different
types of institutional fields, generalizability from a single case study is limited and additional
research is needed to reinforce and refine the theory. As such, we hope that the new perspective
we introduce will spur additional research into this increasingly important issue.
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CHAPTER 4: POLYCENTRIC RESOLUTION OF INFORMATION
POLLUTION IN OPEN COLLABORATION SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
The impact of open collaboration (OC) systems online is widespread, touching many individuals
and institutions in society. At the same time, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that OC
systems can be contaminated with low-quality, biased, unintentionally misleading, and even
deliberately manipulated content. While prior research has examined how different organizational
mechanisms relate to the quality of final or mature OC outputs, we know little about how OC
systems address information pollution problems as they arise during output development. Against
this backdrop, we draw on polycentric information commons (PIC) theory to offer a detailed
analysis of how information pollution is resolved in Wikipedia articles. The result is two
contributions to theory. First, we advance knowledge on information pollution as an inherent threat
to OC systems and on how these systems can successfully address pollution through polycentric
practices. Second, we offer empirical validation of PIC theory and extend it with new insights into
how polycentric principles may be incorporated on the operational levels of governance.

Key Words: Open collaboration, polycentric information commons, information pollution,
quality management, Wikipedia
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4.1 Information Pollution in Open Collaboration Systems Online
Open-collaboration (OC) systems online—such as Wikis, open source software (OSS)
development, crowdsourced innovation, and other online sociotechnical arrangements that rely
mostly on self-selecting participants for creating value (Levine and Prietula 2013)—represent a
novel production paradigm distinctively different from traditional business organizations (Benkler
2006; Baldwin and Von Hippel 2011; Von Hippel and Von Krogh 2003). Prior organization
research on OC systems has examined their emerging structures (Baldwin and Von Hippel 201;
Kittur et al. 2009), dynamics (Kane and Ransbotham 2016; Ransbotham and Kane 2011),
procedures (Faraj et al. 2011; Levine and Prietula 2013; Viégas et al. 2007), and governance
(Aaltonen and Lanzara 2015; Forte et al. 2009; Markus 2007; Shah 2006), and how these different
mechanisms relate to the quality of final or mature outputs 15 (Aberdour 2007; Wilkinson and
Huberman 2007). However, our understanding of how OC systems address quality issues as they
arise remains limited. Drawing on polycentric information commons (PIC) theory (Mindel et al.
2018), we conceptualize arising quality issues as “information pollution” events to examine how
polycentric governance helps resolve pollution in OC systems.
It is hardly surprising that open-access platforms—including social media, media-sharing
websites, blogs, peer-to-peer networks, and online-review platforms—can become inundated with
polluted content (Clauson et al. 2008; Gyimothy et al. 2005; Mayzlin et al. 2014). The pollution
spectrum ranges from unintentionally misleading or deliberately manipulated information to
disturbingly gruesome content. For instance, reports indicate that Facebook and Twitter are
flooded with false rumors, fake news stories, and other polluted content (Allcott and Gentzkow

15

Output of OC systems, whether code or information, is constantly updated and refined. Prior research has
typically relied on the quality scores assigned by the contributor community or outside experts after the output is
mature and relatively stable.
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2017). Daily, an army of moderators in these companies work “to soak up the worst of humanity
in order to protect the rest of us” (Chen 2014), taking down racist, masochistic, violence-inciting
posts, as well as shocking images and videos of animal cruelty, beheadings, and child pornography
(Kanter 2018). Facebook and Twitter concede that they are overwhelmed, despite constantly
increasing the number of monitors (Kanter 2018). By comparison, most open-access platforms
have far fewer resources to combat the problem.
An examination of prominent OSS development platforms finds a high prevalence of defunct, dirty
data (Howison and Crowston 2004). Moreover, OSS (like all software) may contain bugs
(Gyimothy et al. 2005; Stamelos et al. 2002) and is vulnerable to misuse by actors that deliberately
insert malicious code (Ransbotham 2010). Similarly, Wikis may contain incomplete, biased,
manipulated, and erroneous information (Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011;
Lavasa et al. 2011). Given that virtually everyone, from students (Haigh 2011; Lim 2009) to
professionals (Brokowski and Sheehan 2009; Miller and Murray 2010; Peoples 2009), turn to
Wikis for information, frequent and persisting low-quality information is likely to spillover and
impact society as whole.16 In addition, frequent and persisting low-quality information is likely to
reduce the trust we put in OC systems. Hence, the question of how these systems address pollution
quickly before it spills over and causes mistrust is crucial to the lasting viability of the novel and
innovative OC mode. Although extant research provides important empirical findings on some
factors associated with OC system quality (Arazy et al. 2011; Arazy and Nov 2010; Kittur and
Kraut 2008), it provides little theoretical insight on which OC governance practices best achieve
timely resolution of quality issues as they arise.

16

For instance, false information on vaccinations adversely impacts the public health, while false information used
in litigation may create bad precedence.
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PIC theory builds on the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) and collective-action paradigms
(Ostrom 1990, 2000) to conceptualize online systems characterized by low barriers to participation
as information commons. Defined as highly accessible, self-rising information systems in which
stakeholders share an overarching goal (Mindel et al. 2018, pp. 609), information commons, more
so than traditional centralized systems, are susceptible to information pollution and other
collective-action threats because of their openness (Mindel et al. 2018). PIC theory asserts that one
way to address these collective-action threats is by incorporating polycentric principles into the
system’s governance practices and technical features (Mindel et al. 2018).
To advance our understanding of how OC systems can effectively resolve pollution, we draw on
PIC theory to examine how polycentric practices—shared accountability through work
distribution, boundary regulation on content, incremental adaptation of the information, and
recognition of peer contributions—impact resolution of pollution events in Wikipedia. We identify
the posting of a cleanup template and collective actions toward its removal as an information
pollution event on an article. Because pollution in the physical world as well as in the information
world may spread outside of its immediate boundaries, it is important to resolve it effectively in
an expedient manner. Using pollution events as the unit of analysis, we therefore zoom-in on the
relationship between polycentric practices during the event and the time it takes to resolve the
event as an indicator of the effectiveness of polycentric governance. As a result, our research
advances knowledge on information pollution and how using polycentric practices in OC systems
may successfully address it. In addition, our research contributes to PIC theory by empirically
examining its propositions and by offering novel insights into how polycentric principles may be
incorporated in governance at the operational level.
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4.2 Addressing Information Pollution in Open Collaboration
OC systems online, initially spearheaded by OSS development and wiki technologies, represent a
novel model of organizing production that is distinctly different from traditional managerial
settings (Aaltonen and Lanzara 2015; Benkler 2006; Forte and Lampe 2013; Levine and Prietula
2014). OC systems are defined as an “online environment that supports the collective production
of an artifact through a technologically mediated collaboration platform that presents a low
barrier to entry and exit and supports the emergence of persistent but malleable social structures”
(Forte and Lampe 2013, p. 57). These systems generate value by broadly inviting people to
participate in the production of a common good and allowing them to build relatively freely on
each other’s work (Kumar et al. 2011; Levine and Prietula 2014).
Research on OC systems provides various insights into tensions underlying their operation.
Although low barriers to participation create conditions for fast growth, they also may spur rapid
decline when participants suddenly disengage (Ransbotham and Kane 2011). This tension between
freedom of entry and exit in OC systems introduces a source of volatility that is largely nonexistent in traditional organizations. In fact, research has found that most participants contribute
only once and never return (Anthony et al. 2009; Panciera et al. 2009; Shah 2006). Most of the
work is subsequently shouldered by a relatively small group of dedicated core participants
(Panciera et al. 2009; Shah 2006) who may also exit at any time. Thus, it is often essential in OC
systems to continuously attract new contributors to replace those who leave (Ransbotham and
Kane 2011) and to inject renewed energy, perspectives, and ideas to the system (Morgan et al.
2013). Revitalization of content and participants is essential for the long-term prospects of OC
systems.
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The need to attract and retain new participants gives rise to another tension—that between longtime and new participants. While most organizations experience the challenge of incorporating
new members (Allen and Meyer 1990), the challenge can be even more pronounced in OC systems
that lack dedicated human resource managers, new employee orientation programs, or clear
incentive structures. Further, research shows that veteran participants can be impatient with
newcomers who are not familiar with task requirements or the system’s established operational
norms (Halfaker et al. 2013; Suh et al. 2009). Research has also found that participants in OC
systems are often driven by a combination of needs for both personal and social fulfillment (Hertel
et al. 2003; Morgan et al. 2013), and that the rejection of newcomers by veterans reduces
motivation, causing many to leave (Halfaker et al. 2013). It is therefore critical for OC systems to
resolve such tensions between veteran and new providers in a constructive manner.
Work in OC systems is typically self-selected rather than assigned (Crowston et al. 2005; Kittur
and Kraut 2008; Stvilia et al. 2007). This freedom of choice is a major catalyst of creativity
(Benkler 2006), but it also may cause bottlenecks in production, inefficiencies, and conflict (Kittur
and Kraut 2010; Mishra et al. 2002; Yasseri et al. 2012). Specifically, the increasing empirical and
anecdotal evidence of low-quality and manipulated content in OC systems (Gyimothy et al. 2005;
Hafner 2007; Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011) suggests that the low barriers to
participation amplify the systems’ vulnerability to misuse in comparison to traditional closed
systems. To manage quality, OC systems typically adopt various governance mechanisms that seek
to strike a balance between necessary controls and inherent openness, typically by including
elements of bureaucracy, democratic procedures, and mechanisms that facilitate independent
participation. Different OC systems often include some combination of communication
mechanisms (Gutwin et al. 2004, Viegas et al. 2007), formal and informal rules (Butler et al. 2008;
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Scacchi 2007), and soft hierarchies (Crowston and Howison 2006; Cabunducan et al. 2011) to
improve coordination and overall performance.
To understand how current research addresses the relation between these different organizational
mechanisms and the quality of outputs, Table 4.1 offers an overview of OC system quality
research. It is important to note that the intangible nature of outputs—that is, content, code, and
ideas—and the fact that outputs constantly change through updates and edits, make substantive
quality a moving target. Many researchers therefore rely on small-scale qualitative assessments
(Arazy and Nov 2010; Chesney 2006; Giles 2005) to determine quality. Other researchers turn to
internal rating schemes created in OC systems to examine which factors are associated with quality
(Blumenstock 2008; Kane 2010; Kittur and Kraut 2008; Wöhner and Peters 2009) or use proxy
metrics such as contribution retention rate in relation to output lifetime as a quality indicator
(Anthony et al. 2007). Other approaches include using automated tools to detect errors in code
(Stamelos et al. 2002) and using quality indicators in Wikipedia articles (Dalip et al. 2009).
Although each of these studies provides important insights, the difference between methods and
units of analysis makes it difficult to compare and consolidate findings. Moreover, current research
focuses on factors associated with the quality of final or mature outputs rather than on the
mechanisms used to resolve quality issues as they arise during development of these outputs.

Table 4.1 Overview of OC Research Related to Pollution in OC Systems
Theoretical
perspective

Method
and data

Unit of
analysis

Anderka et
al. 2011

Inductive machinelearning-based
prediction model of
quality problems; no
specific hypotheses

Machine-learning
density estimation with
class probability
estimation

10,000 Wikipedia
articles with one or
more out of 10
types of cleanup
templates

Anthony et
al. 2007

Deductive
hypothesis
development

Examination of the
effect of contributor
anonymity and edit

Quality of
contributions
measured as the

Study
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Findings
and insights
1.
2.

1.

Method for mining and extracting
cleanup templates
The algorithm successfully
predicted quality issues
associated with 4 out of 10
templates
Registered users’ quality
increases with more contributions
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partially based on
previous empirical
findings

Arazy and
Nov 2010

Blumenstock
2008

Chesney
2006

Deductive
hypothesis
development
partially based on
previous empirical
findings

None (no
hypotheses)

None (deductive
hypothesis
development)

history on quality of
contributions in
Wikipedia

rate of each
contributor’s
content retained in
the current version

Qualitative
assessment of the
accuracy and
completeness of 50
articles by “experts”

2.

Large number of high-quality
contributions come from
anonymous contributors who
contribute only once

1.

Coordination positively impacts
article quality
Unequal contribution among
editors on the article level is not
associated with quality
Unequal contribution among the
same editors across Wikipedia is
positively associated with quality
Number of editors is not directly
associated with quality

2.
Wikipedia article
and editors

Quantitative measures
of editing activities on
those articles
Comparison of length
(word count) in
Wikipedia’s featured
articles and a random
sample of other
articles

4.

Wikipedia article
word count

Survey-based
assessment of the
credibility of 30
articles by experts, 24
random-assignment to
non-experts and
Wikipedia as a whole

3.

Perception of the
credibility of the
Wikipedia article
and editor

1.

Positive association between word
count and designation of featured
article status

1.

Experts found articles to be more
credible than non-experts
13% of articles were reported for
mistakes

2.

1.
None (exploratory
hypothesis
development)

Comparison of two
models of quality
estimation of 50 stable
and 29 controversial
Wikipedia articles

Article quality as
assessed by
students

Giles 2005

None (no
hypotheses)

Blind comparison by
experts of 42 science
articles in Wikipedia
and Encyclopedia
Britannica

Wikipedia articles

Halfaker et
al. 2008

Collective effort
model (no
hypotheses)

Examination of the
dropout rate of editors
in two sets of 200K
edits, reverted and
non-reverted

Wikipedia edits;
edits that remain
untouched longer
used as a proxy for
quality of edit

None (mathematical
model development)

Comparing the
performance of
measurement models
through a series of
experiments using 242
Wikipedia articles
about various
countries

Article quality as
indicated by its
links

De la
Calzada and
Dekhtyar
2010

Hu et al.
2007

Javanmardi
and Lopes
2010

None (no
hypotheses; builds
on previous
research)

Comparing the time
featured and nonfeatured articles are in
a high-quality state
Conceptualizing
revisions that last
longer as high quality

2.

1.

Articles from both sources are
found to contain a similar average
number of errors

1.

Reverts discourage contributions,
especially reverts made by
veteran providers of new providers
Editors who continue to do work in
Wikipedia after being reverted
increase the quality of their work

2.

1.
2.

1.
Quality of featured
and non-featured
articles
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Quality of articles of different type
should be computed using
different means
Methodological insights on using
multiple amateur quality
evaluators as opposed to
individual experts

2.

Authors with more authority
produce higher quality edits
Length of articles associated with
their quality

The average article quality
increases with more edits
Featured articles are of high
quality 86% of the time, while nonfeatured are high quality 74% of
the time
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Kane 2010

Kittur and
Kraut 2008

None (deductive
hypothesis
development
partially based on
case study findings)

Theories of group
coordination (no
hypotheses)

Qualitative case study
of editing a featured
article
Quantitative analysis
of factors associated
with the promotion of
188 articles nominated
to receive featured
article status

1.
Wikipedia article
promoted to
receive featured
article status
Virginia Tech
shooting article
(editing case study)

2.

3.

1.

Quantitative analysis
of variables
associated with
23,619 articles with
changing quality
scores

Wikipedia article
quality score

2.

1.
Stvilia et al.
2007

Wilkinson
and
Huberman
2007

Wöhner and
Peters 2009

None (grounded
approach)

None (no
hypotheses)

None (no
hypotheses)

Case study with
qualitative and
quantitative
techniques

Wikipedia editing
activities across
articles, talk, policy,
and user pages

Comparing editing
activities in featured
and none-featured
Wikipedia articles

Wikipedia featured
article status as a
proxy of quality

Algorithm-based
comparison of the life
cycles of 100 featured
and good articles and
100 articles nominated
for deletion

Wikipedia articles

2.

The number of edits and editors is
not associated with article
promotion
The number of anonymous edits
and breadth of top contributor
experience negatively associated
with article promotion
Revisions and knowledge-depth of
top contributors positively
associated with article promotion
High concentration of the main
work, with more contributors in
supporting roles associated with
change in quality score
Equal work distribution and
coordination on the talk page is
not associated with quality scores
When editors modify each other’s
contributions, it implicitly or
explicitly involves an evaluation of
the quality of those contributions
Self-selection allows significant
savings in terms of selection and
coordination costs

1.

Correlation found between the
number of edits and distinct
editors and quality

1.

Identified 11 life-cycle metrics
associated with quality used for
the algorithm
Length of articles and high
intensity in contribution activity is
most associated with quality score

2.

The overview in Table 4.1 also reveals a second shortcoming—namely, that current research on
organizational mechanisms and quality in OC systems is not based on an integrative theoretical
framework. With the exception of a few studies (Arazy et al. 2011; Arazy and Nov 2010; Kittur
and Kraut 2008), almost all research examining quality in OC systems is exploratory in nature,
rather than anchored in theory or based on theoretically informed hypothesis testing (Anderka et
al. 2011; Blumenstock 2008; De la Calzada and Dekhtyar 2010; Halfaker et al. 2011; Hu et al.
2007; Javanmardi and Lopes 2010; Wilkinson and Huberman 2007; Wöhner and Peters 2009).
This lack of theoretical anchoring makes it difficult to know how mechanisms relate to outcomes
and how to consolidate findings from different studies. As a result, prominent researchers in the
field call for studies that are more theory-informed to build new theoretical knowledge on OC
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system governance beyond what we can know through empirical work or research applying
theories established long before OC systems emerged (Arazy et al. 2011; Majchrzak 2009; Von
Krogh et al. 2012).
To advance our understanding of quality management in OC systems, we draw on PIC theory
(Mindel et al. 2018) to focus on resolution of content quality issues related to information
pollution. The lens of PIC theory allows us to consolidate previous findings in the OC system
quality literature under a single overarching theoretical framework. Moreover, zooming in on the
information pollution issue promotes broader theoretical understanding of how systems
characterized by low barriers to participation work to reduce errors, improve quality, and address
biased as well as manipulated content.

4.3 Information Pollution in Polycentric Information Commons
Three decades ago, Orman (1984) identified information pollution as a major problem in the
information age. Defined as the contamination of information supply with incomplete, inconsistent,
or irrelevant information (pp. 64), Orman argued that information pollution will negatively impact
organizations. This notion received initially little attention, yet there is a renewed theoretical
interest in the phenomenon as it pertains to open-access platforms characterized by low barriers to
participation such as social media, online communities and Wikis Drawing on the tragedy of the
commons (Hardin 1968) and collective-action paradigms related to the governance of common
access resource systems in the physical world (Ostrom 1990), Mindel et al. (2018) conceptualize
open-access platforms online as “information commons”, and theorize that their long-term
sustainability is threatened by information pollution.
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PIC theory posits that when an unlimited number of often-anonymous participants are free to
upload content online, it is almost inevitable that some contributions will be polluted (Mindel et
al. 2018). Previously researched phenomena exemplifying information pollution include
manipulated online reviews (Mayzlin et al. 2014), fake and heavily biased news circulating on
social media (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017), buggy code (Gyimothy et al. 205), and erroneous
information uploaded to online forums and Wikis (Clauson et al. 2008; Kata 2012). Information
pollution can be viewed as any type of content that is misaligned with the goal of the information
commons (Mindel et al. 2018), including uploading factually accurate information about a certain
topic to an information commons dedicated to an entirely different issue. Unchecked persistent
pollution is likely to reduce the value of the information commons to those who appropriate its
content; it can also discourage those who provide content from making further contributions.
Because the long-term sustainability of information commons depends on the balance between
continuous engagement and renewal of participants17 (Butler 2011; Ransbotham and Kane 2011),
continuing pollution can potentially set in motion a downward spiral (Mindel et al. 2018).
Typically, pollution of open-access systems—such as a contaminated lake or a littered park—is
addressed by paid workers who are employed by the government or subcontracted through a
private firm. Similarly, government and private resources are increasingly being deployed to
monitor information pollution online (Chen 2014; Kanter 2018). Still, the sheer scale of the
information uploaded online daily makes it impossible for content monitors to address it all in an
effective manner. Information commons 18 such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube employ

17

PIC theory distinguishes between three broad categories of participant stakeholders: producers of the systems,
providers of content, and appropriators of content.
18
According to PIC theory, any system online that relies on self-selecting content contributors who are free to
participate or exit at any time may be viewed as an information commons, regardless of its ownership structure.
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thousands of dedicated content monitors, but even these resource-rich systems find it difficult to
keep up with information pollution (Chen 2014; Kanter 2018). Inspired by research on bottom-up,
polycentric governance of physical local resource systems (Ostrom 1990), PIC theory suggests
providing the community of users with the power and the tools to monitor pollution and address it
themselves on the local level of the information commons.19
4.3.1 Operational Level of Governance
PIC theory points out that polycentric principles manifest at three different but closely related
levels of governance: constitutional, collective-choice, and operational (Table 4.2, Figure 4.1).
Although the tiers are distinct, they build on each other and influence each other’s evolution
through feedback loops. The constitutional level of governance defines the overarching goal20 of
the system through basic guidelines, terms-of-use rules, and the technical features put in place.
Constitutional rules are set by the system developers—that is, the producers of the information
commons. Collective-choice is the level of governance where participants—that is, content
providers—influence the adoption and development of rules and features. The degree of collectivechoice effectiveness depends on the system producers’ inclusivity and receptiveness to feedback.
In most information commons, providers may petition producers to evolve and change rules and
features. In some PICs, such as Wikipedia, providers may even devise certain rules and features.
The rules and features determined on the constitutional and collective-choice levels directly impact
how information providers operationally engage with the system day to day. In turn, problems and
phenomenon encountered on the operational level may further inform action on the collective-

We address the downsides of allowing participants more power to monitor each other in the “Discussion” section.
Information pollution, according to PIC theory, is information that departs or conflicts with the information
commons’ overarching goal. For example, uploading fiction to an information commons dedicated to creating
encyclopedic information would be considered pollution.
19
20
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choice level. In some cases, collective-choice may influence the adjustment of core constitutional
policies and features (Mindel et al. 2018).

Table 4.2 Polycentric Levels of Governance
Level

Definition

Examples from Wikipedia

Constitutional

The core policies and technical features
set by the information commons
producers that create the conditions for
polycentricity

• The constant availability of live-editing function to
all users
• The five pillars (Wikipedia’s constitutional rules)

Collective-choice

The policies, rules, and technical
features created or influenced by the
information commons providers

• Tens of key policies and guidelines set by
Wikipedia’s providers21
• Thousands of templates created to tag problems
in articles
• Arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes

Operational

The day-to-day information provision
activities based on the rules and
features set by producers on the
constitutional level and by peer
providers on the collective-choice level

• Hundreds of millions of edits to articles
• Hundreds of thousands of postings of template
tags to indicate a problem with an article
• Hundreds of thousands of postings of links to
guidelines and policies in comments on edits

In Wikipedia, the five fundamental pillar rules22 represent the constitutional level of polycentric
governance granting the community of participants the freedom of collective-choice in
determining the rules that govern most operational details. The collective-choice rules created by
the community, in turn, directly and indirectly guide the everyday editing of articles and associated
talk pages. An example of the nesting of polycentric governance is the constitutional rule,
“Wikipedia is written from a neutral point of view,” which inspires the collective action
responsible for creating templates for flagging biased content that, when posted, inspire
operational actions such as deletion of biased content by self-directed providers.

21

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_policies_and_guidelines
(1) Wikipedia is an encyclopedia. (2) Wikipedia is written from a neutral point of view. (3) Wikipedia is free
content that anyone can use, edit, and distribute. (4) Wikipedia’s editors should treat each other with respect and
civility. (5) Wikipedia has no firm rules. (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Five_pillars)
22
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Figure 4.1 Ostrom’s Levels of Governance23

At present, PIC theory addresses the constitutional and collective-choice levels of polycentric
governance of information commons by focusing on greater inclusivity in decision-making on
rules and technical features for boundary setting, peer monitoring, modifications, and peer
recognition. In our research, we draw on PIC theory and expand it to include the operational level
of governance by examining how polycentricity impacts pollution resolution when it arises during
content development.24
4.3.2 Polycentric Principles
Polycentric governance evolves incrementally through collective-choice processes; this contrasts
starkly with traditional organization governance, which is deployed top-down on subjects at lower
levels of the hierarchy. A high degree of collective-choice—the notion that the community sets the
rules through consensus—is found to be associated with the long-term success of local
arrangements governing shared resource systems such as grazing grounds, fisheries, and forests

23
24

Adapted from Ostrom et al (1994, p. 47).
“Action Situation” on the operational level.
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(Ostrom 1990). Correspondingly, PIC theory asserts that a multitude of independent centers of
decision-making operating within the frame of an overarching goal is the key to the long-term
sustainability of information commons (Mindel et al. 2018). The theory also asserts that open
content provision is a double-edged sword—potentially generative and degenerative at the same
time—and that an information commons should ideally incorporate four polycentric principles in
its governance to reduce the prevalence and impact of threats arising from the system’s open
nature.
First, an information commons should not solely rely on paid outsiders for monitoring, but rather
should allow the community to police itself as much as possible. Defined as “the extent to which
rules and features afford peer monitoring and gradual sanctioning to support appropriate
behavior and dispute resolution in an information commons” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the
principle of shared accountability aims to create a sense of ownership toward the information
commons among participants. The principle of shared accountability suggests that the more the
community actively monitors against those who break the information commons boundaries, the
more it will be able to serve its overarching goal. Focusing on resolving information pollution on
the operational level, shared accountability can manifest in different ways, including flagging of
polluted content or disruptive users, direct removal of content, and community-based arbitration
mechanisms to resolve disputes. Shared accountability works to reduce the cost of monitoring
against information pollution and is predicated on the idea that, when participants in the
information commons share the task of maintaining its integrity, they are more likely to resolve
pollution effectively.
Second, an information commons should allow participants a high degree of freedom in
determining the rules on content and conduct boundaries. Defined as “the extent to which rules
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and technical infrastructure features afford information provision and appropriation consistent
with the information commons’ overarching goal” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the principle of
boundary regulation helps address collective-action threats by increasing the community’s sense
of the content and conduct that should characterize the information commons. Every information
commons has a different overarching goal, which necessitates context-specific boundaries (Ren et
al. 2007). The principle of boundary regulation suggests that a high degree of inclusion of
participants in setting rules will lead to higher consensus and a greater likelihood that the
boundaries will be accepted and followed. Resolving pollution on the operational level requires a
certain level of awareness of the boundaries—that is, the rules on content and acceptable
conduct—by participants. In most cases, boundary regulation occurs when participants simply
communicate the rules to those who seem unaware of them; in Wikipedia, for instance, participants
might ask someone not to post content about dogs in an article dedicated to cats, or cite the policy
against original research in article editing when that issue arises. In other instances, core
participants with administrative authority may issue more-official warnings and may even ban
those who insist on ignoring the information commons’ boundaries.
Third, an information commons should avoid sudden top-down dictated changes that might upset
participants and instead incrementally adapt in a bottom-up fashion. Defined as “the extent to
which changes in infrastructure and rules are gradually introduced and providers and
appropriators are actively involved in shaping them” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the principle of
incremental adaptation aims to strike a balance between the need to adapt and sensitivity to
participants’ needs and opinions. The principle of incremental adaptation suggests that those who
are most closely involved with the everyday operational dynamics of the information commons
are also more likely to provide constructive feedback for its adaptation. Moreover, it suggests that
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smaller changes are more likely to be positively received, as opposed to sudden extensive changes
that may alienate many participants. Incremental adaptation also reduces the cost of experimenting
with changes. If a certain change is only gradually different from the previous version and is well
received, it can be quickly incorporated and further adapted. On the other hand, if it is not well
received, it is easy to replace it with another incremental adaptation. On the operational level,
incremental rather than extensive modification of OSS code or wiki content is more likely to lead
to output that is more balanced, contains fewer errors, and gains more consensus.
Lastly, because information commons depend on volunteers for content, they should create a
positive environment for those actively participating. Defined as “the extent to which providers
are acknowledged by peers, appropriators, and producers” (Mindel et al. 2018, p. 619), the
principle of provider recognition aims to enhance the personal and social experience for
participants. The provider recognition principle suggests that a volunteer workforce must be
motivated to continuously engage with the information commons. On the operational level,
provider recognition may be manifested in the form of direct recognition for high-quality work, as
well as in the awarding of virtual status and popularity symbols such as avatars, icons, likes, smiley
faces, and any other signal of positive acknowledgment.

4.4 Study Design and Hypotheses
In our research, we focus on pollution events in one of the most influential OC systems online: the
English Wikipedia 25 (Fallis 2008; Tapscott and Williams 2008). Wikipedia is an archetype of
polycentricity as its governance has almost entirely been devised by its community members
(Aaltonen and Lanzara 2015; Butler et al. 2008; Viegas et al. 2007). The website is a dynamic

25

Appendix A provides details on data.
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information repository that is constantly updated and improved through the work of numerous
volunteers operating independently outside of a centralized organizational order. Prior research
shows that although Wikipedia contains inaccurate, vandalized, biased, and incomplete
information (Holman Rector 2008; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; Lavasa et al. 2011), it is for the
most part considered to be a high-quality source of encyclopedic information (Brown 2011;
Chesney 2006; Giles 2005). As such, it may provide important lessons regarding pollution
resolution during content development for other information commons characterized by low
barriers to participant entry and exit.
4.4.1 Dependent Variable
Wikipedia’s overarching goal is to provide encyclopedic information. The articles should be
accurate, complete, relatively concise, and stick to reporting facts—any information that fails to
align with these criteria and overall encyclopedic aims can be viewed as polluted.
To govern article development, Wikipedia’s users have devised, through a process of collectivechoice, a multitude of templates that can be placed on article pages to signal to readers and the
community of information providers that something is not right (Anderka et al. 2011). At present,
Wikipedia has 195 such major templates and hundreds of subtemplates; one of the more familiar
templates is the general cleanup template, which signals that an article is in suboptimal shape and
needs intensive attention to resolve issues with its content (Figure 4.2). When an article is tagged
for cleanup, a message box appears on the top of the article page stating that the article “may
require cleanup to meet Wikipedia’s quality standards.”

Figure 4.2 Wikipedia’s Cleanup Tag
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The guidelines for cleanup template usage encourage those who post it to specify the parts of the
article requiring attention, but often the posted templates are simply general notices that caution
readers and serve as a call for action aimed at prompting potential providers to improve the state
of the article. The posting of the cleanup template also automatically adds the article to a list on
the “Wikiproject cleanup” page, where information providers interested in cleanup tasks can see
it. Data shows that a cleanup template can remain on an article page for months and even years
before an information provider makes the evaluation that it is no longer needed and removes it.
Based on the premise that timely pollution resolution is important for stabilizing article quality
while reducing its adverse impact on trust among appropriators, in our analysis, we focus on the
period between the posting and removal of the general cleanup template. Hence, the unit of
analysis is pollution event and the outcome variable of interest is the time to resolve the event as
an indication of effective resolution of information pollution.
4.4.2 Independent Variables
PIC theory asserts that polycentric governance helps reduce pollution on average; the challenge is
to identify how polycentricity manifests in the context of an individual information commons and
how different polycentric governance principles work in detail (Mindel et al. 2018). Wikipedia is
a behemoth encompassing multiple tiers of governance (Forte et al. 2009; Morgan and Zachry
2010). However, because our objective is to identify polycentric governance on the operational
level of article editing, we focus on identifying polycentric practices and examining their impact
on resolution time during pollution events.
The posting of a cleanup template represents an act of shared accountability in which an
information commons member cares enough about the site’s overarching goal to take the extra
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step to warn readers and spur action by the community. While in most information commons the
act of shared accountability ends with flagging (after which an algorithm or an employed content
monitor will address the issue), in Wikipedia, the community of participants determines the state
of the content. Hence, shared accountability continues after the posting of a cleanup template
through shared efforts to edit the article until the cleanup signal is deemed unnecessary. As such,
we consider the work distribution during the pollution event to measure the extent to which the
community shares the responsibility of resolving it. Prior research finds that relatively few
providers are responsible for the bulk of the work in OC systems (Kittur and Kraut 2008; Von
Krogh et al. 2013), and PIC theory suggest that too many participants active at the same time can
create congestion (Mindel et al. 2018). Building on prior research and PIC theory, we therefore
assert that the extent to which work is proportionally distributed among a few productive providers
determines the speed with which pollution resolution is achieved. Hence, we hypothesize:
H1: Shared accountability in terms of proportionate work distribution in relation
to number of providers reduces the time it takes to resolve pollution events.
Being an encyclopedia, each Wikipedia article is naturally bounded by its topic and the site’s
overarching goal of producing accurate, complete, well written, relatively concise, and neutral
information. Over the years, the Wikipedia community has devised multiple editorial policies to
guide the boundary of articles (Butler et al. 2008; Morgan and Zachry 2010). Examples of these
policies include guidelines calling for neutrality, verifiability, and avoiding the use of copyrighted
material and original research. Prior examination of the prevalence of policy citations calls for
more research on the relationship between evocation of policies and consequential collective
actions in OC systems (Beschastnikh et al. 2008). As such, we draw on PIC theory to assert that
policy citation in article editing represents an act of boundary regulation.
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In the same way that evoking rules and policies in the physical world often represents an act of
boundary regulation in a shared resource system (for instance, the highway patrol officer cites the
law when enforcing the boundaries of acceptable conduct on the road), evoking policies in
information commons represents an act of boundary regulation. In Wikipedia, we therefore
consider the number of policies cited in edits during the pollution event to measure the level of
boundary regulating practices. We expect increasing evocation of policies to initially slow down
pollution resolution before speeding it up. We further explain why. Policies in Wikipedia are
developed by self-selecting policymakers and determined through consensus on the collectivechoice level. Most Wikipedia editors do not take part in this process and are likely unaware of the
policies guiding content boundaries. An initial increase in citation of rules during pollution events
thus indicates misalignment between editing activities and the set standards and boundaries on
content. However, as policies are continuously cited, editors—that is, information providers—
increasingly get on the “same page” which leads to pollution resolution.26 Drawing on PIC theory
on the role of boundary regulation during pollution resolution, we predict that, after reaching a
threshold, policy citation will help stabilize boundaries which, in turn, will help reach pollution
resolution.
H2: Boundary regulation through policy citations increases pollution resolution
time up to a point and reduces it thereafter.
Wiki technology predicates on the idea that unconstrained individual users can make numerous
modifications conveniently through their web browsers (Leuf and Cunningham 2001). This
opportunity to implement incremental changes gives rise to a constantly growing body of digital
artifacts. As a result, every aspect of Wikipedia is modified in an incremental manner, including

26

This is a little like getting teenagers to clean after themselves through continuous reminders. At first, they might
not listen and keep making a mess, but with enough nagging they are more likely to clean.
178

Polycentric Information Commons  V. Mindel  2018

its rules and policies pages, templates, projects, and, of course, the article pages themselves. Each
discrete edit is an adaptation that slightly modifies the article from its previous form. In our data,
we measure the number of article revisions during the pollution event. Our expectation is that more
revisions will lead to faster pollution resolution. Drawing on PIC theory, we hypothesize:
H3: Incremental adaptation through revisions reduces the time it takes to resolve
pollution events.
Much has been written on what motivates Wikipedia participants to spend their time and energy
editing articles for no pay. Researchers have identified diverse motivations that can be loosely
grouped into reasons of personal and social fulfillment that are partially intrinsic and partially
driven by peer recognition (Kuznetsov 2006; Nov 2007; Yang and Lai 2010). Wikipedia has a few
mechanisms to signal peer recognition for work on the collective-choice level, including “barn
stars”—virtual medals awarded by peers (Kriplean et al. 2008)—and assignment of administrator
privileges (Burke and Kraut 2008). On the operational level of article editing, however, Wikipedia
does not have a peer-recognition mechanism; that is, individual edits do not receive “likes” or
“smiley faces.” On the other hand, there is a peer-rejection mechanism in place.
As part of its effort to combat vandalism of articles, Wikipedia has a revert mechanism to restore
the article to its previous, pre-vandalized form. While the revert mechanism has proven
instrumental for quick resolution of vandalism (Priedhorsky et al. 2007), it is also known to be
abused at times (Sumi and Yasseri 2011). Instead of reverting to the previous version to combat
vandalism, some providers revert articles to a previous version simply because they like it better.
By doing that, providers essentially disregard the effort of their peers. Thus, while we do not have
a valid way to operationalize provider recognition, we suggest that reverts of multiple revisions
represent a form of provider rejection. PIC theory asserts that provider recognition is positively
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associated with pollution resolution. Using a reversed logic, we theorize that provider rejection is
likely to have the opposite effect. Because the revert mechanism is intended to reverse vandalism
and low-quality edits, its use is likely to be associated with faster pollution resolution at first.
However, drawing on the logic of PIC theory, we hypothesize that persistent rejection of
contributions is ultimately likely to lead to a slowdown in pollution resolution.
H4: Provider rejection through multiple revision reverts reduces pollution
resolution time up to a point and increases it thereafter.
To recap, PIC theory predicts that the more that independent participants share the responsibility
of incrementally adapting an article—while abiding by the community-set rules and avoiding
rejecting each other’s efforts—the faster pollution will be addressed. Table 4.3 summarizes the
main constructs and variable operationalization.

Table 4.3 Variable Operationalization
Construct

Definition

Variable

Operationalization

Unit

Pollution

The extent to which information fails
to align with the overarching goal of
the information commons

Pollution
resolution
time
(DV)

The period between the
posting of a cleanup
template and its removal

Days

Shared
Accountability

The extent to which rules and
features afford peer monitoring and
gradual sanctioning to support
appropriate behavior and dispute
resolution

Work
distribution
in relation to
information
providers
(IV1)

Work distribution
equality between the
posting of a cleanup
template and its removal

1 − 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼27
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠

Boundary
Regulation

The extent to which rules and
technical infrastructure features
afford information provision and
appropriation consistent with the
information commons’ overarching
goal

Policy
citations
(IV2)

Number of policies cited
in edit comments
between the posting of a
cleanup template and its
removal

Links to
policies

27

Measure of equality ranging from 0 to 1 where 0 indicates complete equal work distribution while 1 indicates a
complete unequal work distribution.
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Incremental
Adaptation

Provider
Rejection

The extent to which changes in
infrastructure and rules are gradually
introduced and providers and
appropriators are actively involved in
shaping them

Revisions
(IV3)

Number of edits made to
the article between the
posting of a cleanup
template and its removal

Discrete edits

The extent to which providers feel
rejected by peers

Reverted
revisions
(IV4)

Number of reverts of
revisions between the
posting of a cleanup
template and its removal

Reverted
revisions

4.4.3 Control Variables
Previous research assessing projects in OC systems typically controls for a project’s level of
popularity and completeness (Ransbotham and Kane 2011). Mature projects or projects that
naturally draw more participants are likely to exhibit different patterns and dynamics in
comparison to other, less developed and more peripheral projects. In our analysis, we use five
control variables indicative of article completeness and popularity among providers prior to the
pollution event. We control for article maturity by accounting for its length in characters and its
age prior to the posting of the cleanup template. We control for the level of the article popularity
and activity by accounting for the number of unique providers making edits to it prior to the posting
of the cleanup template. We control for the number of references an article has at the time when
pollution event begins because it partially indicates the article maturity and quality state prior to
the posting of the cleanup template. We control for the article history of explicit coordination
(Kittur and Kraut 2008) by accounting for the number of unique participants on the talk page prior
to the posting of the cleanup template.

4.5 Dataset Construction
We used a freely available English Wikipedia database dump from 1 January 2017. It would be
computationally very demanding to sample pollution events directly from the dump; instead, we
first took a large random sample of 340,000 articles and identified 5,487 pollution events in them
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using regular expression patterns. The identified events appeared on 4,679 different articles; i.e.
some articles contained more than one pollution event (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 Pollution Event Length and Order Across Articles
Number of pollution event

N (pages)

Mean (days)

SD (days)

Min (days)

Max (days)

1

4,020

520.66

718.98

028

3,896.59

2

519

356.14

507.36

0

2,841.33

3 or more

119

188.8

361.23

0.001

2,770.88

4,679

478.12

689.85

0

3,896.59

Second

639

421.9

563.4

0

2,841.33

Third or more

169

274.37

457.47

0.001

2,770.88

Pollution event order
First

Because an event appears in exactly one article, every event has an equal probability of being
sampled and our base sampling strategy is unbiased. There are, however, three potential sources
of selection bias that emerged from the way we further processed the data.
First, the current version of our Python tools could not process three very large articles (more than
~2GB data); the article topics were “Barack Obama” (page id 534366), “Syrian Civil War” (page
id 30741795), and “Adolf Hitler” (page id 2731583). Given the topics of the three omitted articles,
it is not surprising that they had attracted many edits. Although these articles may also have
contained pollution events, we expect the potential bias introduced by the omission of these articles
to be negligible. If each omitted article contained 10 pollution events (vs. the maximum of 8 events
per article in the remaining sample), we still would have omitted only 0.5 % of the randomly
sampled events.

28

Some articles receive the cleanup template right at their birth to prompt providers to improve them.
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Second, to reduce heterogeneity, we limited our analysis to 4,325 pollution events ranging in
duration from 24 hours to 1,500 days.29 Cleanup templates that appear for less than 24 hours on an
article either have a high likelihood of being posted by mistake or did not reach consensus for
being required. At the other extreme, we find that exceptionally long pollution events lasting more
than 1,500 days are mostly on outlier articles covering obscure topics. Such articles typically have
low levels of editorial activity.
Third, some articles contained more than one pollution event, which raised a question as to whether
the two (or more) events on the same article were independent. To address this, we ran a series of
robustness analyses in which we tested our model on articles with a varying number of pollution
events and their varying order.
We also retrieved data for 172,576 talk pages corresponding to article pages in the sample (though
not all articles have a talk page) to examine communications and coordination activities during
pollution event. However, due to the relatively low intensity of activity on talk pages during
pollution events (addressed in the “Descriptive Statistics” section), we decided not to pursue this
angle further. Appendix A offers more details about the data processing.

4.6 Analysis Results
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
It takes a relatively long time to resolve an information pollution event in Wikipedia; the mean
pollution event lasted 324 days (SD 370.2 days). Although some articles in Wikipedia are “classic”
encyclopedic topics, most address topics that are less familiar to the general population, and thus

29

We follow the logic of past researchers of Wikipedia article quality, who often bound the analysis to avoid
comparing pages significantly different in their stage of development; some, for instance, removed “stub” pages
(Wilkinson and Huberman 2007).
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require the attention of specific editors knowledgeable about the subject. We believe that this
disparity in topic familiarity and the number of potential contributors knowledgeable of it is behind
the skewed distribution and the high standard deviation in pollution resolution time.

Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics (N=4,325)
Variable

Mean

Pollution event length (days)
Article length at start of pollution event (characters)
Article age when pollution event starts (days)
Number of providers active before pollution event
Number of providers active before pollution: talk page
Number of providers active during the pollution event
References before pollution event
Article length change (characters)
Policy citations during the pollution event
Revisions
Work distribution (GINI)
Reverted revisions
Edit distance (net of all added/subtracted characters)

324
10,049.6
845.2
43.1
5.8
13.3
4.9
2,662.3
5.3
43.5
0.63
6.7
8,290.7

S.D.
370.2
16,283.6
996
108.4
17.8
19.4
18.4
6,424.7
13.1
94.2
0.18
25.5
20,582

Min
30

0
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
2

Max
1,499.2
207762
5,353.5
2,160
640
301
485
151,191
301
1,854
0.97
656
456,359

An average of 13.3 providers made 43.5 revisions on average during a pollution event. The
providers added and deleted a net average of 8,290.7 characters, which ultimately resulted in a
change of 2,662.3 characters before the event was resolved. An average of 5.3 revisions during the
event contained a reference to Wikipedia policy. Consistent with previous findings (Kittur and
Kraut 2008) work distribution is fairly concentrated with a GINI coefficient of 0.63. We calculated
work concentration as each article’s proportion of edit-distance (total characters added or
removed) by each unique editor during the pollution event. The high GINI score indicates that a
disproportionate amount of work was carried by a small number of editors.
Past studies of work dynamics in OC systems are conflicted on the importance of explicit
coordination; researchers find evidence that explicit coordination helps to improve outcomes

30

Some articles receive the cleanup template right at birth to prompt providers to improve them.
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(Arazy and Nov 2010), but also that a disproportionate amount of work is carried out independently
without any back-and-forth communication among participants (Kittur and Kraut 2008). In our
data, we find that almost all editing activities during pollution events are largely devoid of explicit
coordination via Wikipedia’s talk pages. During the considered pollution events, an average of
only 1.8 providers participated on the talk page, making 4.7 revisions to it and citing on average
only 0.06 policies.
Examination of pairwise correlations (Table 4.6) shows a close association between three of the
four variables of polycentric practices: policy citations and revisions (r = .83), policy citations and
reverted revisions (r = .87), and revisions and reverted revisions (r = .87). PIC theory asserts that,
in an ideal scenario, polycentric governance practices complement each other (Mindel et al. 2018),
and we are not surprised to see the strong correlation.
Table 4.6 Correlations
1

2

3

4

1

Pollution event length

2

Policy citations

.30**

3

Policy citations (squared)

.10**

.82**

4

Revisions

.22**

.83**

.63**

**

**

5

6

7

8

5

Reverted revisions

.13

.87

.76**

.87**

6

Work distribution (GINI)

.29**

.32**

.12**

.41**

.26**

7

Edit distance

.12**

.45**

.28**

.63**

.42**

.37**

8

Article age

.15**

.26**

.10**

.20**

.18**

.17**

.15**

**

**

**

**

**

**

9

10

11

Length of article

.30

.30

.16

.36

.27

.26

.46**

.42**

10

Providers during pollution

.30**

.83**

.56**

.92**

.81**

.45**

.55**

.26**

.33**

11

Providers before pollution

.06**

.35**

.20**

.35**

.35**

.19**

.25**

.50**

.61**

.38**

12

Providers before: talk page

-.05

.27**

.16**

.28**

.27**

.15**

.24**

.39**

.56**

.30**

.87**

-.02

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

**

.47**

9

13 References before pollution
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

.19

.10

.17

.14

4.6.2 Model Specification and Analysis Procedures
We specify our baseline model as follows:
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PEL=β0+ β1Controls+ β3SHA+β4BR+ β5BR2+β6INA+ β7PRJ+β8PRJ2+ ε (Equation 1)
In the model, PEL is the pollution event length, SHA is shared accountability, BR is boundary
regulation, INA is incremental adaptation, and PRJ is provider rejection. Equation 1 includes the
three polycentric practices (SHA, BR, and INA). However, we had to revise Equation 1’s
specification because of the high colinearity between reverted revisions, policy citations, and
revisions. Specifically, we follow a two-step process to estimate the unique portion of PRJ
(U_PRJ) that is not overlapped with BR and INA. We first use Equation 2 to estimate the portion
of PRJ that is overlapped with BR and INA (O_PRJ). We then use Equation 3 to compute the
unique portion of PRJ (U_PRJ) that is not overlapped with BR and INA:
O_PRJ = β0 + β1BR + β2INA (Equation 2)
U_PRJ = PRJ – O_PRJ (Equation 3)
Next, we replace PRJ with U_PRJ in Equation 1 to get the following model:
PEL=β0+ β1Controls+ β3SHA+β4BR+ β5BR2+β6INA+ β7U_PRJ+β8U_PRJ2+ ε (Equation 4)
We use hierarchical OLS regression analysis to estimate the model, adding variables in the
following order: (1) the control variables, (2) shared accountability, (3) boundary regulation, (4)
squared value of boundary regulation (BR2) to test for the hypothesized curvilinearity, (5)
incremental adaptation, (6) standardized residual of provider rejection, and (7) standardized
residual of provider rejection squared (PRJ2).
4.6.3 Results
Equation 1’s model explains 40.5% of the variance in pollution event length (where 11.9% is
explained by the control variables). Each individually added polycentricity variable uniquely
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contributes to the variance explained (Table 4.7). The variance inflation factor (VIF) values are
less than 5, suggesting that multicolinearity is not a major issue.
Table 4.7 Equation I Regressions Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Article age

.314***

.303***

.283***

.279***

.262***

.238***

.215***

Length of article

.065***

.007

-.088***

-.068***

-.052***

-.058***

-.065***

Providers before pollution event

-.521***

-.550***

-.541***

-.650***

-.654***

-.600***

-.545***

Providers before: talk page

.126***

.125***

.019

.100***

.109***

.109***

.029*

References before pollution

-.025**

.005

.075***

.054***

.043***

.030***

.055***

-.274***

-.206***

-.161***

-.172***

-.187***

-.135***

.375***

.853***

.972***

.964***

1.632***

-.493***

-.500***

-.490***

-1.17***

.262***

-.145***

-.148***

-.241***

-.447***

Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)
Policies cited in

revisions2

Model 3

(BR2)

Model 4

Revisions (INA)

Model 5

Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)
Reverted

Revisions2

Model 6

(U_PRJ2)

Model F

.347***
774***

F change
Adj. R2

Model 7

0.119

ΔR2

1,115***

1,744***

1,719***

1,545***

1,779***

1,775***

2,487***

4,477***

1,082***

107***

2,615***

1,073***

0.189

0.298

0.324

0.334

0.382

0.405

0.07

0.109

0.025

0.01

0.056

0.022

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

H1, which predicted that shared accountability (proportionate work distribution in relation to
number of providers) will reduce the length of pollution events, is supported (β = -.135, p < .0001).
H2, which predicted that boundary regulation (policy citations) will be associated with a longer
pollution event to a point and a quicker pollution resolution thereafter, is supported. Policy
citations are associated with an increase in the length of pollution events (β = 1.632, p < .0001)
and policy citations squared with a decrease in their length (β = -1.1705, p < .0001). H3, which
predicts that incremental adaption (number of revisions) will decrease the length of pollution
events, is supported (β = -.148, p < .0001). H4, which predicted that provider rejection (reverted
revisions) will be associated with a shorter pollution event length to a point and a longer pollution
event resolution thereafter, is supported.
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We find all control variables to be significantly associated with pollution event length. We find
that age of articles is associated with increased pollution event length (β = .215, p < .0001), and
article length is associated with a decrease in pollution event length (β = -.065, p < .0001). The
number of providers involved with an article prior to the posting of the cleanup template is
associated with decreased pollution event length (β = -.545, p < .0001). The number of providers
involved on the article talk page prior to the posting of the cleanup template is associated with
increased pollution event length (β = .029, p < .05). The number of references prior to the posting
of the pollution tag is associated with an increase in pollution event length (β = .055, p < .0001).
These results suggest that more-mature articles with a history of high provider involvement are
more likely to resolve any arising pollution faster.
4.6.4. Robustness and Additional Analyses
We conducted several robustness tests and additional analysis related to the impact of five key
factors: the variance in the number of pollution events across articles, the variance in the order of
pollution events, provider rejection, talk page activity, and veteran vs, new providers.
Number of Pollution Events
To test for the consistency of our hypothesized model across articles with a varying number of
pollution events, we conducted three analyses. First, we tested the model with articles that had
only a single pollution event (N=4,020). As Table B1 in Appendix B shows, the model results are
consistent with our main analysis of pollution events from articles with varying numbers of
pollution events. Second, we tested the model with articles that had two pollution events (519
articles, N=1,038). As the model results (Table B2, Appendix B) show, incremental adaptation
(revision) is no longer statistically significant in relation to pollution resolution time. Finally, we
tested the model on articles containing three or more pollution events (119 articles, N=408). As
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Table B3 in Appendix B shows, incremental adaption (revision) is positively associated with
pollution event length, suggesting that it slows down pollution resolution. The results of these
analyses suggest that incremental adaptation (revision) helps resolve pollution faster in articles
with a single pollution event, but that this association reverses itself in articles with three or more
pollution events.
Order of Pollution Events
To test for our hypothesized model’s consistency across pollution events based on their order, we
conducted three analyses. First, we tested the model across all first events in our sample (N=4,679).
As Table B4 in Appendix B shows, the direct relationship between boundary regulation and
pollution resolution time is statistically insignificant. In all other respects, the model is consistent
with the main model. Second, we tested the model across all second events (N=639). The model
results (Table B5, Appendix B) are consistent with the main model, in which we do not distinguish
between pollution event order. Finally, we tested the model across the third or more pollution event
(N=169). As Table B6 in Appendix B shows, these results are inconsistent with our main model:
(1) We detect no significant relationship between incremental adaptation and pollution resolution
time. (2) We found no curvilinear relationship between provider rejection and pollution resolution
time. This is slightly different from our research model findings. However, it is important to note
that 97 percent of pollution events in the random sample has two or less pollution events; having
a third or more pollution event is rather an atypical occurrence.
Provider Rejection
In the main specification, we incorporated U_PRJ and its squared term in the model specification
(Equation 1), as PRJ is highly correlated with boundary regulation (policy citations) and
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incremental adaptation (revision). By way of robustness, we evaluated a model with controls and
only PRJ and SHA as per the following equation:
PEL=β0+ β1Controls+ β2PRJ+β2PRJ2+ β3SHA+ ε
We used a three-step hierarchical OLS regression analysis to estimate the equation, adding
variables in the following order: 1) control variables, (2) provider rejection, and (3) squared value
of provider rejection to test for the hypothesized curvilinearity.
The model explains 24.3% of the variance in pollution event length (where 11.9% is explained by
the control variables). The addition of provider rejection and provider rejection squared uniquely
contributes to variance explained (Table 4.8). The VIF values are less than five, suggesting that
multicolinearity is not a major issue.
Table 4.8 Provider Rejection Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Article age

.314***

.329***

.337***

.335***

Length of article

.065***

-.023**

-.020*

-.109***

Providers before pollution event

-.521***

-.536***

-.609***

-.549***

Providers before: talk page

.126***

.046**

.114***

.057***

References before pollution

-.025**

.046***

.029***

.061***

.274***

.528***

.263***

-.274***

-.072***

Reverted revisions (PRJ)
Reverted revissions2 (PRJ2)
Work distribution / providers (SHA)

Model 4

-.276***

Model F

773.6

F change
2

Adj. R

.119

ΔR2

1,044.7

954.2

1,156.1

2,115.1

337.9

2,085.2

.179

.19.8

.243

.06

.019

.045

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

Our results also support H4, which predicted that provider rejection (reverted revisions) will
reduce the length of pollution events to a point and increase it thereafter. Provider rejection is
associated with an increase in pollution event length (β = .263, p < .0001), and provider rejection
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squared is associated with a decrease in pollution event length (β = -.072, p < .0001). Apart from
references before a pollution event, the control variables are statistically associated with pollution
event length.
Talk Pages
Previous research shows mixed results regarding the importance of explicit coordination;
researchers have found evidence that explicit coordination helps to improve outcomes (Arazy and
Nov 2010; Viegas et al. 2007), but also that a disproportionate amount of work is carried out in
relative isolation, without communication between contributors working on the same article
(Kittur and Kraut 2008). In our data, we find that almost all editing activity during pollution events
is devoid of explicit coordination through the talk page. An average of only 1.9 providers (SD 3.5)
participated on the talk page during an event, making an average of four revisions (SD 16.9) to it
and citing on average only 0.05 policies (SD 0.6). We performed a hierarchical OLS hierarchical
analysis adding variables in the following order: (1) control variables, (2) polycentric governance
variables, and (3) talk page variables (see Table B7, Appendix B). We find that the addition of talk
page variables adds only modestly to variance explained (adjusted R2 changes only 1.7 %) and that
our hypotheses still hold when we include the talk page variables.
Veteran and New Providers
We further examined how work distribution between veteran and new providers impacts pollution
resolution. Consistent with previous research (Panciera et al. 2009; Shah 2006), we find that
greater involvement of veterans is associated with faster pollution resolution. Interestingly,
however, we find that most of the work during pollution events is shouldered by providers new to
the article rather than by previous contributors to it. Approximately 85% of providers active during
the pollution event were not active on the article prior to the cleanup template posting; further,
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new providers were responsible for approximately three-fifths of the total aggregate edit distance
during the pollution event. This indicates that the cleanup template acts as a call for action and is
more effective at injecting new blood into the article than in rousing existing providers to improve
their work. We again performed a hierarchical OLS analysis adding variables in the following
order: (1) control variables, (2) polycentric governance variables, and (3) variable on veteran
providers. The veteran provider variables are: (a) the ratio of editors who remain active (veteran
editors of the article) in relation to all editors who were active before the pollution event; (b) the
number of veterans; (c) the ratio of veterans to all editors active during the pollution event; and (d)
the proportion, in characters, of the length change that veterans made As Table B8 in Appendix B
shows, we find that the involvement of veteran providers reduces the length of pollution events,
but including those variables adds only modestly to variance explained (adjusted R2 changes
2.6%). Again, our hypotheses hold when considering veteran’s activities.

4.7 Discussion
Our empirical analysis supports the general assertion that polycentric governance practices
influence pollution resolution in Wikipedia. Specifically, we find that shared accountability and
incremental adaptation are linearly associated with faster pollution resolution, while boundary
regulation and provider rejection have more complicated relationships. Based on these findings,
we first bring together theoretical contributions to the literature on addressing quality in OC
systems (Arazy and Nov 2010; Chesney 2006; Giles 2005; Kane 2010; Kittur and Kraut 2008;
Wöhner and Peters 2009). We then move to discuss the findings in light of PIC theory (Mindel et
al. 2018) and the implications of our findings for resolving pollution in OC systems and other
online platforms with low barriers to participation.
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4.7.1 Resolving Information Pollution in Open Collaboration Systems
Our analysis shows how shared accountability, content boundary regulation, incremental
adaptation of the output, and rejection of the work of peers affect the duration of pollution events.
We thereby expand previous work on quality management (Halfaker et al. 2011) and other research
on the importance of continuous, even mundane, contributions in OC systems (Beck et al. 2015).
Our dependent variable, pollution event resolution time—as opposed to various article quality
metrics that have been used in the past—provides new insights on quality management in OC
systems such as Wikipedia when a local quality “crisis” arises. These insights concern the
distribution and number of edits during the pollution event, as well as the use of policy citations
as a governance mechanism at the operational level.
Previous research on the connection between work distribution and quality in Wikipedia finds that
unequal work distribution, where a limited number of participants do most of the work, is
associated with higher quality of mature outputs (Kittur and Kraut 2008). Our findings add further
insight by providing evidence on how work distribution across a limited number of participants
impacts pollution resolution time. Consistent with previous work, we find that the limited number
of participants is indeed positively associated with outcomes; however, we also find that the more
equal the work distribution is across those participants, the faster the pollution resolution occurs.
Future research should examine the optimal balance between number of participants and their work
distribution in addressing quality problems as they arise.
Previous research is mixed regarding the association between the number of edits and the final
quality score of Wikipedia articles. Some studies find no relationship (Arazy and Nov 2010; Kane
2010), while others detect a positive relationship (Javanmardi and Lopes 2010; Wilkinson and
Huberman 2007). We find that, on the pollution event level, the number of edits is associated with
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faster cleanup in articles with two or less pollution events, and that it becomes associated with
slower pollution resolution in articles with three or more pollution events. This suggests that we
need more research on how governance differences impact isolated and persistent pollution.
Prior research provides insights into policy citations as a governance mechanism in Wikipedia
(Beschastnikh et al. 2008), but it does not specify how these citations relate to quality management.
Our findings suggest that policy citation—a mechanism for regulating article boundaries—at first
slows down the cleanup but, after reaching a threshold, is associated with faster cleanup. We
speculate that boundary regulation is initially likely to indicate confusion or disagreement
regarding an article’s trajectory. However, consistent boundary regulation helps better align
contributors on the article, which can stabilize its quality faster.
Finally, prior research on the revert mechanism in Wikipedia finds it to be useful for combating
vandalism (Priedhorsky et al. 2007) as a form of information pollution. However, researchers also
find that the revert mechanism sometimes creates edit wars between providers with conflicting
views on an article’s preferred trajectory (Yasseri et al. 2011). Other research finds that persistent
rejection of contributions from new participants cause them to drop out, which is
counterproductive for Wikipedia’s long-term sustainability (Halfaker et al. 2011,2013). We build
on these insights and find that reverts of revisions between participating contributors (as opposed
to individual reverts aimed at combatting attempts to presumably vandalize an article) are initially
associated with faster pollution resolution, while persistent rejection of peer work slows it down.
This suggests that the revert mechanism is effective initially for removing low-quality
contributions but, when continuously used, it discourages participants from continuing to help
clean up the article. This is consistent with past findings, yet the conceptualization of revision
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reverts as indicating peer rejection gives us better theoretical insight into their negative association
with quality management.

4.7.2 Contribution to PIC Theory
PIC outlines a multifaceted theoretical argument on how collective-action threats negatively
impact the sustainability of online systems characterized by low barriers to participation. The
theory argues that, to address collective-action threats and improve the odds of sustainability, these
systems must create the conditions for free, unstructured participation in determining the system’s
trajectory by incorporating polycentric governance practices in their design of rules and technical
features. In other words, PIC theory asserts that users should be given more freedoms and face less
restrictions in setting the boundaries, monitoring against rule violators, and gradually impacting
the adjustment of system rules and features. The argument is based on Ostrom’s (1990)
observations that polycentric governance is more effective than centralized control at sustaining
shared resource systems in the physical world. However, adapting polycentric governance from
the physical to the virtual realm is not straightforward and to date remains purely theoretical. By
examining a specific part of the theory—the relationship between the four polycentric governance
principles and the resolution of information pollution as one of five collective-action threats31—
we confirm the relationship between polycentric governance and pollution resolution and provide
some important new insights currently not addressed in PIC theory.
While we find shared accountability and incremental adaption to be directly associated with
pollution resolution as predicted in PIC theory, we find the association between boundary
regulation and pollution to be curvilinear—initially associated with a slowdown in resolution, and

31

The others are: free-riding, congestion, violations, and rebellion (Mindel et al. 2018).
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only after reaching a threshold associated with more expedient pollution resolution. Incremental
adaptation was found to speed-up resolution only in articles with a single pollution event; in
articles with three or more pollution events, incremental adaptation was found to be negatively
associated with resolution time. We speculate that repeated pollution is indicative of a difficulty
in reaching a consensus over an article’s form and content. In our random sample, only about 3%
of articles have three or more pollution events. Nonetheless, we identify here an opportunity for
future research to examine in more detail polycentric governance in the face of repeated pollution.
PIC theory did not predict the initial worsening in pollution resolution because of boundary
regulation, yet it makes intuitive sense after observing this empirically. Citing rules during a
collaborative effort to maintain its boundaries indicates that the participants are not aligned, but
after the rules have been expressed enough times, the workflow becomes smoother and faster. This
is what we believe happens during resolution of information pollution in Wikipedia—the initial
increase in policy citations indicates a state of flux, yet persistent reminders about the article’s
boundary help to get all participants aligned.
Finally, PIC theory asserts that to keep the community members engaged, they should receive
recognition for their efforts. Although Wikipedia has a couple of noteworthy provider recognition
mechanisms, those mechanisms are expressed only on the collective-choice level in the
background of article editing; no provider recognition mechanisms exist on the operational level,
where the actual provision work takes place. For that reason, we could not directly examine how
provider recognition positively relates to pollution resolution, but instead had to rely on the reverse
logic that “provider rejection”—persistent rejection of peer contributions—is likely to negatively
relate to pollution resolution. Although Wikipedia’s revert mechanism was adapted to combat
vandalism and has proven effective for that, it also has the unintended consequence of becoming
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a tool for edit wars and is used by editors with diverging views on an article’s trajectory to
undermine each other’s work. Though we have no way to know for sure, we speculate that the
negative impact of persistent rejection on pollution resolution is the combination of two factors:
multiple rejections of contributions slows down the progress of cleaning; it also discourages those
editors whose contributions were rejected from meaningfully participating in the cleaning of
pollution.
Our research also contributes to PIC theory by extending it to the operational level of polycentric
governance. In Ostrom’s (1990) seminal work, she identifies three interrelated levels of
governance: (1) constitutional, (2) collective-choice, and (3) operational. As Figure 4.2 shows, the
three levels of governance, though distinct, are very much interrelated through permeable links of
rules, policies, and feedback loops. In our research, we focus on the operational level, where
policies and rules determined on the levels of constitutional and collective-choice inform the
operational, day-to-day activities of contributors in the face of pollution.
At present, PIC theory, while mentioning the three levels, does not directly address the distinction
between levels. Better distinction between the levels of governance in the analysis of rules and
technical features, however, provides more nuance as to how polycentric practices are incorporated
in a system. In our research, we find that, while article governance hinges on the rules and technical
features determined on the constitutional and collective-choice levels, conceptualizing
polycentricity on the operational level is far from straight forward.
The principle of shared accountability refers to the general desirability of having the community
of providers participate together in governing the information commons (Mindel et al. 2018).
However, logic and past research tell us that it is impractical and counterproductive to have
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everyone participate (Kittur and Kraut 2008). Polycentricity is not about equal participation, but
rather is about the spontaneous emergence and disappearance of independent centers of influence.
We find that, in relation to pollution resolution on the operational level, it is desirable to have a
limited number of providers, yet the more equally the workload is spread among them, the better
the outcome. Thus, shared accountability on the operational level is not about how many people
show up to help, but more about how the few that self-select to show up share the workload.
Incremental adaptation is another abstract principle that appertains to the general desirability of
having the information commons gradually adapt so as to avoid “rocking the boat” too much and
also preserve the benefit of having multiple perspectives that build on previous foundations. As
such, all of Wikipedia’s guidelines and templates are continuously generated in a gradual manner
through continuous collective-choice processes. On the operational level, each single edit
represents a pattern of incremental adaptation. In our research, we examined how such adaptation
affects resolution of pollution events and find that there is a limit to how effective it can be. That
is, we find that incremental adaptation on the operational level, though helpful in most cases
(which have a single pollution event), is also associated with slower pollution resolution in articles
with persistent pollution (three or more instances).
The rules and policies, as well as the revert mechanism, which were developed in Wikipedia
through collective-choice processes over time to improve article quality and contribute to the
overarching goal of producing encyclopedic information, do not directly alleviate pollution when
employed on the operational level. Here, citation of policies determined on the collective-choice
level for regulating article boundaries slowdown pollution resolution before alleviating it,
suggesting a lag effect between the enforcement of boundaries and the redirection of an article’s
trajectory.
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Because some information commons do not have an explicit provider recognition mechanism on
the operational level, researchers must be creative in examining other factors that impact provider
motivation. Consistent with previous research (Halfaker et al. 2011,2013), we find that persistent
provider rejection through reverts of revisions slows down pollution resolution. This finding is
theoretically consistent with the notion introduced in PIC theory on the positive impact of provider
recognition, yet it also differs in two key respects: (1) Rejection has an initial positive impact on
pollution resolution time, which suggests that it—at least initially—acts as a boundary regulation
mechanism. (2) We can only speculate as to whether persistent rejection reduces the effectiveness
of pollution resolution because it slows down the cleaning process or because it causes providers
trying to help to quit. Previous research finds that rejection causes demotivation, but we suspect
that contributors might quit simply because they are frustrated with having to start over. There is
an opportunity for future research to zoom in on this question.

4.7.3 Practical Implications
Our research has implications for the management of OC systems and other online platforms with
low barriers to participation. The openness of various OC systems makes them a fertile ground for
information pollution, ranging from low-quality and erroneous information to incidental and
deliberate misinformation to uploads of disturbingly gruesome content (Chen 2014; Holman
Rector 2008; Kanter 2018; Kupferberg and Protus 2011; Lavasa et al. 2011). Further, the increase
in information pollution reduces public trust in the systems, and there have been calls to impose
more traditional regulations on them (Barrett 2018). In short, information pollution can jeopardize
the long-term viability and independence of OC systems characterized by low barriers to
participation.
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In response to such threats, systems are spending an increasing portion of their resources to employ
professional moderators to identify and remove polluted content, but even so they often concede
that it is difficult to keep up with the flood of content (Chen 2014; Kanter 2018). Moreover, many
systems do not have the means to employ content moderators and are even more vulnerable to
degeneration because of pollution.
Our findings suggest that online systems characterized by low barriers to participation should adapt
mechanisms and rules that facilitate participation in the governance of those systems. This may
often seem managerially counterintuitive, as systems under threat tend to close themselves and
seek control rather than further opening for participation. Facebook’s recent decisions to invest
greater resources into controlling and monitoring content illustrate this instinct (Kanter 2018). By
contrast, building on our insights and PIC theory, we assert that systems with low barriers to
participation may need to allow more of their users greater freedom at setting boundaries and
monitoring and adjusting the system. For instance, most open-access systems already incorporate
various flagging mechanisms that let users identify bad content; we assert that the producers of
these systems should consider going further and give some editorial privileges to trusted users. As
our findings indicate, shared accountability is not about having everyone participating, but more
about getting the right people to share the burden.
Instead of relying only on professional monitors, systems such as Facebook should find inspiration
in the polycentric Wikipedia model and experiment with ways in which the community of users
can discuss and agree on article boundaries; monitor, identify, and help remove polluted content;
and suggest new mechanisms for maintaining the system’s information integrity. There is no
general recipe for how open-access systems online should do it, but if those systems find ways to
tap into their user base—not just for participation in content provision and exchange, but also for
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monitoring and removing pollution—they will likely resolve pollution events in a more efficient
and cost-effective manner.
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Appendix A: Dataset Construction
Wikimedia Foundation makes data underpinning different Wikipedia sites freely available at
https://dumps.wikimedia.org. We downloaded a data dump for the English Wikipedia on 1 January
2017 and transformed it into a tabulated dataset following a similar approach applied in Aaltonen
and Lanzara (2015) and Aaltonen and Seiler (2015).
According to ‘enwiki-20170101-site_stats.sql’ file in the data dump, the raw data contains the full
text of 867,033,963 article revisions to 41,099,459 articles since January 2001. 5,321,706 of these
articles represent encyclopedia articles, while the rest of the articles are lists, redirects, portal pages
and other means of organizing the content, user profiles, help pages and pages that support
administrative and editorial functions such as Wikipedia policies and guidelines, categories,
templates, and more. Each article may be accompanied by a talk page that allow users to discuss
its content.
The downloaded data contains XML-formatted page records that encapsulate revision records that
is, individual edits to the page. The page record contains a header section with the page title,
namespace, id and some optional tags such as “redirect” in the example below. The header section
is followed by revision records. Each revision record contains an id, timestamp, contributor record,
the full text of the revision and some optional tags such as “comment” that is a summary of the
edit (not to be confused with talk page comments). Below is an example of page record. Note that
we have truncated the record to show only the first revision of the page and slightly altered
indentation to make it easy to perceive the XML structure.
<page>
<title>AccessibleComputing</title>
<ns>0</ns>
<id>10</id>
<redirect title=“Computer accessibility” />
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<revision>
<id>233192</id>
<timestamp>2001-01-21T02:12:21Z</timestamp>
<contributor>
<username>RoseParks</username>
<id>99</id>
</contributor>
<comment>*</comment>
<model>wikitext</model>
<format>text/x-wiki</format>
<text xml:space=“preserve”>This subject covers
* AssistiveTechnology
* AccessibleSoftware
* AccessibleWeb
* LegalIssuesInAccessibleComputing
</text>
<sha1>8kul9tlwjm9oxgvqzbwuegt9b2830vw</sha1>
</revision>
.
.
.
<page>

An exact graphical depiction of the pipeline that was used to transform the can be found in Figure
A1, together with a brief explanation of each step in Table A1. The following is a narrative
overview of the process.
We take a random sample of 340,000 articles and associated 172,576 talk pages (not all articles
have a talk page) and transform their XML records into an initial tabulated dataset using a purposebuilt Python script (Step 5, 6, 7, 8). Due to a technical limitation of our processing environment
we have dropped 5 pages from further processing due to their large size (over ~2 GB). The
transformation process stores page title and id, revision id, timestamp, user id and name, and lots
of other information for each sampled page revision. Each revision is represented by a row in the
initial dataset (output from Step 8). During the initial transformation, we also calculate a number
of further metrics such as the Levenshtein edit distance between consecutive page revisions to
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estimate the amount of content change or effort put into each revision. We also analyze the content
of each revision by matching a number of regular expression patterns against the revision content,
creating a variable for each matched pattern.
We then identified 4,924 articles with the presence of a cleanup template at some point in their
history (Step 9, 10). We further removed pages with intractable revert patterns during pollution
events to arrive at a sample of 4,679 articles and 5,487 pollution events as some articles contain
more than one event, that is, a cleanup template appears on them more than once.
Table A1 Data Pipeline Steps
Step

Label

Description

1

enwiki-20170101

Data dump download from https://dumps.wikimedia.org

2

20170216-enwiki-20170101-filenames

Creation of a list of filenames in the data dump

3

20170303-one-id

Creation of a dummy file required by the processing script

4

20170303-enwiki-20170101-page-ids

Creation of a list of page ids

5

20170703-random-sample-ids

Random sampling of article pages and their talk pages (ids)

6

20180422-enwiki-user-groups

Identification of users that belong to a particular user group

7

20180422-enwiki-regexp-analyses

Creations of regular expression patterns to analyze page and
edit summary content

8

20180501-article-sample-with-talk-pages

Transformation of XML records for the sampled pages into a
tabulated dataset

9

20180505-revision-dataset-per-polluted
page

Creation of a separate datasets that combines both page and
talk page revisions for each page with the presence of
Cleanup or Cleanup rewrite template.

10

20180507-pollution-events-dataset

Creation of an aggregated dataset with one row per observed
pollution event.
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Figure A1. Data Pipeline Graph
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Appendix B: Robustness Analysis

Table B1. Articles with Single Pollution Event Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,020)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Article age

.144***

.106***

.097***

.076***

.057***

.059***

.060***

.015

-.033

-.068**

-.095***

-.061**

-.067**

-.069**

Length of article
Providers before pollution event

-.116**

-.167***

-.317***

-.393***

-.346***

-.319***

-.307***

Providers before: talk page

.066

.103**

.142***

.225***

.201***

.174***

.173***

References before pollution
Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)

-.025

-.014

-.023

-.020

-.043*

-.058**

-.058**

-.458***

-.357***

-.273***

-.289***

-.261***

-.259***

.392***

.796***

.964***

1.051***

1.080***

-.466***

-.425***

-.350***

-.429***

-.256***

-.235***

-.207***

-.395***

-.502***

Policies cited in

revisions2

(BR2)

Revisions (INA)
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)
Model F

.134**
10.1***

F change
Adj.

R2

0.016

ΔR2

129.3***

200.3***

241***

229.3***

236.9***

216.9***

712.2***

487.8***

347.6***

79.7***

174.1***

9.7**

0.22

0.338

0.413

0.429

0.463

0.465

0.203

0.118

0.075

0.017

0.034

0.002

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

Table B2. Articles with Two Pollution Events Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=1038)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Article age

.314***

.246***

.210***

.174***

.153***

.149***

.132***

Length of article

-.028

-.082

-.090*

-.102*

-.065

-.097*

-.111*

-.423***

-.467***

-.639***

-.619***

-.615***

-.540***

-.458***

Providers before: talk page

.232**

.261***

.374***

.373***

.375***

.342***

.301***

References before pollution

-.017

.035

.049

.042

.020

.015

.012

-.370***

-.270***

-.205***

-.220***

-.208***

-.208***

.796***

.914***

1.003***

1.235***

-.441***

-.440***

-.352***

-.618***

-.155**

.048

.098

-.395***

-.830***

Providers before pollution event

Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)

.376***

Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)
Revisions (INA)
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)
Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)
Model F

.447***
16.6***

F change
Adj.

R2

ΔR2

0.077

42.7***

66.3***

68.2***

62.6***

159.4***

165.6***

55.6***

12.1**

0.201

0.315

0.350

0.128

0.114

0.036

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001
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*
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0.029

0.023
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Table B3. Articles with Three or More Pollution Events Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=408)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Article age

.352***

.316***

.281***

.255***

.240***

.216***

.187***

.015

-.044

-.067

-.048

-.030

-.083

-.091

-.329**

-.321**

-.336**

-.392***

-.403***

-.305**

-.266**

Providers before: talk page

.020

.020

.002

.029

.035

.027

.013

References before pollution

.056

.078

.064

.045

.040

.028

.034

-.314***

-.252***

-.187***

-.205***

-.185***

-.183***

.905***

1.124***

1.274***

1.886***

-.605***

.240***

-.541***

-1.22***

Length of article
Providers before pollution event

Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)

.327***

Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)
Revisions (INA)

-.030

Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)

.245

.365**

-.712***

-1.51***

Reverted Revisions2 (U_PRJ2)
Model F

.771***
8.1***

F change
Adj.

R2

0.085

ΔR2

14.8***

21.4***

24.1***

22***

24.6***

26.3***

43.8***

49.4***

31.3***

3.8

31.4***

26.4**

0.178

0.272

0.326

0.332

0.382

0.421

0.094

0.094

0.055

0.007

0.051

0.040

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

Table B4. First Pollution Event Only, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,679)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Article age

.170***

.094***

.094***

.095***

.099***

.101***

.095***

Length of article

-.018

-.073***

-.073***

-.072***

-.124***

-.135***

-.130***

-.171***

-.162***

-.162***

-.176***

-.209***

-.184***

-.189***

Providers before: talk page

.055

.050

.050

.049

.047

.036

.026

References before pollution

.017

.040*

.040*

.037*

.064*

.061***

.059***

-.428***

-.428***

-.424***

-.372***

-.364***

-.360***

.094

-.005

-.009

-.009

-.006

Providers before pollution event

Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)
Policies cited in

revisions2

(BR2)

.094***

Revisions (INA)

.077**

.057**

.226***

-.223***

-.366***

-.301***

-.215***

-.148***

Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)
Reverted

Revisions2

(U_PRJ2)

Model F

.273***
21.4***

F change
Adj. R2
ΔR2

0.023

184.8***

158.4***

146.2***

152.5***

144***

135***

978.5***

0.023

48.6***

162***

52***

34.4**

0.196

0.196

0.204

0.232

0.24

0.246

0.174

0.000

0.009

0.028

0.009

0.006

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001
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Table B5. Seconds Pollution Event Only, DV: Event Length Time (N=639)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Article age

.226***

.198***

.182***

.150***

.121**

.100*

.088*

-.081

-.135*

-.130*

-.141**

-.100

-.123*

-.128*

-.381***

-.388***

-.527***

-.526***

-.511***

-.412***

-.399***

Providers before: talk page

.192*

.182*

.258***

.271***

.268***

.236**

.227**

References before pollution

.007

.070

.091

.083

.057

.030

.041

-.332***

-.247***

-.185***

-.206***

-.181***

-.174***

.706***

.902***

1.060***

1.320***

-.432***

-.396***

-.363***

-.695***

-.275***

-.237***

-.221***

-.527***

-1.13***

Length of article
Providers before pollution event

Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)

.296***

Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)
Revisions (INA)
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)
Reverted

Revisions2

(U_PRJ2)

Model F
R2

Model 7

.536***
9.2***

F change
Adj.

Model 6

0.063

ΔR2

21.8***

28.8***

30***

29***

31***

32.3***

78.7***

58.8***

28.6***

15.3***

34.8***

29.9***

0.169

0.242

0.275

0.292

0.329

0.360

0.107

0.073

0.034

0.018

0.038

0.031

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

Table B6. Third or More Pollution Events, DV: Event Length Time (N=169)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Article age

.283**

.251**

.226**

.198**

.191*

.180*

.184*

Length of article

-.066

-.064

-.008

.058

.058

.078

.074

Providers before pollution event

-.320**

-.346**

-.377***

-.414***

-.413***

-.427***

-.423***

Providers before: talk page

.261**

.188*

-.025

-.143

-.127

-.129

-.141

References before pollution

.040

.025

.014

-.038

-.036

-.034

-.037

-.298***

-.289***

-.229***

-.234***

-.224***

-.222**

.301**

1.147***

1.217***

1.486***

1.385***

-.803***

-.804***

-.875***

-.773**

-.087

-.062

.024

-.267*

-.255*

8.9***

8.7***

7.8***

Work distribution / providers
(SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)
Policies cited in

revisions2

(BR2)

Revisions (INA)
Reverted Revisions (U_PRJ)
Reverted

Revisions2

(U_PRJ2)

Model F

-.094
5.6***

F change
Adj. R2
ΔR2

0.125

7.7***

8.4***

10***

15.5***

10.2***

15.5***

.19

4.8***

.2*

0.201

0.246

0.312

0.318

0.335

0.352

0.078

0.049

0.067

0.006

0.018

0.017

* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001
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Table B7. Talk Page Variables Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Article age

.314***

.223***

.206***

Length of article

.065**

-.083***

-.124***

Providers before pollution event

-.521***

-.534***

-.447***

Providers before: talk page

.126***

.024*

-.044***

References before pollution

-.025**

.053***

.074***

-.162***

-.167***

Work distribution / providers (SHA)
Policies cited in revisions (BR)

1.824***

1.897***

Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)

-1.127***

-1.118***

Revisions (INA)

-.307***

-.128***

Reverted Revisions (PRJ)

-1.420***

-1.338***

.738***

.719***

Reverted Revisions2 (PRJ2)
Number of editors on talk page

.189***

Policies cited in talk pages

.047***

Policies cited in talk

pages2

-.002***

Talk page revisions

.005***

Reverted revision talk page

-.267***

Reverted revision talk page2

.129

Model F

773.6

F change
Adj. R2

.119

ΔR2
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001
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1749.2

1213.6

2258.2

139.1

.401

.418

.283

.017
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Table B8. Veterans and New Provider Results, DV: Event Length Time (N=4,325)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Article age

.152***

.022

.061***

-.028

-.103***

-.047*

Length of article
Providers before pollution event

-.230***

-.236***

-.191***

Providers before: talk page

.087*

.115***

.114***

References before pollution

.019

-.010

-.006***

Work distribution / providers (SHA)

-.226***

-.201***

Policies cited in revisions (BR)

1.335***

1.272***

Policies cited in revisions2 (BR2)

-.699***

-.661***

Revisions (INA)
Reverted Revisions (PRJ)
Reverted

Revisions2

(PRJ2)

.041

-.121***

-.890***

-.839***

.429***

.383***

Ratio of remaining veterans to previously engaged editors

.042**

Number of veterans

-.106***
-.132***

Ratio of veteran during pollution event

.014

Proportion of length change by veterans

-.070***

Veteran’s edit distance during pollution event

-.006

Proportion of Veteran’s edit distance during pollution event
Model F

21

F change
Adj. R2

.024

ΔR2
* p < .05; ** p < .001; *** p < .0001

216

254.4

182.9

437.5

31

.408

.434

.385

.026

